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This thesis investigates non-arbitrariness in novel sets of signs (mappings between 
signals and meanings).  Two common ways of characterizing signs – by the degree 
of motivatedness they exhibit and by the degree of systematic compositionality they 
exhibit – are not necessarily orthogonal.  Thus, the emergence of arbitrariness and of 
systematic compositionality in language should be studied together.  We focus on a 
particular interface of the two properties: the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.  
Previous work that demonstrates how novel signs can emerge and then evolve to 
become arbitrary does not measure systematic compositionality.  On the other hand, 
previous work on systematic compositionality proposes a mechanism for the 
evolution of systematic compositionality and a measure of the property, but does not 
address the evolution of arbitrariness.  We propose a parallel theory of the emergence 
of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.  Systematic compositionality emerges 
in novel, motivated signs and is maintained as the signs become arbitrary. 
We report a series of experiments that probe how the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements arises in novel communication systems.  In Experiment 1, partners must 
create signs from scratch to communicate about items that share semantic features.  
The systematic re-use of arbitrary elements emerges.  Further, the evolution of 
arbitrariness and systematic compositionality are parallel: even participants’ first 
drawings of items are systematically compositional, and this systematic 
compositionality is maintained as the signs become arbitrary.  Experiment 2 
demonstrates that naïve participants, who played no role in – indeed, did not even 
observe – the creation of the sign systems, can nonetheless detect the systematic 
compositionality in them and generalize from it.  Experiment 3 shows that 
participants actually do make use of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements that 
they observe in others’ sign systems, when faced with the task of communicating 
(rather than learning and reproducing).  The systematic compositionality is not only 
maintained, but appears to be increasing, over generations of participants observing 





signs for items they have not observed – presumably, as they generalize using the 
systematic compositionality they have observed. 
In sum, we present an alternative mechanism for the emergence of the systematic re-
use of arbitrary elements: arbitrariness and systematic compositionality emerge in a 
parallel fashion within the dyad, and subsequent communicators maintain – or even 
increase – the structure they have observed.  More generally, we demonstrate the 
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1 Arbitrariness and systematic 
compositionality in language 
This thesis explores how a human language can come to map signals to meanings in 
the unique way that it does.  To that end, this introductory chapter lays out the key 
theoretical concepts.  In particular, it: 
• makes some preliminary clarifications about languages and signs; 
• explains what arbitrariness is, and how arbitrary conventional language is; 
• explains what systematic compositionality is, and how systematically 
compositional conventional language is; and 
• argues for considering the two properties together, and presents one way the 
two interact in language: the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements. 
It then introduces the specific question that this thesis aims to answer – how the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements emerges in a language – and lays out the 
structure of the remainder of the thesis. 
Chapter 1. Arbitrariness and systematic compositionality in language.  
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1.1 Language as a set of signs 
Human language can be thought of as a set of signs, or mappings between signals 
and meanings.1   The word “sign” has been used differently2, so we provide a few 
examples of our use here.   
1.1.1 Complexity 
Words, phrases, sentences, etc. vary in complexity, but are all strings of sounds that 
map to meanings and therefore are considered signs in this thesis.  For example, 
spoken English includes these mappings: 
"dog" ! a domesticated canine, bred in many varieties 
"love" ! to have a deep, tender feeling of affection toward a person 
"big house" ! a building in which people live, which is large in size 
compared to others 
"eat pizza" ! to chew and swallow a portion of an Italian open pie made of 
thin bread dough spread with tomato sauce and cheese 
                                                
1 The capacity to use language involves more than simply encoding and decoding signs.  The meaning 
of a signal is sometimes just a clue to the speaker’s meaning.    
2 For example, people say there is a “sign for” a certain item.  We would say there is a signal for a 
certain meaning, and reserve “sign” for the pairing of a signal with a meaning. 
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1.1.2 Modality  
People can communicate through various media.  Thus, all kinds of signals can carry 
meaning.  In this thesis, I’ll provide examples of communication in these modalities: 
• Speech.  Speech is sound, which fades quickly over time.  One can 
manipulate the pitch, loudness, etc. of it. 
• Graphics.  Graphics are two-dimensional spatial representations, e.g. 
drawings and paintings.  They have no sound.  They do not change over time, 
except during production. 
• Gestures take place in three-dimensional space, and extend into time. They 
have no sound.   
This thesis addresses how the signals of a language relate to their meanings. 
1.2 Languages exhibit arbitrariness. 
1.2.1 Arbitrariness vs. motivatedness 
Saussure (1916) argued that the basic units of language (words) are arbitrary signs - 
signs in which the connection between the signal and the meaning is arbitrary.  In 
support of this, he noted that different languages have different signals for the same 
meanings.  For example, a horse is called “horse” in English, “cheval” in French, and 
“caballo” in Spanish3.  None of these sequences of sounds has an intrinsic 
relationship with the concept of a horse; there is no natural reason why a particular 
                                                
3 The presence of multiple signals mapping to the same meaning isn’t a strong argument for 
arbitrariness.  As we will see, there are many different ways (and different degrees to which) a signal 
can non-arbitrarily relate to its meaning. 
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signal should be connected to a particular meaning.  In fact, any other sequence 
of sounds would have worked equally well4. 
Arbitrariness is so prevalent in language that one might ask how else a (linguistic) 
sign could be.  In addition to the arbitrary sign (the symbol), Peirce (1955) noted two 
other types of sign: the index and the icon. 
In an index, the signal is directly connected to the meaning in some way (e.g., 
physically or causally). For example, the presence of smoke means that there is a fire 
because the fire caused the smoke.  Also, someone’s crying means that they are in 
great distress because the distress caused the crying.  If the meaning exists, the signal 
exists – whether or not someone interprets the sign.  Thus, pure indices aren’t 
communicative (where communication is volitional); the signals aren’t generated for 
the purpose of communication. 
In an icon, the signal resembles the meaning. There are two types of iconicity: 
imagic (where a single signal physically resembles its referent) and diagrammatic 
iconicity (where the arrangement of signals resembles the relationship between their 
referents).  A linguistic example of imagic iconcity is onomatopoeia, where speech 
sounds mimic the sounds of what’s referred to, e.g., “meow” and “sizzle”.  An 
example of diagrammatic iconicity is Caesar’s “veni, vidi, vici”, where the temporal 
sequence of words reflected the temporal sequence of the events they referred to. 
Note that this distinction between imagic iconicity (similarity between a signal and 
its meaning) and diagrammatic iconicity (similarity between the arrangement of 
signals and the relationship between their meanings) depends on what a basic 
meaningful signal is.  It could be argued that “meow” also illustrates diagrammatic 
iconicity because the arrangement of “me” before “ow” reflects the temporal order of 
the sounds an actual cat makes.  Perhaps “meow” and “sizzle” both tend to be 
                                                
4 Of course, a speaker can’t utter anything he wants for a given meaning.  The sign must be 
accepted by the other speakers of the speech community.  This isn’t usually done by some 
explicit agreement but rather by following tradition – roughly, the sounds you produce when 
you mean DOG are the same your parents produced. 
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considered onomatopoeic because at least part of each string of sounds has a 
natural connection to its meaning not in virtue of the arrangement of the sounds.  For 
example, perhaps the “z” sound (or the fact that it is fricative) relates to sizzling.  It’s 
also possible that “meow” is considered an example of imagic iconicity rather than 
diagrammatic iconicity because it’s mistaken as an irreducible morpheme, i.e. 
“meow” isn’t obviously composed of meaningful units. 
There are many different ways for a signal to have a natural connection to its 
meaning.  Many involve both iconicity and indexicality. Peirce (1955) himself, when 
introducing the distinctions between icons, indices, and symbols, noted that the 
categories aren’t mutually exclusive; a sign can be part iconic, part indexical, and/or 
part symbolic. 
To begin with, what is depicted by the signal need not be the actual meaning.  If 
someone wants to refer to Robert DeNiro by drawing, they might draw not Robert 
DeNiro, but rather a taxi because Robert DeNiro starred in Taxi Driver.  (Garrod, 
Fay, Lee, Oberlander, & MacLeod, 2007)  To communicate an abstract concept such 
as love, someone might draw a heart.  To communicate the category of vehicle, 
someone might depict one particular car (an example of the category). 
Further, there are often different ways to depict any given item.  If someone is trying 
to depict a bowling ball using gesture, they could show the shape of the ball with 
their hands (perhaps by making an “O” with their two hands).  They could also show 
the motion of the bowling ball (perhaps by tracing a straight, long path on the ground 
with their finger).  They could instead depict the effect the bowling ball has on their 
body (perhaps by showing the shape their fingers make when they’re in the bowling 
ball) or the motion they make when they are bowling. 
In short, any association one makes with the meaning could be depicted, and this 
associated item could be represented in a myriad of ways.5  Since there are many 
                                                
5 This can be demonstrated.  For example, we could task people to communicate a variety of items by 
drawing, and then show that the drawings for similar meanings (say, the drawings for various people) 
are not necessarily themselves similar. 
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different ways for a signal to have some inherent connection to its meaning, 
where the distinction doesn’t matter, I will follow Saussure (1916) and conflate these 
into the category of “motivated”. 
Motivatedness (and, thus, arbitrariness) is a matter of degree because the strength of 
the (inherent) connection between a signal and a meaning can vary across signs.  
While a sign is often deemed iconic if the signal resembles the meaning at all, 
iconicity is actually a scale: the more the signal resembles the meaning, the more 
iconic the sign.  For example, a detailed illustration of a professor is more iconic than 
a sketch of a head with a mortarboard on it.  In the context of communication, 
indexicality is a scale in the same way.  For example, if fire always causes smoke 
and nothing other than fire causes smoke, then there’s a very strong connection 
between smoke and fire. 
1.2.2 Measuring arbitrariness 
To illuminate the concept of motivatedness vs. arbitrariness, we consider here how to 
measure how arbitrary a sign is. 
Keller (1998) distinguishes between two views of linguistic meaning.  Under the 
representational view, the meaning of the signal is that which it represents, or “stands 
for”.  In contrast, with an instrumental notion of signs, one asks how signs function.  
For example, Keller takes the latter view and characterizes the kind of inference 
made when interpreting a given signal (causal, associative, or rule-based), rather than 
characterizing the relationship between the signal and the meaning.6  This 
representational/instrumental distinction is helpful as we explore how to measure 
arbitrariness: we can use linguistic or psychological measures. 
                                                
6 One advantage to this approach is that it can account for the fact that a sign can function as an icon 
for one person but a symbol for another.  Another, related, advantage is that it can offer an account of 
how signs can evolve.  
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Garrod, et al. (2007) use a linguistic measure of the iconicity vs. arbitrariness of 
drawings.  They argue that the complexity of a signal is a measure of the sign’s 
iconicity – all else equal, the less information there is in the signal, the less the signal 
can resemble its meaning.  Note that this measure captures how much information 
the signal might carry about the meaning, but cannot capture how the item depicted 
in the drawing relates to the drawing’s meaning.  Indeed, the meanings of the signal 
do not factor into this measure at all. 
It is possible to construct a measure of arbitrariness that takes account of both signals 
and meanings.  Although iconicity and indexicality are properties of individual signs 
or constructions, if we found regularities across unrelated languages – certain sounds 
tending to map to certain meanings – we’d have support that these connections 
between sound and meaning are universal (and, thus, presumably inherent or 
natural).  Conversely, the fewer the cross-linguistic regularities found, the more 
arbitrary the connections must be. 
Fay, et al. (2008) offer a psychological measure of the relative iconicity/arbitrariness 
of signs: transparency to naïve overseers.  The more motivated a sign is, the more 
transparent the connection between signal and meaning.  When a sign is highly 
motivated, people who don’t know the language should nonetheless be able to guess 
the meaning from the signal.  When a sign is very arbitrary, they should not be able 
to; people need to be taught arbitrary signs.  Thus, we can measure arbitrariness as 
accuracy on identification of the meaning from the signal by a naïve overseer. 
1.2.3 How arbitrary is language? 
We’ve considered how signals can relate to meanings.  We turn now to how arbitrary 
or motivated the signs in language actually are.  We will see that, while there is some 
motivatedness in conventional languages, they make use of vast numbers of arbitrary 
signs. 
Chapter 1. Arbitrariness and systematic compositionality in language.  
 
8 
Several types of diagrammatic iconicity (in which the arrangement of signals is 
similar to the relationship between their meanings) are exhibited in language and 
literature.  For example, there is Iconicity of Complexity (Haiman, 1985), in which 
the complexity of a signal – how many signals it’s composed of, whether there are 
any embeddings in it, etc. – indicates the complexity of the concept it refers to.  
Reduplicative plurals (e.g. “p.” as the abbreviation for “page” but “pp.” for “pages”) 
are an example: producing the singular form multiple times indicates that there are 
multiple referents.  Also, relativization, subordination, and the like involve an 
increase in complexity in both signal and meaning.   
There is also a kind of secondary diagrammatic iconicity.  As in primary 
diagrammatic iconicity, the relationship between signals is similar to the relationship 
between their meanings.  But while primary diagrammatic iconicity is independent of 
any particular language (i.e. those relationships are possible in any language), 
secondary diagrammatic iconicity is not.  For example, in Caesar’s “veni, vidi, vici”, 
each verb consists of two syllables and each syllable is the same length, formed by 
the same consonant (“v”) and a vowel.  Caesar chose these three similar words to 
emphasize the similarity (in terms of ease of execution) of the three actions they refer 
to, i.e. that conquering was as easy as coming and seeing for him.  But it is only by 
chance that these three words are similar; it would not work in English.  This and 
other kinds of diagrammatic iconicity are more creative and less conventional.  That 
is, they don’t involve rules of the language but rather manipulations of it. 
There is some evidence for sound symbolism, i.e. that the individual sounds in words 
(phonemes) carry meaning.  If the sound has a natural connection to its meaning, 
then the sound symbolism is an example of iconicity.  Onomatopoeia, when speech 
imitates the sound of the referent (illustrated above) is one type of sound symbolism.  
Many languages have onomatopoeic words referring to anything from animal sounds 
(“cock-a-doodle-doo”) to the noise made in an explosion (“kaboom”).  
(www.writtensound.com)  However, the vast majority of words in any language are 
not onomatopoeic.  We’ll discuss sound symbolism further in the next chapter.  For 
now, we note that it’s unclear how prevalent such natural connections between 
Chapter 1. Arbitrariness and systematic compositionality in language.  
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signals and meanings are.  What is clear is that each of the world’s languages has 
at least thousands of morphemes.  Since a morpheme is the basic meaningful unit of 
a language (a word or word unit), it itself has no meaningful parts (parts from which 
to derive its meaning), and so it must be learned.  (If a morpheme were iconic, it 
would have smaller meaningful units, and cease to be a morpheme.7)  
Klima and Bellugi (1979) argue that, even in American Sign Language, where one 
might expect a high degree of iconicity, many of the words are arbitrary - there is 
residual iconicity but plays no role in the structural descriptions of the language or 
the way the language is processed.  
1.3 Languages exhibit systematic compositionality. 
So far we have distinguished between motivated connections between signals and 
meanings and arbitrary ones; a signal was either constrained by its meaning in virtue 
of naturalness, or not constrained by its meaning at all (except by convention).   
But there is another possibility: a sign can be non-arbitrary without having any 
natural connection to its meaning, but rather in virtue of other signs in the language.  
Consider the word “walked.”  It is not the case than any other signal for that meaning 
would have worked equally well.  Specifically, the “-ed” suffix was determined from 
the fact that the meaning is past tense.  It’s not that “-ed” has some natural 
connection to the past tense - the past doesn’t sound like “ed”.  Rather, the word 
includes that suffix because other words for past tense verbs do.  Here we introduce 
the concept of systematic compositionality, a type of non-arbitrariness that applies to 
sets of signs.8 
                                                
7 In theory, a morpheme could be motivated in virtue of its being indexical.  But pure indices seem to 
be incompatible with the volitional communication, which this thesis addresses. 
8 Diagrammatic iconicity requires the existence of multiple signs, since the similarity is between the 
arrangement of signals and the relationship between their meanings.  But it is not a property of a set of 
signs but rather of a single complex sign, akin to a linguistic construction.  This is evident from the 
fact that, the very first time someone produces a diagrammatic icon, it should be understood – the 
Chapter 1. Arbitrariness and systematic compositionality in language.  
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1.3.1 Systematic compositionality vs. arbitrariness 
An expression is compositional if its meaning is a function of the meanings of its 
parts and the way in which they’re combined.  This principle is commonly attributed 
to Frege.  (Garcia-Alvarez, 2005)  For example, the meaning of the utterance “Man 
bites dog.” includes the meanings of “man”, “bites”, and “dog” – the situation that 
the utterance refers to involves a man, biting, and a dog.  Further, the order of the 
words indicates that it’s the man biting the dog – not vice versa, not someone else 
biting both of them, not someone biting someone else and the man and dog simply 
existing, etc.    
Compositionality is closely related to combinatoriality, in which signal (or meaning) 
elements recur across signals (or meanings) but do not carry meaning. 
How does one know the meaning of the parts of an expression?  This is where 
systematicity comes in.  “Systematicity” is a broad term, usually used to refer to 
some kind of regularities across instances.  For example, Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) 
argue that cognitive capacities are systematic because some are intrinsically 
connected to each other.  They cite an example of a linguistic capacity: across 
language learners, if one knows how to say that John loves the girl, then he also 
knows how to say that the girl loves John. 
This thesis addresses the nature of the mappings between signals and meanings in 
communication systems.  Thus, we use “systematicity” to mean regularity in the 
mappings between signals and meanings across signs.9 
A language can be systematic without being compositional.  There can be a common 
frame of reference across signs that is orthogonal to compositionality.  For example, 
                                                                                                                                     
Hearer understands because the connection is natural, not because he has seen the connection 
elsewhere.  
9 Note that we are not taking account of the tokens of the sign types.  We assume that one always 
means the same thing when he says “red house” and that he always says “red house” when he means 
that. 
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imagine that someone has to refer to musical notes, but can only draw on a 
sketchpad to do so.  They might draw a tall line to refer to the highest note, a short 
line to refer to the lowest, and so on.  Even though each sign is simple (i.e. no sign is 
composed of independently-meaningful parts), there is a kind of regularity across the 
signs, and the signal for a given meaning is constrained by the existence of other 
signs. 
It’s harder to imagine, but the converse is also true: a language can have 
compositional expressions without being systematic.  For example, if one is 
explicitly taught that “zeit” means time and “geist” means spirit, he can figure out 
that “zeitgeist” means spirit of the time.  This holds regardless of whether he has 
seen “zeit” or “geist” in any other contexts. 
Despite the fact that compositionality and systematicity are independent concepts, 
it’s their combination we’re interested in here.  Thus, we focus on systematic 
compositionality: the regularity of signal elements and meaning elements across 
(complex) signs.  We consider the extent to which signals for similar meanings share 
something, and to which the meanings of signals that share something are themselves 
similar. 
Why focus on this composite property – systematic compositionality – rather than on 
either compositionality or systematicity?  While not always acknowledging it, the 
literature often addresses the combination of the two.  For example, both 
systematicity and compositionality are required for people to be able to generate 
novel complex signs (e.g., sentences) that can be understood by others.  Likewise, 
some claims about how compositionality evolves depend on the parts of signs 
recurring, not just on the signs having parts.  For example, Kirby (2000) 
demonstrates that a compositional language can be transmitted to a new generation 
of learners even though they do not observe every sign in it.  Of course, this only 
holds if the language is also systematic: if someone hasn’t learned how to express the 
specific meaning hat a man bit a dog, they cannot know how to express it unless the 
way they should express man, biting, and dog in the new context is the same as they 
observed in other contexts. 
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How else might sets of signs be?  First, sets of signs can have no systematic 
compositionality at all.  In this case, each sign would be arbitrary and thus would 
map holistically to its meaning.  That is, we would have something like a word for 
every possible meaning we’ll want to express, even the meanings composed of 
meanings that already have signals.  For example, we’d have a word to express the 
meaning that a man is biting a dog, and that word would sound nothing like “man”, 
“bites”, or “dog.”   
Second, a language can exhibit various degrees of systematic compositionality.  For 
example, idioms make a language less systematically compositional.  Consider 
“bought the farm”.  This is composed of the three parts “bought”, “the”, and “farm” 
arranged in a certain order.  The phrase should mean that there exists a farm and that 
someone purchased it.  Instead, it means that someone died.  Although both the 
signal and its meaning are complex, the signal maps as a whole onto its meaning – 
the meaning is not derived from its parts or the way its parts are put together.  Note 
that idioms can’t exist without the existence of some degree of systematicity in the 
language.  An idiom is distinguished as meaning the “wrong” thing – it’s composed 
of independently meaningful parts, and one can derive a meaning of the whole 
expression from them, but this meaning is the wrong one.  In other words, “cat”, 
“pat”, and “hat” aren’t idioms – although each is clearly composed of parts, and each 
must be learned holistically, the sounds in them never carry meaning. 
Irregulars also make a language less systematic, but in a different way.  Most past 
tense words contain “-ed” but “went” does not.  Irregulars don’t contain 
independently meaningful parts, but should.   
Having unnecessary words might be a special case of irregularity.  It’s logically 
possible that a language has morphemes only for basic semantic features.  Anything 
that could be uniquely described by listing its semantic features would be.  For 
example, if there’s only one yellow fruit in the world, there’s no need for the word 
“banana” if the words “yellow” and “fruit” already exist (and occur in other complex 
signs, contributing consistent meanings). 
Chapter 1. Arbitrariness and systematic compositionality in language.  
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1.3.2 Measuring systematic compositionality 
As with motivatedness vs. arbitrariness, we explain systematic compositionality 
further by considering how it could be measured.   
Kirby (2000), presenting simulations of the evolution of systematic compositionality, 
compares the number of rules in an agent’s grammar to the number of meanings that 
that agent can express.  An agent’s language is systematically compositional to the 
extent that the agent stores fewer rules than the meanings that he can express – his 
language cannot be a list of unanalyzed vocabulary items for complex meanings. 
Brighton, et al. (2005) define compositional languages as topographic mappings 
from signals to meanings.  That is, compositionality is defined as the degree to which 
similar signals map to similar meanings.  “Man bites dog” and “man bites cat” are 
similar signals because they share something, viz. “man bites”.  Because these signs 
are compositional10, their meanings are also similar – the meaning of each sign is 
derived from the meaning of its parts and the way they’re put together so, since they 
share parts in the same position, their meanings are similar.  In contrast, “kicked the 
bucket” and “kicked the pail” are similar forms, but their meanings are not similar.  
The similarity of the two forms doesn’t indicate similarity between their meanings.  
Thus, how topographic the set of mappings between signals and meanings is an 
indication of how compositional the language is.  Compositionality can then be 
measured as Pairwise Distance Correlation, the correlation between the distance 
between pairs of meanings and the distance between the corresponding pairs of 
signals.  (Brighton, et al., 2005)  In topographic mappings, there will be a positive 
correlation.   
RegMap (Tamariz & Smith, 2008) is a measure of the regularity in the mappings 
from signals to meanings (or vice versa).  For each possible mapping from signal 
                                                
10 To be clear, compositional languages must also be systematic in order to be topographic mappings. 
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component to meaning component, one compares the number of examples of that 
mapping with the number of counterexamples to it. 
Both Pairwise Distance Correlation and RegMap are linguistic measures, 
characterizing how signals relate to meanings.  We might instead take a more 
psychological approach.  For example, given that compositionality is defined in 
terms of how the meaning of a complex sign is derived, we could probe how people 
actually process complex signs.  This way, we could distinguish between regularities 
that exist in a language and regularities that people actually use. 
In addition to signal comprehension, signal production could be used as a measure of 
systematic compositionality.  If the systematic compositionality has a psychological 
reality, when someone generalizes to a new meaning, their signal will include the 
elements they observed in signals for similar meanings. 
1.3.3 How systematically compositional is language? 
Language does have idioms and irregularity.  Also, there appears to be much in 
language that could be systematically compositional but isn’t; it’s not the case that 
only what cannot be described compositionally is expressed with an arbitrary sign.  
Nonetheless, the degree of systematic compositionality in language is striking, 
especially when we consider the infinite set of grammatical sentences we can 
produce and understand. 
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1.4 Considering arbitrariness and systematic 
compositionality together 
1.4.1 Why look at the two together? 
We began by defining motivatedness and arbitrariness as properties of individual 
signs – roughly, whether there’s any kind of natural/inherent connection between a 
signal and a meaning.  We then introduced systematic compositionality as a property 
of sets of signs – roughly, the degree to which signal elements map to the same 
meaning elements across complex signs.  If one dimension is a property of individual 
signs and the other is a property of sets of signs, it’s tempting to view them as 
orthogonal, and dismiss the relationship between the two is trivial. 
However, although iconicity and indexicality are properties of individual signs, it’s 
sensible to talk about the relative motivatedness or arbitrariness of a set of signs.  It’s 
simply the sum of those measures on the relevant subset of individual signs.  For 
example, if all the signs in a language are highly iconic, it’s sensible to call the 
language highly iconic.  Likewise, although systematic compositionality is a measure 
on sets of signs, it’s sensible to describe an individual sign as systematically 
compositional.  If there is some systematic compositionality in a set, the systematic 
compositionality of an individual sign is how well it fits into the identified system.  
For example, the sign (compound word) “greenhouse” is partly systematically 
compositional and partly arbitrary – it’s something like a house and is often green, 
but it has a more specific meaning than just “green house”.  In the end, the two 
dimensions are both characterizing what constrains the signal one produces for a 
given meaning, and what constrains the meaning of a given signal.     
These properties – motivatedness (where the signal has an inherent connection to its 
meaning), systematic compositionality (where parts of the signal map to parts of the 
meaning in the way they do in other signs), and arbitrariness (where the signal is not 
related to the meaning in either of these two ways, but likely works just because of 
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convention) – all apply to the signals for the same meanings.  If there were a level 
of semantic representation (e.g. of features like red, person, etc.) that got motivated 
or arbitrary signs and then higher levels of semantic representation (e.g. things that 
can be described as sets of these features, like firefighter) that were systematic, we 
could address the two dimensions independently.  But this isn’t the case.  Signals for 
the same level of representation can be iconic, systematically compositional, or 
completely arbitrary. 
By looking at the two dimensions in terms of constraints on individual signs (rather 
than as properties of individual signs vs. properties of sets of signs), we can address 
why a sign takes the form that it does.  Consider briefly a set of iconic drawings for 
concepts related to primary education: teacher, classroom, teaching, and school.  
Since the drawer intended the drawing of each concept to resemble that concept, it’s 
plausible that each would contain a drawing of a blackboard.  The set of drawings 
would be technically systematic then.  Yet, one might be resistant to calling them 
systematic, because that label obscures what constrained what was drawn.  In other 
words, in this case the drawer didn’t draw a blackboard in any one drawing in order 
to be consistent with this other drawings; the systematicity was coincidental.  Now 
consider that this same person produced a drawing for school bus as well, and it 
included a chalkboard.  Now we might argue that it is systematicity, not iconicity, 
that’s constraining these drawings.  By considering the motivated vs. arbitrary and 
the systematically compositional vs. arbitrary dimensions together, we are able to 
understand what’s constraining the production of each individual signal. 
1.4.2 How the two dimensions generally interrelate 
Now that we’ve established that motivatedness, systematic compositionality, and 
arbitrariness each characterize the constraints on the signal one produces for a given 
meaning (and on what meaning one gets from a given signal), let’s take a closer look 
at how they interrelate.  In what follows, we’ll assume a certain level of semantic 
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representation, and look at what constrains the signal one produces for a meaning 
at that level. 
In some ways, motivatedness is compatible with systematic compositionality.  First, 
one could argue that iconicity is a type of compositionality.   Iconicity is defined in 
terms of the way a signal relates to its meaning: does it resemble it or not?  In this 
sense, a drawing of a professor that consists only of a drawing of a mortarboard is 
iconic.  But in order to resemble complex meanings, iconic sign will tend to consist 
of independently meaningful parts, i.e. be compositional.  Further, a set of maximally 
iconic signs will be systematic.  To the extent that there are more iconic ways to 
represent given semantic features, then the same features will be represented the 
same way across signs.  For example, the most iconic way to represent classroom 
might be to draw what the inside of a typical classroom looks like, and the most 
iconic way to represent teacher is to draw what a typical teacher looks like (including 
the environment in which a teacher is typically found: a classroom), so the drawings 
for these two related meanings will share many elements. 
In other ways, motivatedness and systematic compositionality can be seen as 
opposing pressures.  For example, systematicity is not necessarily iconic, because it 
is less constrained semantically: an element that recurs across signs can mean 
anything; it need not map to perceptual features of the referents, but could mean 
something more functional or abstract.  If someone is drawing an airplane, iconicity 
and systematicity might pull them in different directions – they can either produce a 
drawing that looks like an airplane or produce one that looks more like the other 
vehicles that have been drawn.   
1.4.3 Languages systematically reuse arbitrary elements. 
There could be relatively arbitrary or relatively systematically compositional signs at 
all but the most basic levels of linguistic analysis, including words, phrases, etc.   We 
consider here just one case of their interaction: the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
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elements.  For example, the words “big”, “red”, “apple”, and “house” are 
arbitrary, and the referring expressions “big house”, “red house”, “big apple”, and 
“red apple” systematically re-use them.   
This property – the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements – is closely related to 
Duality of Patterning.  (Hockett, 1960)  Duality of Patterning refers to the fact that, 
in human language, meaningless units combine to create meaningful units that also 
combine.  Specifically, morphemes are combinatorial - individual sounds recur 
across morphemes but do not carry any meaning - and then multi-morpheme words 
or phrases are compositional – morphemes recur across words and phrases and do 
carry the same meanings when they do.  The systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
is more general – we address how meaningful, arbitrary units combine, but do not 
address whether those units are combinatorial. 
1.5 How can the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
evolve in language? 
Interestingly, the two features we’ve been talking about – arbitrariness and 
systematic compositionality - are often cited as hallmarks of human language.  For 
example, Hurford (2004) notes that “Human language is qualitatively different from 
animal communication systems in at least two separate ways. Human languages 
contain tens of thousands of arbitrary learned symbols (mainly words)... Human 
language also has complex compositional syntax. The meanings of our sentences are 
composed from the meanings of the constituent parts (e.g. the words). “  Given the 
uniqueness of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements, the rest of this thesis 
addresses how it can arise in a human language.   
To answer this, we will survey the literature on the question in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 
3, we point out some issues about the general approach that previous work has taken, 
and offer an alternative.  Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present experiments that probe the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements in novel sign systems.  Chapter 7 concludes 
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by summarizing the main contributions of the current research, and making 





2 Previous work on how the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements can arise in a language 
In Chapter 1, we laid out the key theoretical concepts surrounding the systematic re-
use of arbitrary elements and motivated the specific question of how it can arise in a 
language.  Here we survey the literature on this question. 
2.1 What we know about novel signs 
2.1.1 People can find ways to successfully communicate in the 
absence of conventional communication systems. 
Sometimes, people are not exposed to any language.  In particular, deaf individuals 
have often found themselves in situations in which they needed to create a language 
from scratch.  Despite this, people find ways to successfully communicate.  For 
example, when a deaf child is born to hearing parents who don’t know sign language, 
he isn’t exposed to any conventional language.  Goldin-Meadow, et al. (1995) 
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showed that, despite the lack of language input, these children create a system of 
gestures to communicate with their caretakers, called homesign.  As another 
example, the Al-Sayyid Bedouin group is an isolated community with an unusually 
high proportion of deaf individuals.  Sandler, et al. (2005) describe the Al-Sayyid 
Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL) that has arisen from scratch in this community. 
Recent experimental work has pioneered the controlled study of how communication 
systems emerge and evolve.  One goal of this work is to explore how people find 
ways to successfully communicate in the absence of conventional communication 
systems, especially by creating novel signs.  For example, de Ruiter, et al. (2007) had 
subjects play a video game in which they had to cooperate in order to move their 
tokens into the correct orientation and location.  Similarly, partners in Scott-Phillips, 
et al. (2009)’s game were to move to rooms of the same colour, but could not see the 
colours of each other’s environments.  In both cases, although players had only the 
motion of their own tokens with which to communicate, most were eventually 
successful.  
2.1.2 The first signs people produce are motivated. 
When people find themselves in the absence of language, the first signs they produce 
are usually iconic or motivated in some other way, i.e. not arbitrary11.  This is very 
clear when people invent signs in the manual modality, i.e. gestures.  For example, in 
homesign, the shape and motion of an object are encoded in the shape and motion of 
one’s hands.  (Goldin-Meadow, et al., 1995)   
We see this same thing – that the first signs people produce are motivated – in the 
experimental work.  For example, the task of Galantucci (2005)’s subjects was to 
bring their agent into the same room as their partner.   Each of the rooms was marked 
with an icon, but partners could communicate using only a novel graphical channel 
that transformed their signals in an obscure way.   After a number of attempts, some 
subjects established signs that allowed them to win the games.  The signals for the 
                                                
11 Scott-Phillips, et al.  (2007) offer an interesting exception. 
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rooms varied widely across the games, but many had inherent connections to their 
meanings: representing the room’s location in the environment or the shape or the 
number of vertices of the room’s icon.  People can find motivated ways to 
graphically represent even music.  Healey, et al. (2007) presented a Music Drawing 
Task, in which subjects refer to short pieces of unfamiliar music with their partners.  
They can draw on a virtual whiteboard, but may not write letters or numbers.  Most 
of the signals they produce to solve the task make use of one of two strategies.  Some 
drawings consist of recognizable objects, figures, or scenes – these are iconic 
drawings of associations one might make to the pieces of music, e.g. a race car for a 
piece of music with a fast tempo.  Other drawings represent the structure of the 
pieces, e.g. drawing a curve with peaks and valleys that match the high and low notes 
in the piece.  Clearly, people can exploit a wide range of connections between signals 
and meanings to get communication systems off the ground. 
While we see that novel signs are motivated when people invent gestures and in the 
experiments using novel communication channels (often graphics), the reader might 
wonder how the beginnings of spoken language could be motivated.  First, as we saw 
in Chapter 1, sometimes a word can sound like what it means.  For example, many 
languages have onomatopoeia.  It’s easy to imagine how, even before any language 
has been established, someone could refer to a bear by producing a “grrr” sound.   
But it’s justifiably hard to imagine being able to sound like everything one might 
refer to,12 as some things one will want to refer to may not have a distinctive sound.  
However, sound can carry meaning in many other ways.  To start, many languages 
exhibit sound symbolism at linguistic levels below the word (e.g., clusters of 
phonemes, or even phonetic features).  For example, Parault and Schwanenflugel 
(2006) confirmed the psychological reality of seven sound symbols in English:  
• “fl-“ meaning moving light or movement in air,  
• “gl-“ meaning unmoving light,  
• “j-“ meaning up and down movement,  
• “scr-“ meaning grating impact or sound,  
                                                
12 We’ll see later that this isn’t necessary in order to get language off the ground. 
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• “sl-“ meaning smoothly wet,  
• “sn-“ meaning breath-noise or quick movement or creep, and  
• “sw-“ meaning swift movement.   
Participants were asked to generate a written definition for obsolete English words 
that either used one of the sound symbols or were non-sound symbolic.  Then, for 
each word, the participants had to choose the correct definition from among three 
distractor definitions.  Sound symbolic words yielded significantly more accurate 
definitions than non-sound symbolic words, and the correct definition was 
recognized significantly more often for sound symbolic words than for non-sound 
symbolic words. Thus, these sounds carry meaning. 
In a similar vein, Monaghan and Christiansen (2006b) demonstrate that there is a 
systematic relationship between phonological features of words and their lexical 
category.  They looked at the most frequent nouns and verbs in English and French, 
and found that in both languages the first few phonemes and especially the last few 
phonemes correctly classified the words as noun or verb significantly above chance. 
Monaghan and Christiansen (2006a) extend this work to other languages and another 
aspect of the meaning of words.  They analyzed frequent words in English, Dutch, 
French, and Japanese and found that a number of phonological cues in each 
distinguished function words from content words and nouns from verbs.  
Syntactic patterns can also carry meaning, independent of the words used in them.  
(Goldberg, 1995)  For example, it’s implausible to claim that the meaning of sneeze 
includes causing motion and yet it appears to in a sentence like “He sneezed his tooth 
right across town.”  (Goldberg, 2003)  It’s the number of arguments that “sneezed” 
appears with that gives it this meaning.  The syntactic patterns in which a verb 
appears provide information about its meaning, since its meaning must be consistent 
with the patterns’ meanings.  Fisher, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1991) demonstrate the 
existence of a number mappings between the syntax and the semantics of verbs - 
verbs that were judged to share certain syntactic properties were also judged similar 
in meaning.  For example, mental verbs such as “believe” are associated with the 
sentential complement pattern (e.g., “She believes that the apple is rotten”).  Lidz, 
Gleitman, and Gleitman (2003) suggest that some of these mappings between 
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syntactic patterns and the meanings of words may even be universal.  They show 
that, across divergent languages (Kannada and English), child native speakers used 
the number of arguments of the verb to derive an aspect of its meaning, its 
causitivity.        
Similarly, such sound-meaning correspondences may be universally understood.  For 
example, Japanese has words that mimic voices and also words that mimic manners 
or states (which don’t necessarily have sound).  Iwasaki, et al. (2007) showed that 
native English speakers, with no previous experience with Japanese, are sensitive to 
aspects of the meaning of some of these mimetic words.  They had native English 
speakers and native Japanese speakers rate various Japanese mimetic words for 
laughing and walking on several semantic dimensions each.  For example, each 
participant had to rate “yota-yota” (the manner of walking with heavy, faltering 
steps) on semantic dimensions such as from purposeful to aimless, from big strides to 
small strides, and from graceful to clumsy.  Surprisingly English speakers’ ratings 
agreed with Japanese speakers’ ratings for many of these semantic dimensions.   
Imai, et al. (2008) further explored the non-arbitrary mappings between sounds and 
manners of action.  They created novel Japanese mimetics expressing different 
manners of walking, based on previous work describing what meanings the 
individual sounds carry.  For example, they created the novel mimetic “hyaihyai” for 
semi-swift walking with light, playful steps, as ‘‘h” has been shown to express 
weakness and unreliability and ‘‘y” has been shown to express leisurely, unreliable 
motion.  For each novel mimetic, they created two video clips with a character 
walking in a manner that either matched or did not match the mimetic.  English 
speakers with no prior experience with Japanese then rated how well the mimetic 
matched the action in each video.  The English speakers rated the matching actions 
as a significantly better fit than the non-matching actions.  Other English speakers 
heard each novel mimetic and were asked to choose, between the matching and non-
matching videos for it, which action the word referred to.  They chose the matching 
action at a level significantly above chance.  Thus, even people who don’t know any 
Japanese have some information about how the sounds map to manner in it.  This 
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suggests that the mimetics found in Japanese use associations between sounds 
and meanings that may be universal. 
One can also find sound-meaning correspondences that are actually instantiated 
cross-linguistically.  For example, Nuckolls (1999) reviews cross-linguistic evidence 
that high front vowels (such as in “heed”) tend to express diminutive concepts such 
as physical smallness, quickness, brightness or lightness, singularity, and attitudes 
such as affection.   
By surveying the world’s languages, we find surprising ways that sounds – from 
whole words down to phonetic features – carry meaning.  We can also probe the 
associations people make to sound experimentally.   
First we note synaethesia, a neurological condition in which people make odd cross-
modal associations, e.g., see certain words in certain colours.  Ramachandran and 
Hubbard (2001) suggest that synaethesia may be the extreme form of normal cross-
modal associations which helped to get spoken language off the ground.  
Marks (1974) began to probe this by presenting (normal) participants with squares of 
gray paper that varied in their brightness (from black through white).  For each, the 
participants varied either the pitch or the loudness of a tone until it “matched” the 
brightness of the gray.  Participants reliably associated brighter values with higher 
pitched and louder tones. 
Marks (1987) used a classification task to reveal associations between sound and 
vision.  He created stimuli that had both an auditory and a visual component.  Each 
participant’s task was to make a binary judgment about one of them (i.e. to ignore the 
other).  For example, the participant might see a light while hearing a tone, and have 
to judge whether the light was dim or bright, but make no judgment about the tone.  
They found that lightness and brightness affected the response time to pitch and, 
conversely, pitch affected the response time to lightness and brightness.  For 
example, participants classified the lightest stimulus (white) significantly faster when 
it appeared with a high-frequency tone than with a low-frequency tone, indicating 
that light visual stimuli are congruent with high-frequency tones.  They found other 
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cross-modal interactions: between the loudness of a sound and the brightness of 
an image, and the pitch of a tone and the shape (round vs. sharp) of an image.   
Using a similar paradigm, Ben-Artzi and Marks (1999) explored the non-arbitrary 
connections between the (spoken) words “high” and “low”, pitch, and position.  They 
created eight three-dimension stimuli: the words “low” or “high” spoken in either a 
low or high pitch presented to the participant through either low or high speakers.  
Participants were instructed to classify the stimuli as high or low according to just 
one of the dimensions.  In general, participants were quicker to classify when the 
values on the irrelevant dimensions were congruent with the value on the relevant 
dimension.  For example, classification by position was significantly faster when the 
pitch and the word were congruent with it (viz. also high or low) than when they 
were incongruent. 
Reilly, et al. (2008) demonstrated that there are non-arbitrary connections between 
colours and tones.  They paired colour swatches that varied in hue and brightness 
with tones (which vary in frequency).   Participants answered whether or not the two 
were a good match.  Participants matched hue to the frequency of the tone linearly: 
the higher the wavelength of the colour, the lower the frequency of the tone.  For 
example, the vast majority of participants endorsed the match of a 190 Hz tone with 
a dark blue colour swatch.  There was also an interaction between brightness and 
frequency of the tone.  Reilly, et al. also paired novel objects with pseudowords and 
found interactions between the phonology of the pseudowords and the hue and 
animacy of the objects. 
Simner, et al. (under review) demonstrated non-arbitrary relationships between 
features of speech and types and concentrations of taste.  Participants received drops 
of 12 tastes: sweet, sour, bitter, and salty at three different concentrations each.  
Their task was to adjust settings on four different sound continua to match each taste.  
The four sound continua represented qualities of speech: vowel height, vowel 
backness, voice discontinuity, and overall acoustic energy.  They discovered a 
preference for mapping increasing concentrations of taste to certain phonetic 
features: lower, more front, and more staccato vowel sounds, as well as sounds with 
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higher overall acoustic energy.  Participants systematically mapped types of taste 
to certain phonetic features as well.  For example, sweet tastes were judged to have 
higher vowels than bitter tastes, to match more continuous vowel sounds than salty 
tastes, and to have lower overall acoustic energy than bitter, salty, and sour tastes. 
Thus, there are many ways vocalizations can be motivated.  So far, previous work 
has illuminated non-arbitrary relationships between sound and at least the hue, 
brightness, and lightness of colour; spatial position; animacy; diminutiveness 
(smallness, quickness, singularity, affection, etc.); shape; the type and concentration 
of taste; and various manners of activities (laughing, walking) and movement (e.g., 
of light). 
If vocalizations still seem to be limited in their expressiveness, note that we need not 
assume that the beginnings of spoken language consisted of only spoken signals.  As 
Bickerton (2003) notes, language probably began as “a mixture of anything that 
might serve to convey meaning.  The original mixture of isolated grunts and gestures 
may have eventually settled on the vocal mode merely through the exigencies of 
communicating at night, over distance, or in dense vegetation.” (p. 81)  If this is the 
case, people could use more than speech to convey their meanings.  Even if it seems 
like speech could not be very motivated, people could add information using other 
modalities to establish these speech signs. 
In order to show that the first signs people create can be motivated, we have shown 
that people exploit inherent connections between the meanings they want to express 
and the signals they can produce.  It’s important to note that one need not signal the 
actual meaning.  There may be many associations to a given meaning that one can 
encode in order to convey that meaning.  For example, in a game of Pictionary, one 
might draw a taxi for Robert DeNiro because Robert DeNiro starred in the movie 
Taxi Driver.  (Garrod, et al., 2007)  That’s not a drawing of Robert DeNiro, but 
rather of an association to him.  Examples like this can be found in homesign as well. 
Homesign gestures don't always represent the perceptual features of the object, but 
sometimes of the hand as it grasps the object or the path of motion of the object 
instead. (Goldin-Meadow, et al., 1995)  Also, most of the homesign systems in 
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Goldin-Meadow, et al. (1995) had at least one category of event that wasn't based 
on perceptual features, but rather on a semantic factor (such as vehicles or animate 
objects).  Thus, even though someone might not be able to sound like (or look like, or 
act like, etc.) a particular meaning he’d want to express, he could sound like 
something associated to it. 
2.2 What we know about how signs can change 
If the first signs people create are motivated, how do they become arbitrary?  We 
turn now to what we know about how signs change. 
Various kinds of semantic change have been documented, in particular by 
Bloomfield (1933).  As an example of just one type of change, the meaning of the 
word “meat” narrowed – it used to mean food in general but now includes only 
edible flesh.  Different forces for change have also been identified.  For example, 
Grzega and Schoener (2007) name, among many other factors, the increasing 
dominance of a prototype.  One example is how “kleenex”, the name of a particular 
brand of tissue, became the prototypical example of tissues and is now used to refer 
to any kind of tissue.  An overarching theme in the literature on semantic change is 
that people extend their use of a particular signal to meanings that are similar to the 
original in some way, as opposed to extending the signal to unrelated, randomly-
selected meanings. 
Usage-based models of language (Bybee, 2006; Croft, 2005), cite frequency as a 
major pressure for language change.  In these models, someone’s grammatical 
knowledge does not consist in a static collection of rules, but rather is continually 
shaped by their experience using language.  The frequency of signs plays a leading 
role in language change: frequently-used signs are entrenched, affecting how they’re 
processed.  For example, Bybee and Scheibman (1999) show that the word “don’t” is 
reduced (phonologically) most in the most frequent environments in which it 
appears, such as in “I don’t know.” 
In addition to observing how conventional languages have changed, we can explore 
experimentally how people adapt their use of conventional language.  A large body 
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of research has demonstrated how interaction in a dialogue constrains the 
production and comprehension of referring expressions, allowing communication 
partners to converge on linguistic descriptions of items (by converging on 
conceptualizations of them) and, sometimes, shorten those descriptions.  (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & 
Doherty, 1994; Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Schober & Clark, 1989)  
2.2.1 Spotlight on graphical communication experiments 
The Concept Drawing Task (Garrod, et al., 2007; Healey, Garrod, Fay, Lee, & 
Oberlander, 2002) extended this work by prohibiting subjects from using 
conventional language.  This approach is particularly appropriate when investigating 
the emergence of a property that conventional language already possesses, such as 
the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.  In this way, we can see what signs 
subjects create and how those signs evolve.  Each round, one of the subjects (the 
“Drawer”) has an ordered list of concepts and the other (the “Matcher”) has an 
unordered list of the same concepts.  The Drawer takes each of the concepts in turn 
and produces a sketch for it on virtual whiteboard they share, so that the Matcher can 
identify the concept.  Players can draw whatever they like but may not write 
anything, such as letters or numbers.  Pairs play for a number of blocks, so that each 
concept is drawn and identified several times over the course of the game.  We can 
then examine how the signals for the meanings changed over time. 
2.3 What we know about getting arbitrariness 
Motivated signs can become arbitrary through interaction.  Among other measures of 
how the signals for the items changed with interaction, Garrod, et al. (2007) found 
that graphical complexity (roughly, the amount of virtual ink used) decreases.  They 
argue that this complexity is a measure of iconicity – all else equal, the less 
information there is in the signal, the less the signal can resemble its meaning – thus 
showing that signs become more arbitrary with interaction.  
Fay, et al. (2008) measure the motivatedness vs. arbitrariness of signs as 
transparency to naïve participants.  They find that the signs produced by pairs of 
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participants in a community retain their transparency over the course of 
interaction better than the signs produced by isolated pairs. 
This move to arbitrariness is also seen in sign languages. Frishberg (1975) argues 
that there was a strong tendency for signs to become more arbitrary rather than 
maintaining a level of iconicity in American Sign Language (ASL).  For example, 
the sign for “we” was a series of separate thrusts, first at one’s own chest and then at 
three or four other persons (real or imagined) and then at one’s own chest again.  
Today, the sign consists of two touches on the chest, with a small, smooth sweep of 
the wrist or arm between the touches.  This lexicalization represents a move “from a 
composite, explanatory, and iconic representation of the notion of ‘we,’ to a 
conventionalized, more arbitrary form.”  In fact, Goldin-Meadow, et al. (1995) argue 
that, for all gestural communication systems, iconicity acts as an organizing principle 
only in the earliest stages. 
2.4 What we know about getting systematic 
compositionality 
2.4.1 There are suggestions of systematic compositionality in 
novel sign systems, but no measures of it. 
We now see how arbitrariness can emerge in a novel communication system; what 
about systematic compositionality?  These above studies don’t measure the degree to 
which signals for similar meanings share an element.13  Some provide examples of 
novel sets of signs that appear to exhibit systematicity (De Ruiter, et al., 2007; 
Galantucci, 2005; Healey, et al., 2007), but the recurring elements appear highly 
iconic.  That is, we don’t find the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements there.  
Garrod, et al. (2007) provide an example of the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements: one pair’s successive drawings for “art gallery”.  Each contains three 
elements: an iconic drawing of a building, something like a “less than” symbol, and 
an iconic drawing of a painting.  They note that the building element became 
                                                
13 Healey, et al. (2007) offer a measure of a sense of “systematicity” (viz. the use of a common frame 
of reference when producing signals) that is more general than ours here. 
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associated with all and only the institutions in the set of concepts, and describe 
how the building and painting elements simplified to become more arbitrary.  As 
they don’t actually measure systematicity, it’s left open how common this 
systematicity is across pairs, and how early this systematicity emerges with respect to 
the evolution of arbitrariness.  For example, did the building element occur in 
drawings for institutions other than art gallery (say, for parliament) while it was still 
very iconic?  Or did the pair change its drawings for the other institutions later in the 
game? 
2.4.2 Synthetic and analytic protolanguage theories 
Language evolution researchers theorize about what a protolanguage could have 
looked like, and how it then could have evolved into a proper language.  Hurford 
(2000) identifies two dominant views of the move from protolanguage to language: 
synthetic and analytic.  On the synthetic view, the signals in protolanguage had 
atomic meanings.  These were then strung together to make the kinds of phrases and 
sentences we find in language.  On the analytic view, the meanings of the signals in 
protolanguage were complex.  They were then dissected to produce signals for 
atomic meanings, more like the words we find in language.  
Wray (1998) takes the analytic view.  Specifically, she envisages the signs in 
protolanguage being processed holistically, much as idioms (e.g., “that’s the way the 
cookie crumbles”) are today.  She suggests that the signals would share phonemes 
with each other and the meanings of the utterances would share elements.  For 
example, “mebita” might mean GIVE HER THE FOOD, “ikatube” might mean 
GIVE ME THE FOOD, and “kameti” might mean GIVE HER THE STONE.  By 
chance, “mebita” and “kameti” share a syllable and also share an element of their 
meaning.  A language learner analyzing these utterances could infer that “me” means 
HER.  Generations of learners could chip away at the analysis of the language. 
Tallerman (2007) argues that this holistic approach is fundamentally flawed.  One 
problem she notes is that, since recurrences between elements of the signal and 
elements of the meanings are chance, there should be at least as many 
counterexamples as there are examples of any putative word.  Some of these 
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criticisms are addressed by K Smith (2006).  Regarding the number of 
counterexamples outweighing the number of examples, he notes that whether it’s a 
problem depends on how the language learner deals with counterexamples – perhaps 
people analyzed the utterances whenever they noticed a recurrence, and simply 
ignored counterexamples to it.   
Debates over the nature of protolanguage are heated, but some work tries to bridge 
the gap.  K. Smith (2006) proposes that the analytic and synthetic views may be 
compatible with each other, if protolanguage consisted in a series of stages.  In a 
similar vein, A. Smith (2008) suggests that protolanguage utterances had varying 
levels of semantic complexity.  As such, people used both concatenation and 
segmentation.   
With respect to systematic compositionality, we note another way the views 
converge: in both, the mappings between signals and meanings in protolanguage are 
assumed to be arbitrary; protolanguage is assumed not to be systematically 
compositional.  To foreshadow the approach taken in this thesis, we suggest another 
possibility: that novel signs are systematically compositional, and they are so 
because novel signs are motivated and motivatedness often implies concatenation. 
2.4.3 Spotlight on the Iterated Learning Model of the evolution of 
compositionality 
The Iterated Learning Model (Brighton, et al., 2005; Kirby, 2000, 2001; Kirby, 
Cornish, & Smith, 2008) demonstrates how a set of arbitrary signs could become 
systematically compositional.  Here’s how it works in a nutshell: even in a set of 
arbitrary signs, the signals for two similar meanings (e.g., that John loves Mary and 
that Bill loves pizza) might share something (e.g., the syllable “ka”).  A language 
learner might note this mapping between signal element and meaning element.  Now, 
a person doesn’t learn signals for every meaning he’ll want to express in his lifetime.  
(For example, I want to express that I’m writing a dissertation on non-arbitrariness in 
novel communication systems, but no one ever expressed that exact meaning to me.)  
When one wants to express a meaning he hasn’t learned a signal for, if that meaning 
contains the same element (here, loves) as the mapping, he could generate a signal 
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that includes the signal element (here, “ka”).  Over generations of people 
replacing arbitrary signs this way, the language becomes more systematically 
compositional.   
The model is simple.  There’s a set of possible meanings.  In one implementation, 
each is represented as a predicate-argument proposition taking a limited set of atomic 
arguments, like eat(tiger, john).  In another, each meaning is an item with one of 
three possible shapes, one of three possible colours, and one of three possible 
motions. 
There’s also a set of possible signals.  These are strings of various (but usually 
limited) lengths composed of letters or syllables from a finite set.   
Crucially, the set of meanings and the set of signals are both combinatorial.  This 
makes it possible for two meanings to share an element, for two signals to share an 
element, and for the language to be systematic compositional (where signals that 
share an element map to meanings that share an element). 
In its simplest implementation, the model starts out with two agents: A and B.  (For 
ease of explication, A is male and B female.)  Agent A produces signs; he’s assigned 
a random proper subset of the possible meanings and, for each, generates a random 
signal.  Agent B learns all of his signs, i.e. she stores all the mappings between 
signals and meanings he produced.  For example, A might produce, and B might 
learn, a set of signs including: 
sdx ! loves(john,mary) 
lkq ! loves(mary,john) 
Crucially, B generalizes from the signs whenever she can.  By chance, two signs 
might permit a generalization: the signals for two similar meanings, i.e. meanings 
that share an element, might have also shared an element, as in: 
filg ! admires(mary,john) 
finv ! admires(pete, john) 
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B can spot the mapping between the signal element and meaning element that 
recurs in these two signs, and stores it14: 
fi X ! admires(X, john)  
She then simply creates mappings between what’s left of the signal and what’s left of 
the meaning, for each sign: 
lg ! mary 
nv ! pete 
Eventually, A dies, B becomes a sign producer, and a new sign learner (C) is born.  
Like A was, B is now assigned a random proper subset of the possible meanings to 
express.  But unlike A, B knows some signs already.  If B has learned a mapping 
between the meaning she is to express and a signal, she utters that signal.  If she has 
learned no mapping for any part of the meaning, she utters a random string.  She can 
also use what she learned from generalization when producing a signal for a 
meaning.  If she has learned a mapping between part of that meaning and a (sub-
)signal, she utters that and then utters random strings for the rest of the meaning. 
The model goes on for many generations.  In each, the producer dies, the learner 
becomes the producer, and a new learner is born.   
This Iterated Learning Model work consistently finds that systematic 
compositionality increases over generations. (We have already reviewed the ways 
that systematic compositionality is measured in this Iterated Learning Model work, 
in Chapter 1.) This works because the signal-meaning mappings in a compositional 
language are more general than those in an irregular language.  A mapping between a 
part of a string and a part of a meaning can be observed in more than one (complex) 
sign, whereas an irregular mapping between a complex signal and a complex 
meaning will necessarily be observed less frequently.  For example, one is less likely 
                                                
14 The actual rules in this particular implementation of the Iterated Learning Model are more complex, 
taking account of grammatical categories.  We simplified them here because we are interested in 
compositionality only. 
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to have heard someone express that they are writing a dissertation on non-
arbitrariness in novel communication systems than they are to have heard someone 
express anything at all about a dissertation.  This matters when learners observe only 
a subset of the language, because then the mappings between signal elements and 
meaning elements are more likely to be observed and used in the next generation.  
Conversely, irregular rules will die out unless they happen to be observed by every 
generation. 
The Iterated Learning Model can also explain how languages can retain a degree of 
irregularity.  Kirby (2001) introduced noise to the signals produced, so that part of 
the signal was deleted at random.  This would sometimes make a regular signal 
irregular.  In addition, the frequency distribution of the meanings expressed became 
non-uniform (so that some meanings were expressed more often than others).  
Irregular signals that were mapped to frequent meanings remained in the language 
because they were observed and subsequently used by every generation.  
In sum, the Iterated Learning Model starts from a set of signs that are arbitrary but 
combinatorial: the set of signals is combinatorial, the set of meanings is 
combinatorial, and mappings between the signals and the meanings is arbitrary.  By 
chance, similar signals will sometimes map to similar meanings.  Agents notice these 
chance recurrences between signal elements and meaning elements, and use them 
when generating signals for meanings (that they have not learned signals for).  An 
agent will learn the signals for only some of the meanings he will eventually need to 
express.  This provides the opportunity for each generation to replace irregular signs 
with more compositional ones. 
One might doubt how well this model matches the behaviour of real human learners.  
However, Kirby, et al. (2008) demonstrates that systematic compositionality evolves 
in generations of human experimental participants as well.  Each participant learns an 
"alien language" and then is tested on it. The language consists of words for a highly 
structured set of items (27 items, where each is one of three shapes, is one of three 
colours, and has one of three motions).  The words that the first participant learns are 
also highly structured; they're randomly generated strings of syllables, but there are 
Chapter 2. Previous work.  
 
36 
only 9 syllables used.  Each subsequent participant learns the words that the 
previous participant produced during his test.  There is an observation bottleneck: 
each participant is trained on only half of the language but tested on the whole 
language. 
Kirby, et al. (2008) examine how the languages change as they’re learned and 
reproduced by each participant in the chain.  They find that the languages become 
easier to learn: the language that the last participant produces during her test matches 
her input language (of which she's observed only half) better than the language the 
first participant produced did.  Further, the languages become increasingly 
structured: similar meanings are expressed using similar signals to a greater extent in 
the last generation than in the first generation. 
2.4.4 The emergence of systematic compositionality is tied to the 
need to express new meanings. 
Selten and Warglien (2007) confer that compositionality is tied to the need to express 
new meanings.  They ran a communication experiment where the meanings are 
highly structured: each item is one of a few shapes, with one of a few inserts (or 
none), with one of a few colours (or not coloured).   These semantic features are 
introduced in stages.  For example, the items referred to in the first rounds are just 
shapes, but in the next round they’re shapes with inserts.  The possible signals are 
also highly structured – each round, the participants are allowed to construct signals 
from just a few letters.  There is usually one letter per feature value.  For example, if 
there are three possible shapes, three possible inserts, and three possible colours, 
there will be nine letters.  There’s a pressure to be compositional because there’s a 
cost for using each letter, so one is motivated to avoid long signals.  There’s also a 
pressure to converge on signs with one’s partner because that’s how one earns points. 
They find that compositionality has some benefits.  For example, pairs with 
compositional grammars in the middle of the game were able to extend them when 
they had to assign names to new items.  Pairs with noncompositional grammars 
weren't.  Also, compositional signs are more successful in environments with 
novelty.  In one condition, there’s a round where every item is a brand new 
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combination of old features.  The pairs who had compositional signs scored more 
points.  That suggests that compositional grammars balance the pressure to reduce 
production effort with the pressure to converge on a set of signs with one’s 
communication partner better than ungrammatical communication systems. 
They also find that compositional systems are more likely to arise in certain 
conditions.  Specifically, pairs assigning signals to novel items are more likely to 
develop compositional grammars than those assigning signals to items they had seen 
before (but not with each other - each had played with a different partner in the 
previous session). 
2.4.5 Homesign 
Thus far, we have seen that work on novel signs tends not to address systematic 
compositionality directly, and work on systematic compositionality starts from 
artificial – not novel – signs and thus cannot address arbitrariness directly.   
Goldin-Meadow, et al. (1995) aim to capture a longer timeframe, addressing how 
systematicity arises in homesign.  They studied the gesture systems of four 
homesigning children from when they were around three years old to when they were 
around five years old, over the course of seven sessions.  Each gesture had a 
handshape and motion component, and they found that most gestures (i.e. 
combinations of specific shapes and motion) in the beginning of the study didn’t 
refer to more than one event.  By the end of the study, however, the children did 
extend gestures to more than one event.  Specifically, the number of gestures used 
for more than one event increased over the sessions for three of the four children.  To 
explain this result, they propose that the children move from a state in which they 
consider each of their gestures only in relation to the event it refers to, to one in 
which they consider their gestures in relation to each other as well.  Only when a 
child does, Goldin-Meadow, et al. (1995) claim, does he notice that a particular 
gesture component (e.g., a particular handshape) recurs across gestures with some 
aspect of their meanings in common (in this case, presumably the shape of the 
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object).15  At that point, these recurring gesture components can “be separated 
from the wholes and treated as component parts”, i.e. used productively.  The effect 
is that very similar events (similar with respect to the semantic dimensions encoded 
by both gesture components) will be described with the same gesture.   
This is an interesting theory, but several questions remain.  For example, particular 
gesture components are used in gestures for different items from the beginning of the 
study.  What makes the children suddenly notice recurrences that have been present 
all along?  Further, in the beginning of the study, wouldn’t a child have extended a 
particular gesture to a second item if that item had been similar enough to the first?  
If a child wanted to refer to an event with the same shape and motion as an event 
already referred to, and his other gestures are iconic, why would this gesture be any 
different?  Unfortunately, this possibility was not tested. 
What else might explain this result that gestures are increasingly extended to more 
than one event?  It’s possible that the children are categorizing more over sessions.  
For example, if a child begins to ignore the difference between being 1” wide and 
being 2” wide, characterizing each as simply narrow, then items that differ only 
slightly will come to be described with the same gesture.  Thus, this homesign work 
suggests that a set of iconic signs can become systematic through categorization. 
Unfortunately, Goldin-Meadow, et al. (1995) do not compare the systematicity of the 
children’s gesture systems in the beginning of the study to that at the end.  Although 
they examine how the gestures change in other ways, when addressing systematicity, 
they consider each child’s system as if it were stable across the sessions.  
                                                
15 They call the regularities (the specific gesture components recurring in gestures for similar 
meanings) “haphazard”, but this seems unlikely, given that the gestures are motivated.  If the gestures 
for two different items include the same handshape component, it could be because the two items have 
similar shapes. 




To summarize, previous work has demonstrated how novel signs can emerge and 
then evolve to become arbitrary, but does not measure systematic compositionality.  
Work on systematic compositionality proposes a mechanism for and measure of the 
evolution of systematic compositionality, but starts with arbitrary signs (i.e. does not 
address how arbitrariness emerges).  Thus, there is a gap in the literature: it’s not 






This thesis explores how the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements arises in a 
language.  In the previous chapter, we surveyed the literature addressing this 
question.  We saw that the signs people create are often motivated and that they can 
become arbitrary through interaction, but we did not learn much about how 
systematically compositional these novel signs are.  We also saw how systematic 
compositionality can evolve in an artificial set of arbitrary signs in which both the set 
of signals and the set of meanings is structured, but this work did not directly address 
how novel signs might get to this stage.  Thus, previous work has not painted a 
complete picture of how the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements evolves in novel 
sign systems.  In this chapter, we offer an original hypothesis to fill this gap. 
3.1 The parallel theory of the emergence of the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
Of course, the simple combination of these two lines of research could produce the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements: first motivated signs evolve to become 
arbitrary, and then systematic compositionality evolves in that set of arbitrary signs.  
We’ll call this the serial theory of the emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements.   
We propose another possibility: the parallel theory of the emergence of the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.  In it, the emergence of arbitrariness and the 
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emergence of systematic compositionality are not necessarily serial.  Rather, 
novel signs make two potentially overlapping transitions: one to arbitrariness and the 
other to systematic compositionality.  
How might this happen?  There are two cases to be made here.  First, systematic 
compositionality can emerge before signs have become completely arbitrary.  
Second, systematic compositionality can be maintained as signs become arbitrary.  
We argue these in turn now. 
3.2 Systematic compositionality can emerge before 
signs have become completely arbitrary. 
Let’s first recall that novel signs are likely to be motivated.  This is intuitive – if 
someone produces signals in order to convey meanings, they will choose signals that 
have some connection to those meanings.  Otherwise, how can they expect anyone to 
recover their meanings?  Further, the experimental work reviewed in Chapter 2 
demonstrates that novel signs indeed tend to be motivated. 
3.2.1 Due to chance 
We know that systematic compositionality can emerge in a set of arbitrary signs, as 
long as the signals share elements with each other, the meanings share elements with 
each other, and it’s possible for similar signals to map to similar meanings.  (Kirby, 
et al., 2008).  (Specifically, someone might notice a chance recurrence between a 
signal element and meaning element, e.g., that the names for two red things both 
include “ki.”  They might then use the mapping when speaking about a similar thing, 
thereby increasing the chance that someone else notices the regularity and does the 
same, and so on.)  Although this was shown to hold for a set of arbitrary signs, 
there’s no reason to believe that motivated signs (or signs falling anywhere on the 
motivated – arbitrary continuum) won’t meet these conditions as well. 
3.2.2 Due to motivatedness 
The motivatedness of novel signs offers additional opportunities for systematic 
compositionality to emerge.   
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Immediate systematic compositionality due to motivatedness.  A set of 
motivated signs might be systematically compositional from its birth.  If someone 
wants to refer to two items with something in common (e.g., two edible items), it’s at 
least plausible that they would produce similar signals for them (e.g., signals each 
involving a chewing motion of the mouth).  Thus, a set of signs produced by this 
person could exhibit systematic compositionality, in which signals that share 
elements map to meanings that share elements.  We introduced this relationship 
between motivatedness and systematic compositionality in Chapter 1. 
Increasing systematic compositionality in motivated signs.  Whether or not a set 
of motivated signs exhibits systematic compositionality immediately, i.e. from its 
birth, systematic compositionality can easily increase in a set of motivated signs.  
This could be due to categorization.  People might increasingly categorize semantic 
features, ignoring small differences in meanings (e.g., that one item is 1” wide and 
another 2”).  In this case, in the initial sign system, few signals would share elements 
because even small differences in meaning would be represented in the signal.  In 
later systems, more signals would share elements because these small differences 
would be ignored.  Similarly, one might produce less careful signals.  This is 
something like categorizing signal features.  Imagine some buildings that typically 
take different shapes.  For example, a typical fire station is not as tall as a typical 
hospital.  Imagine also that someone is communicating by drawing.  When initially 
drawing each building, they might aim to represent the shape of each well.  But after 
drawing each several times, perhaps to reduce their production effort, they might 
simply draw a square (along with some distinguishing feature) for each.  This again 
increases the systematic compositionality in the set of signs because the signals for 
buildings now share an element. 
It’s also possible that a set of motivated signs becomes more systematically 
compositional in a less gradual manner, i.e. by sudden replacement of the element of 
a given signal with a different one.  Since many different signals (and signal 
elements) can have an inherent connection to a given meaning (as we argued in 
Chapter 1), people might be willing to replace one sign element with an equally 
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motivated one that makes the set of signs more systematic.  For example, 
someone might draw a school as simply a square (to indicate that it’s a building) with 
a book (to indicate that it relates to primary education).  Although they may have 
consistently drawn another item that relates to primary education (say, teacher) in an 
unrelated way (say, by drawing a chalkboard next to a stick figure), they may decide 
to replace the element in that drawing that indicates that it relates to primary 
education (the chalkboard) with the element used in the drawing for school that 
indicates this (the book).  The set of signs is now more systematic because these two 
signals for similar items now share an element.   
3.2.3 Due to interaction history 
There is at least one more way systematic compositionality can emerge in novel 
signs: as a consequence of communicating with the same people about similar items.  
In this scenario, the first signal produced for a meaning would be highly motivated, 
but a subsequent signal produced for a similar meaning would be constrained not 
(only) by motivatedness but (also) by this first sign.  Let’s consider drawings of 
items relating to primary education as an example.  The first time someone draws 
school for someone else, that drawing will be highly motivated.  However, a later 
drawing of school bus between these two people may not be as motivated as if it 
were drawn between new partners.  Rather, their drawing of school bus could 
reference their earlier drawing of school.  We are suggesting here that, in the same 
way that communication partners converge on what signal to produce for a given 
meaning (Garrod, et al., 2007), they may also converge on what signal element to 
produce for a given meaning element.  If they do, their set of signs will exhibit 
systematic compositionality. 
3.2.4 Combinations of factors 
Here we are arguing that systematic compositionality can emerge in novel, motivated 
signs, i.e. in signs that have not reached complete arbitrariness.  This could happen in 
any of the ways just described, or even as a result of the combination of those 
factors.  For example, both motivatedness and interaction history could 
simultaneously constrain what signal is produced for a meaning related to one 
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already expressed.  If a previously used signal element also has a strong inherent 
connection to the current meaning, it may be more likely to be used.  For example, if 
someone draws teacher as a stick figure standing next to a school, he may have good 
reason to draw school bus as a vehicle next to a school.  In this case, both 
motivatedness and interaction history may provide pressures to draw a school to 
signal primary education items.  If, however, someone drew teacher as a stick figure 
next to a chalkboard, they may not be as willing to draw school bus as a vehicle next 
to a chalkboard.  Despite the pressure from interaction history to draw a chalkboard 
to signal primary education items, the inherent connection between chalkboards and 
school buses might be too weak.  (An iconic drawing of school bus is unlikely to 
include a drawing of a chalkboard.)   
The relative strengths of these pressures may change over time.  For example, the 
history of interaction may replace motivatedness as the main constraint on the signals 
over time.   (Garrod, et al., 2007) 
3.3 Systematic compositionality can be maintained as 
signs become arbitrary. 
We are providing support for the possibility of the parallel emergence of arbitrariness 
and systematic compositionality in novel signs.  In the previous section, we showed 
how systematic compositionality can emerge before signs have become arbitrary.  
We turn now to explaining how signs can become arbitrary without abandoning this 
systematic compositionality.  We can approach this issue from two angles.  First, as 
signs become arbitrary, how can systematic compositionality be maintained?  
Second, how can motivated systematic compositionality become arbitrary systematic 
compositionality? 
3.3.1 As signs become arbitrary, how can systematic 
compositionality be maintained? 
Garrod, et al. (2007) showed that signs can become arbitrary as the signals produced 
for frequent meanings simplify.  They also suggested that the iconic components of a 
Chapter 3. Hypothesis.  
 
45 
signal can become arbitrary while the whole signal retains its semantic 
complexity.  In other words, sign elements - not just whole signs – could become 
arbitrary.  
This scenario is plausible because sign elements shared across multiple signs will 
tend to be used more often than any particular whole sign.  If interaction leads to 
simplification, signal elements should simplify more quickly than complex signals 
containing them.  Imagine, for example, a child who communicates with his 
caretakers by using gesture.  This child refers to the concept of tooth-brushing 
relatively often but in different contexts.  For example, she communicates that she 
has already brushed her teeth, that brushing her teeth is boring, that her brother needs 
to brush his teeth, etc.  We can imagine that the way she gestures tooth-brushing 
would initially be complex and motivated but then simplify to arbitrariness because 
she refers to tooth-brushing often.  Any one of the more complex meanings involving 
tooth-brushing, however, would be expressed less often, and so how she gestures it 
would be less likely to simplify to arbitrariness. 
3.3.2 How can motivated systematic compositionality become 
arbitrary systematic compositionality? 
Another way to look at how a set of signs can become arbitrary while maintaining its 
systematic compositionality is to explore how motivated systematic compositionality 
can morph into arbitrary systematic compositionality.  In the previous section, sign 
elements (mappings between signal elements and meaning elements) became more 
arbitrary because signal elements simplified, and this weakened the connection 
between signal element and meaning element.  A sign element can also become 
arbitrary when the meaning of the signal element changes. 
We first note that the issue of how motivated systematic compositionality can morph 
into arbitrary systematic compositionality is not trivial.  Kalish, et al. (2007) 
demonstrated how difficult it is to replace a prior mapping with a new one.  Thus, it 
may be difficult to change an inherent or natural connection between a signal and a 
meaning. 
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Yet we have already suggested one way the meaning of a signal element could 
change in a way that makes the sign element more arbitrary: the use of a signal 
element could be extended to other contexts. For example, if someone comes to use a 
representation of a particular building to refer to buildings in general, the connection 
between signal and meaning is weaker.  Meanings of signal elements could change in 
other, similar ways.  One could imagine the ways in which signals could come to 
map to less perceptual and more abstract or functional meanings.  For example, the 
representation of a car could come to mean transportation in general and the 
representation of a wedding ring could come to mean love.  In all of these cases, the 
sign elements have become more arbitrary. 
3.3.3 Some degree of arbitrariness allows for (more) systematic 
compositionality. 
Once sign elements have become somewhat arbitrary, systematic compositionality 
might further increase.  For one, once signal elements relate less transparently to 
their original meanings, people may be more willing to extend them to other 
meanings.  For example, if one’s gesture for a particular building (say, movie 
theatre) comes to look less like that particular building, it may be easier for that 
gesture to refer to buildings in general.  Similarly, if people prefer a consistent way 
of referring to things, less obviously motivated signs may allow them to change their 
other signs (or create new ones) to be more systematically compositional. 
This increase in systematic compositionality as a result of the increasing arbitrariness 
of sign elements could happen during comprehension as well.   Perhaps once sign 
elements have become somewhat arbitrary, someone realizes that not all signs should 
be interpreted as motivated, and stops interpreting any of them that way.  The 
distinction between the existence of motivatedness in a language and people’s 
awareness of it is key here.  We suggest not that sign elements need to become 
completely arbitrary to allow systematic compositionality to increase, but rather that 
people need to be able to overlook (or not notice) any residual motivatedness.  In this 
way, motivatedness may stop playing a role in the language before it completely 
disappears from it. 
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3.4 The co-evolution of arbitrariness and systematic 
compositionality 
We have presented several scenarios in which novel, motivated signs could 
immediately exhibit or quickly develop systematic compositionality.  We then 
suggested ways the sign elements could become arbitrary.  To be clear, we are not 
implying that first systematic compositionality emerges and then arbitrariness 
emerges.  As discussed, systematic compositionality could appear immediately, as a 
result of motivatedness, or could develop quickly.  Each of the scenarios presented 
for the latter involves a move away from motivatedness and towards arbitrariness.  
That is, signs become more arbitrary and more systematically compositional in one 
step.  Further, although systematic compositionality can emerge in novel, motivated 
signs, once sign elements have become somewhat arbitrary, systematic 
compositionality could further increase.   
3.5 Summary 
We’ve presented a parallel theory of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements, 
arguing that systematic compositionality and arbitrariness are likely to have arisen in 
a parallel manner.  Systematic compositionality can emerge before complete 
arbitrariness, and it can be maintained or increase as sign elements become arbitrary.  
In the next chapter, we begin to report a series of experiments that probe how the 




4 Experiment 1 
This thesis addresses how the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements can arise in a 
language.  Thus far, we have established that previous work has not painted a 
complete picture of this – work exploring novel signs has shown that they are often 
motivated and then become arbitrary but has not directly addressed systematic 
compositionality, while work on the evolution of systematic compositionality has 
assumed a set of arbitrary signs as its starting point.  We presented the parallel theory 
of the emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements, under which novel, 
motivated signs make two potentially overlapping transitions: one to arbitrariness 
and the other to systematic compositionality.  In this chapter, we begin to report a 
series of experiments that test this possibility. 
4.1 Experimental paradigm 
Ideally, one could observe some people who had never been exposed to language 
start to communicate with each other.  They’d be in a natural environment, 
communicating about whatever they wanted whenever they wanted.  One would 
observe how they communicated from their first utterances up through the point 
where their language was relatively stable.  
This ideal situation isn’t feasible, but we designed an experimental paradigm to elicit 
signs like those that would occur in it.  We discuss some features of the experimental 
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paradigm here.  First we note that we conducted a wide range of pilot 
experiments in order to determine the general features of the paradigm as well as the 
specific details of the actual experiments run.  We will mention these pilots where 
necessary to motivate our choices. 
4.1.1 Participants 
Access to people who have never been exposed to language is difficult.  Instead, we 
used university students as experimental participants and prohibited them from using 
any communicative conventions they had learned.  Participants in a pair were 
separated from each other and could communicate only via an online whiteboard 
shared by the two.  This alone prevents participants from using their normal means of 
communication (e.g., speech, gesture, and body language).  But the participants were 
also prohibited from writing or using any drawing conventions (such as drawing a 
thick cross to symbolize the medical field).  
Students with a background in Linguistics were excluded from the experiment, as 
their explicit knowledge of how languages work could have influenced the signs they 
created. 
4.1.2 Duration of experiment 
It was not feasible to observe participants steadily for months.  Instead, the 
experiment lasted about two hours.  Based on their feedback, this is as long as 
participants can be expected to stay comfortable and concentrate. 
4.1.3 Task 
We couldn’t let participants communicate about whatever they wanted whenever 
they wanted because we had to ensure that at least some meanings were expressed 
many times during the two-hour experiment (so that we could see how signs changed 
over time).  The first limitation we imposed to address this was restricting the 
communication to reference (to either tangible items or activities/situations).  
Reference is a fundamental function of communication, and so was the obvious place 
to start.  Thus, our pairs of participants played a simple reference game.  Each trial, 
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one participant saw an item (a word, such as “teacher”) and drew on a 
whiteboard, and the other participant guessed what the item was. 
Note that the task of the participants was communication, rather than learning or 
imitating others’ signs (as, for example, in Kirby, et al. (2008)).  While there’s surely 
a strong pressure to copy signs from others once a language is established, it’s not 
clear how strong that pressure is from the very first signs – in the earliest stages of a 
language, people may choose to create their own, motivated signs rather than copy 
others’ signs in order to communicate. 
4.1.4 Number, frequency, and order of items 
We also limited the number of items the participants express (instead of, say, putting 
them in some sort of game environment and letting them refer to anything).  We used 
as many items as possible while still ensuring that each occurred often enough to 
allow us to study how the signals for each changed.   
This might have introduced some artificial advantages in communicating.  First, 
participants might have been able to narrow down what the current item was, e.g., by 
keeping track of what had already occurred.  So that they couldn’t, the items 
occurred with varying frequencies and in random order in the experiment.  The 
different frequencies of the items also better matches real life, in which people 
communicate about some things more often than others. 
Another artificial advantage that could stem from limiting the number of items 
involves participants realizing that the set of items is closed.  In real life, people are 
free to refer to new items at any point in time.  This means that, when someone utters 
something, their conversational partner can’t assume they’re referring to something 
the two have talked about before.  Participants in pilots of Experiment 1 who knew 
their set of items was closed reported behaving differently than participants who did 
not realize this.  In particular, participants who knew their set of items was closed 
were more willing to draw something for an item that was different from what they’d 
drawn for that item in the past.  To eliminate this advantage, the participants had to 
communicate a brand new item every so often throughout the entire experiment.   
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4.1.5 Who communicates what when 
In natural settings, it’s unusual for someone to explicitly determine whose turn it is to 
speak.  This is difficult to avoid in controlled experiments, though.   
To make the experiment more like real life, we had participants switch roles 
(drawing or guessing) frequently.  One desired effect of this was that some of the 
items were first communicated by one participant and the remainder of the items 
were first communicated by the other participant.16  Participants in pilot experiments 
(in which the set of items seemed open, as in Experiment 1) reported sticking with 
their first drawing for each item – not adding to it or replacing parts of it during the 
game.  If this is the case, the first person to draw each item effectively chooses how 
that item will be drawn throughout the rest of the game.  This experiment was 
designed to address how people co-create a communication system, so we had each 
participant create some of the signs.  
Frequent role-swapping and the random appearance of the items means that we 
didn’t control when each participant drew each item.  One disadvantage to this is that 
it’s less straightforward to identify a participant’s drawing of an item at any 
particular point in time in the game, such as at the beginning or end of the game, 
because a participant may happen not to draw a certain item for many trials.  For 
example, we may not know what one participant would have drawn for “tractor” at 
the beginning of his game because, by chance, he didn’t get to draw “tractor” for 
several rounds. 
4.1.6 Semantics of the items 
Items were chosen to share semantic features.  Since there are a limited number of 
items, and we are exploring systematic compositionality, the items had to be 
carefully selected to share salient semantic features.  Otherwise, systematically 
                                                
16 This is in contrast to Garrod, et al. (2007), where, when Director and Matcher roles were swapped, 
they were swapped only after all the items had been drawn.   
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compositional sets of signs, where items that share features are mapped to signals 
that share elements, aren’t possible. 
One might be concerned that the fact that all of the items can be seen as similar to 
each other produced an artificial pressure for systematic compositionality to emerge 
in the sets of signs.  However, in post-experiment interviews, many participants 
reported not even noticing the overall organization.  While they certainly know that 
“firefighter” and “teacher” are both a kind of person, they didn’t realize that all of 
their items could be arranged according to just two dimensions.   
Real items, not constructed stimuli.  Although the items were chosen to have 
semantic overlap, we could not guarantee semantic overlap because we used real 
items as stimuli17.  For example, it may not have been salient to all the participants 
that “tractor” has something in common with “school bus”.  This decision to use real 
items contrasts with previous work.  For example, each of Kirby, et al. (2008)’s 
stimulus images was one of three colours, had one of three shapes, had one of three 
motions, and had no other semantic features. Likewise, each item in Selten and 
Warglien (2007)‘s experiment was one of a few shapes, with one of a few inserts (or 
none), with one of a few colours (or not coloured).  Our decision to use real items 
was important, for this thesis explores systematic compositionality in natural sign 
systems.  One step in creating a systematically compositional set of signs is noticing 
the semantic overlap between the items.  Thus, using artificial stimuli in which the 
semantic overlap may be unnaturally salient skips a possibly formative stage.  One 
pilot experiment provided an example of collapsing unimportant distinctions, such as 
the different shapes of particular vehicles.  
Figure 1 shows the initial and final drawings of “fire engine” and “tractor” produced 
in this pilot.   Notice how, by the end of the game, details of the vehicles (such as 
their respective shapes) are left out.  This collapsing of fine distinctions (so that, for 
example, fire engine and tractor can be seen as simply a vehicle that relates to fire 
                                                
17 Technically, our stimuli are words referring to real items. 
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and a vehicle that relates to farming, respectively) is a barrier to systematic 






Figure 1.  Initial drawing of “fire engine” (A), final drawing of “fire engine” (B), initial drawing 
of “tractor” (C), and final drawing of “tractor” (D) from a pilot experiment.  By the end of the 
game, the pair no longer represents the different shapes of the vehicles. 
Some constructed sets of stimuli may have another artificial pressure towards 
systematic compositionality: the items lack unique features.  For example, “tractor” 
appears to be the only item in our stimulus set that has two different-sized wheels.  If 
a pair of participants drew “tractor” as just two different-sized wheels, their set of 
drawings could be less systematically compositional because no part of the drawing 
for “tractor” will occur in drawings of other vehicles or in drawings of other items 
that relate to farming.  When each stimulus item is nothing more than a set of feature 
values shared with other stimuli, representations of them could be almost guaranteed 
to be systematically compositional – how else could one uniquely identify that item?  
We avoided this problem by using real items as stimuli. 
No direct pressure for systematicity.  Since we are exploring systematic 
compositionality in natural signs, it was important that the experiment introduced no 
direct pressure to create systematically compositional sets of signs.  The set of items 
is very structured, so this was tricky.  The first way we ensured this was by never 
presenting the full set of items to the participant - the participants never learn what 
items they will communicate about; the items simply appear in the game.  For 
example, as we explain below, participants don’t guess by choosing from a list of 
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possible items.   Rather, they guess without any hints by typing into a chat 
window.  This means the participants didn’t have a chance to spot the semantic 
structure of the set of items before they created signals for them.  In contrast, Figure 
2 shows the first signs produced for items relating to primary education in a pilot 
experiment in which the participants studied their items, which were presented in a 
table with row labels (e.g., “person”) and column labels (e.g., “primary education”), 
before their game began.  Right from the beginning of this game, the participants 
represented each item as a combination of the two feature values represented in the 
table (viz. as a person, building, or vehicle relating to primary education).   
   
school bus teacher school 
Figure 2.  First drawings of “school bus”, “teacher”, and “school” from a pilot experiment in 
which participants studied their items, organized in a labelled table, before playing their game. 
The second way we ensured that there was no direct pressure to create systematically 
compositional sets of signs was by introducing a prize draw for the top-performing 
pairs of participants.  The prize was large enough (about double the compensation for 
participation) that participants could be expected to care more about their success in 
the game than making their set of signs systematically compositional, even if they 
believed that the latter was what the experimenter wanted from them. 
4.1.7 Communication medium 
In the ideal observation setting described above, people might try to communicate 
using their voices, their motions, their gestures, etc.  In each of these, it may be more 
difficult to produce motivated signs than it is to produce motivated signs on a 
whiteboard.  To make the communication medium in our experiment more 
restrictive, participants drew with a mouse (with which is harder to draw detail than 
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with a stylus pen) and could only draw in black ink.  Participants sometimes 
complained that it was difficult to draw with the mouse. 
The participants were not allowed to use their normal means of communication 
(mainly, speech) because the experiment was meant to inform how people 
communicate in the absence of conventions.  Unfortunately, the graphical medium 
has its own communicative conventions.  Thus, the instructions explicitly prohibited 
the use of symbols and drawing conventions in the game: letters, numbers, 
punctuation (?, !, etc.), mathematical signs (+, =, <, etc.), pointing with arrows, 
universal graphical signs (the cross for first aid, a skull and cross-bones for danger, 
etc.), and drawing conventions (a heart to represent love, + over the eyes to show that 
someone is dead, etc.).  
Participants were also prohibited from marking prominence in any conventional way.  
For example, the instructions explicitly prohibited drawing arrows on the 
whiteboard. But marking prominence may be a natural, pervasive ability, so we 
didn’t explicitly prohibit marking prominence in general (e.g., by circling or tracing 
over a part of a drawing). 
One particular thing to note about our communication medium is that the signals 
aren’t necessarily combinatorial, i.e. they don’t necessarily share elements with each 
other.  This contrasts with some previous work where the participants created signals 
from a limited set of letters or syllables.  Since we’re interested in systematic 
compositionality (the re-use of signal elements in signals for similar meanings), we 
did not want to start from combinatoriality (the re-use of signal elements).  In other 
words, we did not assume combinatoriality, but rather observed what kind of signals 
the participants created.   
Note that this communication medium allows the signs created using it to be 
motivated.  This is important for at least two reasons.  First, some models of the 
evolution of systematic compositionality take as their starting point a set of signs that 
is arbitrary but whose signals are combinatorial.  Yet, we saw in Chapter 2 that novel 
signs are often motivated.  They can become arbitrary as the signals lose complexity, 
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but as signals become less complex, the set of signals may become less 
combinatorial – as each signal simplifies, it may be less likely to share an element 
with another signal.  Thus, it may not be straightforward for a set of novel signs to 
become arbitrary while its signals retain combinatoriality.  Our experiment does not 
assume such a set of signs as its starting point.  Rather, participants create the initial 
signs. 
Allowing motivatedness is important for another reason: in previous work in which 
the sets of signs started off arbitrary, the only way to increase the expressiveness of 
the language (given a bottleneck) was to increase the systematic compositionality of 
the set.  Systematic compositionality was found to be an adaptation to a bottleneck.  
But since novel signs are likely to be motivated – the features of their signals chosen 
precisely because they do convey meaning – this experimental design may have 
produced a somewhat artificial pressure for systematic compositionality.  In other 
words, when people can produce motivated signs, a bottleneck may not have the 
same effect. 
While motivatedness was possible in our experiment, it wasn’t forced.  In the ideal 
setting described above, people aren’t told anything about how to create signs.  They 
would presumably be comfortable generating any signal that conveyed the given 
meaning. Likewise, in Experiment 1, the participants are never instructed to “draw 
the item”.  The participants are told they’re going to communicate items to each 
other by drawing on a whiteboard and that the Drawer’s task is to get the Guesser to 
guess the correct item. 
4.1.8 Pressure to reduce production effort 
When people refer to something often, their signal for that meaning shortens.  (Clark 
& Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986)  Since Experiment 1 necessarily condensed the timeframe of 
this natural process, we introduced a direct pressure to reduce production effort.  We 
did this by encouraging participants to complete as many trials as possible in the 
allotted time (by awarding the top-performing pairs with an entry into a prize draw 
for extra cash).  Instead, we could have rewarded participants for completing a 
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predetermined number of trials quickly.  But pilots showed – and the experiment 
later confirmed – that participants’ speed varied widely.   We would have gathered 
less data (viz. fewer drawings) if each pair completed only as many trials as we could 
expect all pairs to complete during the experiment.   
4.1.9 Motivation to communicate successfully 
In the ideal setting, people would communicate when they wanted to.  Presumably, 
anytime they would communicate, they would care to do so successfully.  We 
ensured that our participants were similarly motivated to communicate successfully 
by implementing a scoring system that rewarded correct guesses and penalized 
incorrect guesses.  Crucially, as mentioned above, there was a prize draw for a good 
amount of cash (about double the compensation for participation) for top-performing 
participants.  So that participants didn't get so frustrated by their poor or slow 
performance that they gave up on the game entirely, the three top-performing pairs 
were entered into a prize draw.  This way, participants were more likely to feel like 
they still had a chance at the prize and stay motivated throughout the game. 
We penalized incorrect guesses so that participants wouldn’t try to skip difficult 
items.  Otherwise, a clever Drawer could simply pause when he got an item he knew 
would take a lot of time to communicate, and the perceptive Guesser then might have 
guessed anything at all, just to get to the next trial. 
Participants were allowed just one guess per trial.   This is a bit artificial, but made 
analysis straightforward - whatever was drawn on the whiteboard was taken to be 
that participant’s signal for the item (as opposed to the whiteboard including 
responses to the Guesser’s guess). 
4.2 Method  
Given these general design considerations, Experiment 1 was designed. 
4.2.1 Participants 
24 University of Edinburgh students participated in exchange for £12.  All were 
native British English speakers.  Students with a background in Linguistics were 
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excluded.  Participants who played together didn’t know each other.  As the 
advertisement called for native British English speakers, participants probably 
assumed they were playing with another native British English speaker. 
4.2.2 Apparatus 
Partners were seated in separate soundproof booths, each in front of a computer 
monitor, keyboard, and mouse.  The experiment was run using the Pigeon software 
(Healey, Swoboda, & King, 2002), which presented the item each trial and provided 
the shared online whiteboard.  Participants guessed and corrected their partners’ 
guesses in a separate MSN Messenger chat window.  Also on the screen was a timer 
counting down from two hours.   
4.2.3 Stimuli 
The items that were used as stimuli are shown in Figure 3. They were chosen to share 
salient semantic features; each item can be thought of as one of five entity types 
(such as person or building) that relates to one of ten themes (such as university 
education or agriculture).   
There were 26 core items, each of which occurred multiple times per game, and 14 
filler items, each of which occurred at most once per game. The participants played 
for two hours and were instructed to complete as many trials as possible.  Pilots of 
the experiment indicated that each pair could be expected to complete at least 126 
trials in the two hours.  Thus, the frequency distribution of the items is based on 
blocks of 126 trials.  Every 126 trials, four of the items (in the innermost box in 
Figure 3) appeared 8 times each, eleven of the items (in the middle box in Figure 3) 
appeared 5 times each, and eleven of the items (in the outermost box in Figure 3) 
appeared 3 times each.  
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teacher school teaching school bus classroom 
firefighter fire station fire-fighting fire engine  
professor university lecturing  lecture theatre 
doctor hospital medical emergency ambulance emergency room 
chef restaurant cooking  gourmet kitchen 
farmer barn farming tractor  
soldier barracks war tank  
prisoner jail crime police car  
chemist pharmacy prescription   
dentist dental practice root canal   
Figure 3. The items used as stimuli. Every 126 trials, each of the four items in the innermost box 
appeared 8 times, each item in the middle box appeared 5 times, and each item in the outermost 
box appeared 3 times.  Every 126 trials, six of the unboxed (filler) items appear.  Each of these 
unboxed items appears at most once per game. 
 
Every 126 trials, six of the fourteen filler items (unboxed in Figure 3) occurred.  
Each filler item occurred at most once per game.  
Within each block of 126 trials, the items occur in random order. 
4.2.4 Rules of the Game 
The full instructions to the game are included as Appendix A. 
They instructed the participants not to use symbols or drawing conventions. 
A team was allowed just one guess per trial.  
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A team won one point for every correct guess but lost one point for any incorrect 
guess or drawing that included a symbol or convention.  The goal was to win as 
many points as possible in the two hours of play.  
Participants from the three top-scoring teams were entered into a prize draw for an 
additional £20. 
4.2.5 Procedure 
Before the experiment started, participants read instructions.  They did not see a list 
of the items they were about to communicate, nor know anything about the items. 
Each trial, one participant was the Drawer and other was the Guesser.  The Drawer 
saw an item (a word, such as “professor”) on his screen and was allowed to draw 
immediately.  The Drawer drew with a mouse, had only black ink, and could not 
erase anything. The Guesser saw everything the Drawer drew immediately, on her 
screen.  The Guesser did not see the Drawer's mouse movements when he was not 
drawing, and could not draw herself.   
When she was ready, the Guesser guessed by typing into a chat window.  The 
Drawer stopped drawing immediately and typed the item into the chat window, 
whether or not the guess was correct.  Nothing but the guess (typed by the Guesser) 
and the exact item (typed by the Drawer) were allowed in the chat window.  The chat 
window was sized to show only the previous three guesses or items, and participants 
were not allowed to scroll up to see earlier items.  Once the Guesser read what the 
item was in the chat window, she hit a “Next Item” button.  Both participants hit an 
“OK” button to start the next trial.  
Every six trials, the participants switched Drawer and Guesser roles.  Both 
participants had to hit a button in order to advance to the next round of six trials.  
Participants were encouraged to take any breaks they needed in between rounds.   
The participants played for two hours. 





Game score.  Game scores varied widely – ranging from 66 to 260 points, with an 
average of 150.67 points (SD = 59.21).   
Pairs received one point for every correctly guessed trial but lost one point for every 
trial which was incorrectly guessed or in which a symbol or drawing convention was 
used.  Thus, success in the game depended on how many trials were completed, how 
many trials were incorrect, and how many trials included symbols or drawing 
conventions.  Let’s look at each of these in turn. 
Trials completed.  Pairs completed between 138 and 330 trials in the game.  The 
average was 232.5 trials (SD = 58.91).  Game score was strongly correlated with the 
number of trials completed (Spearman’s !  = 0.61, p < 0.05). 
Incorrect guesses.  Pairs made between 20 and 70 incorrect guesses in their games 
(M = 36.17, SD = 15.34).  There were an average of 37 unique items in each game 
(SD = 2.57), and each might be expected to be guessed incorrectly the first time it 
appears in the game.  On average, 72% of the incorrect guesses in a game were made 
on items making their first appearance in the game (SD = 16.45%).  There is no 
significant correlation between game score and number of incorrect guesses. 
Symbol use.  Pairs generally followed the instructions not to use symbols or drawing 
conventions.  In fact, seven of the 12 pairs used no symbols or drawing conventions 
at all during their games.  The remaining five pairs used a convention in 1, 5, 5, 26, 
and 32 trials of their games. Interestingly, only two conventions were used by the 
five pairs of participants who used any: (1) the first aid cross, used in drawing of 
medical items, and (2) speech bubbles, used in drawings of primary education and 
university education items, especially “teaching” and “lecturing”. There is no 
significant correlation between game score and the number of trials in which 
symbols or drawing conventions were used. 
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4.3.2 Systematic Compositionality 
Figure 4 shows one of the sign systems that emerged from this game.  Each image 
shows what was drawn on the whiteboard for that item the last time it occurred in the 
game.  Items in italics were drawn by one participant, while items in the normal 
typeface were drawn by the other.  The signs are arranged according to the semantic 
features of the items, not by the chronological order of the trials.  Items in the same 
row and items in the same column share a semantic feature.  For example, the first 
column contains this pair’s drawings for various people. 
 
Figure 4.  One set of signs that emerged from Experiment 1.  Each image shows what was drawn 
on the whiteboard for that item on the last occurrence of that item in the game.  Signs are 
arranged according to the semantic features of the items, not by chronological order of the 
trials.  Italics vs. normal typeface distinguish which participant was the Drawer that trial.  The 
set is highly systematically compositional, in that signals in many of the rows and columns share 
an element.  
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Notice how systematically compositional the set of signs is: the drawings in many 
of the rows and columns share an element.  For example, the drawings for items 
relating to university education (in the second row) each have a filled-in diamond.  
As another example, four of the drawings for activities/situations (in the second 
column) have a row of squiggly lines.  
While the systematic compositionality in the set of signs in Figure 4 is striking, 
devising a way to measure it was not straightforward.   
4.3.2.1 Previous Measures of Systematic Compositionality   
Previous work has measured systematic compositionality using methods not directly 
transferrable to our data.  For example, Kirby, et al. (2008) measured systematicity as 
a Pairwise Distance Correlation (PDC) - the correlation of similarity between signals 
with similarity between their corresponding meanings.  They then calculated the 
extent to which this correlation differs from that we would expect to see if the signals 
were randomly assigned to meanings.  Because signals were character strings and 
meanings were sets of discrete feature values, similarity could be calculated as edit 
distance - the smallest number of insertions, replacements, and deletions required to 
transform one into the other.  Calculating edit distance between the signals or 
between the meanings in Experiment 1 would not be as straightforward, because 
neither the signals nor the meanings are necessarily composed of discrete elements.  
It might be done using human judgment, but the number of required judgments 
would be very high.  
RegMap (Tamariz & Smith, 2008) measures the degree of regularity in the mappings 
from signals to meanings (or vice versa) and does not require any similarity measures 
between signals or between meanings.  For each possible mapping from signal 
element to meaning element (or vice versa), one compares the number of examples 
of that mapping with the number of counterexamples to it.    Unfortunately, we 
would run into a problem similar to the one with Pairwise Distance Correlation using 
this method - because neither the signals nor the meanings in Experiment 1 are 
necessarily composed of discrete elements, counting examples and counterexamples 
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of element mappings would require human judgment – a coder would have to 
break every signal (drawing) down into elements.  This is unnecessarily labour-
intensive for our current purposes; we don’t need to know about the idiomatic signs 
in a set.  Further, we don’t need a coder to consider every possible mapping between 
signal element and meaning element; we just need him to pick out the element 
mappings he thinks the original participants were using.  
Goldin-Meadow, et al. (1995) faced the problem of identifying signal elements as 
well, when they measured regularities within sets of homesign gestures.  They solved 
it by defining signal elements themselves, as categories of feature values.  Then two 
independent coders characterized each gesture using these experimenter-defined 
categories.  Finally, the experimenters calculated the proportion of each child’s 
gesture tokens that fit the system they identified.  The proportions are between 70% 
and 95%.  They say these fits are “quite high”, but don’t provide any baseline. 
4.3.2.2 Current Measure of Systematic Compositionality   
We draw from all of these approaches.    
Here, a set of signs consists of one signal for each of the 26 core items.  For example, 
a pair’s Final set of signs consists of the signal produced for each item the last time 
that item occurred in their game.  The experimenter coded each set for systematic 
compositionality.  Each set of drawings was printed on a page in a table, organized 
so that rows and columns contain drawings for similar items (as in Figure 4).  The 
coder examined each row and each column for any element shared among two or 
more drawings.  If there was a shared element, the coder marked which of the 
drawings in that row or column included it.  The coding instructions are included as 
Appendix B. 
There are 26 drawings (one for each of the core items) and each drawing is inspected 
twice – once as a member of its row and once as a member of its column.  Thus, each 
set of drawings can receive a total score of 52.  The total score divided by 52 is our 
systematic compositionality score. 
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For each of the 12 games of the experiment, we coded the Initial sets of drawings 
(the first drawing of each item from that pair of participants) and the Final sets of 
drawings (the last drawing of each item).   
 
 
Figure 5.  A Mixed Final set of signs.  Each image shows what was drawn for the item the last 
time it appeared in a game, but the images within a row or column are drawn from different 
games.  There is little systematic compositionality in the set – only rarely do drawings in a row 
or column share an element. 
 
To determine baseline systematic compositionality, we constructed 12 sets each of 
two kinds of control sets: Mixed Initial and Mixed Final.  The Mixed Initial sets were 
each composed of the initial drawings from different games of the experiment (i.e. 
from different pairs of participants).  For each Mixed set, for each item (e.g., 
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“teacher”), we choose at random which of the games the drawing would be from, 
with the restriction that the drawings in each row and each column would be from 
different games.  The Mixed Final sets were constructed in an analogous manner.  
Figure 5 shows one Mixed Final set of signs.  Thus we have four categories of sets of 
signs – Initial, Final, Mixed Initial, and Mixed Final – and each includes 12 sets of 
signs. 
The coder marked these 48 sets in random order and blind, i.e. she didn’t know 
which set she was coding. 
4.3.2.3 Reliability 
To check whether the experimenter’s coding was biased, a different coder – who had 
no role at all in the experiment – marked three randomly chosen sets of each category 
(12 sets in total) independently.  Her scores were strongly correlated with those of 
the original coder (Spearman’s !  = 0.82, p = 0.001).  (The sets of systematic 
compositionality scores failed standard tests for normality, and so non-parametric 
statistics were used here and in subsequent systematic compositionality analyses.)  
4.3.2.4 Results 
Figure 6 shows the mean systematic compositionality for each of the four categories 
of sets of signs.18 (MFinal = 42.79, SD = 18.95; MMixed Final = 19.39, SD = 6.32; MInitial 
= 47.76, SD = 11.85; MMixed Initial = 22.28, SD = 11.67)  The first thing to notice is 
that Final sets of signs are more systematically compositional than Mixed Final sets 
of signs (Figure 6A).  That is, pairs’ last drawings of items systematically re-use 
drawing elements more than can be attributed to a tendency across pairs to do so – 
they are truly systematic.  A Mann–Whitney U Test confirmed this (p < 0.01). 
 
                                                
18 One of the Mixed Initial sets of signs is an outlier, with a systematic compositionality score more 
than 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile for Mixed Initial sets of signs.  We chose 
not to exclude it from analysis because there appears to be no error in creation or measurement of that 
set; it’s simply unusually systematic for Mixed Initial sets of signs. 





Figure 6.  Mean systematicity (%) and confidence intervals (confidence level = 95%) for Initial, 
Mixed Initial, Final, and Mixed Final sets of signs. Final sets are more systematically 
compositional than Mixed Final sets and Initial sets are more systematically compositional than 
Mixed Initial sets. 
 
How did Final sets of signs get to be systematically compositional?  It turns out that 
Initial sets of signs are also truly systematically compositional; see Figure 6B.  A 
Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that the Initial sets of signs have significantly 
higher systematic compositionality scores than the Mixed Initial sets of signs (p < 
0.001).   
Further, sets of signs didn’t become significantly more or less systematically 
compositional over time.  A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test found no significant 
difference between the systematic compositionality scores of Initial and Final sets of 
signs (p= 0.2662). 
 




Figure 7.  Scatterplot of Final against Initial Systematicity (%).   Spearman’s ! equals 0.62 
(p=0.03), indicating there is some correlation between the ranking of the Initial sets of signs by 
systematicity and that of the corresponding Final sets of signs. 
 
What then is the relationship between the degree of systematic compositionality in a 
pair’s Initial set of signs and the degree of systematic compositionality in their Final 
set of signs?  Figure 7 is a scatter plot of each of the 12 pair’s Initial systematic 
compositionality score against their Final systematic compositionality score.  There 
is clearly a correlation between the Initial and Final systematic compositionality of a 
pair’s signs.  (Spearman’s !  = 0.62, p < 0.05). 
4.3.3 Arbitrariness 
As in the systematicity analyses, we examined the arbitrariness of the Initial and 
Final sets of signs from each pair.  We hypothesized that, as in Garrod, et al. (2007), 
the arbitrariness of the signs increased through interaction. 




To measure how arbitrary the signs produced in Experiment 1 were, we followed 
Fay, et al. (2008) and had new participants guess what the signs meant.   
12 University of Edinburgh students participated in exchange for chances in a prize 
draw for a £25 Amazon gift voucher.  All were native British English speakers.  The 
corpus was sampled once across participants; each sign was judged once. A mixed 
design was used: each participant was presented with the Initial drawings of each 
core item from one original game and the Final drawings of each core item from a 
different original game.  The participants were assigned games at random. 
The experiment was run over the Internet, and lasted approximately 15 minutes.   
Participants read about the basics of the original communication game and learned 
that the drawings they’d see would be from different games and different points in 
time during the games, in random order.  Participants received an entry in the prize 
draw for each correct guess.   
 
Figure 8.  The screen for a participant making a transparency judgement. 
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Each trial, a participant saw a screenshot of the whiteboard at the end of the trial 
in the original game.  He guessed the meaning of the image by clicking on one of 26 
buttons, one for each possible item.  Figure 8 shows what the screen looks like for an 
example trial. 
4.3.3.2 Results 
Figure 9 shows the mean identification rates (as proportions correct) for Initial and 
Final sets of signs. (MInitial = 64.08, SD = 12.37; MFinal = 45.42, SD = 6.86)  Initial 
sets of signs were more accurately identified than Final sets of signs.  A Mann–
Whitney U Test confirmed this (p < 0.001).  This suggests that the signs became 
more arbitrary – their signals related less transparently to their meanings – over the 
course of the games.  
 
 
Figure 9.  Mean identification accuracy (%) and confidence intervals (confidence level = 95%) 
for Initial and Final sets of signs.  Initial sets of signs are more accurately identified than Final. 
 




In Chapter 3, we suggested several ways systematic compositionality and 
arbitrariness could emerge in parallel.  A qualitative exploration of the signs 
produced during Experiment 1 reveals that many of the possibilities we suggested 
were realized. 
4.4.1 Systematic compositionality due to interaction history 
The first part of our argument for the parallel theory of the emergence of the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements included reasons we could expect a set of 
novel signs to be systematically compositional from its genesis, or to 
straightforwardly become so.  We suggested that this could be due to a combination 
of motivatedness and interaction history.  We’ll consider interaction history first. 
Immediate systematic compositionality due to interaction history.  Perhaps the 
most surprising result from Experiment 1 is that sets of signs are systematically 
compositional immediately, i.e. even the very first signs a pair creates share elements 
with each other.  The elements are specific to the pair; sets of Initial signs drawn 
from different pairs exhibited less than half the systematic compositionality.   
Recall that participants have no access to a list of items they will be communicating 
before the game; it’s not that participants are designing systematically compositional 
sets of signs in advance.  Further, there is no direct pressure for systematic 
compositionality in the game; each pair’s goal is simply to communicate accurately 
and quickly. 
What is behind this immediate systematic compositionality then?  While the 
experiment was not designed to distinguish the effects of motivatedness from those 
of interaction history, there is reason to believe that interaction history plays a larger 
role than motivatedness. 
Systematic compositionality is measured on a pair’s set of signs, not an individual 
player’s.  Specifically, the Initial set for a pair consists of the drawing produced for 
each item the first time that item appeared in the game, regardless of which 
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participant was the Drawer that trial.  On average, half of the drawings in a set are 
produced by one participant in the pair and half are produced by the other.   
For the systematic compositionality of a set of signs produced by two players not to 
relate to the interaction history shared by the two either (1) one player is solely 
responsible for the systematic compositionality in the set or (2) the two players create 
the same sign elements by chance (i.e. they would produce those sign elements 
regardless of partner). 
It’s unlikely that one player in each pair is solely responsible for the systematic 
compositionality in the set of signs produced by both him and his partner.  The initial 
systematic compositionality scores average almost 50%.  The one participant’s 
subset of the signs would have to be perfectly systematically compositional for the 
whole set of signs to achieve this.  Further, the Initial systematic compositionality 
scores reach as high as 67%.  Any systematic compositionality score significantly 
higher than 50% cannot be explained by the self-systematicity of one of the players.   
It’s also unlikely that both players in a pair just happened to choose the same way to 
refer to the items.  For a particular meaning, there are many different motivated ways 
to draw it.  Consider the drawings of “farmer” in Figure 10, drawn from various 
games (of Experiment 1 and similar pilot experiments).  Clearly, participants 
associate many different things with the concept of a farmer: various settings (rolling 
hills, sunshine, plowed land, fruit trees), nearby items (tractor, barn, hay), animals 
(cows, pigs, chickens, a hunting dog), items of clothing (overalls, a plaid shirt, a 
straw hat, Wellies), instruments (spade, pitchfork, walking stick), activities (chewing 
corn, plowing land), and so on.  In fact, this wide variety of signals for a given 
meaning is what the low systematic compositionality of the Mixed Initial sets 
illustrates.  Thus, the immediate systematic compositionality of a pair’s set of signs is 
likely to be due to the interaction history shared by the two. 
 
Chapter 4.  Experiment 1.  
 
73 
    
    
    
  
  
Figure 10.  Drawings of “farmer” across games of Experiment 1 and similar pilot experiments.  
The concept of a farmer is associated with many different settings, animals, items of clothing, 
instruments, and activities. 
 
To explore whether motivatedness or interaction history explains immediate 
systematic compositionality better, we can also find occasions in which they are at 
odds.  Consider, for example, the drawings of “school bus” in Figure 11. For pairs A 
– D, “school bus” was the first primary education item to be drawn, so the drawings 
reflect what people draw for “school bus” when uninfluenced by previous drawings 
of primary education items – roughly, what motivated drawings of “school bus” look 
like.  In contrast, Pair E drew “school bus” after they’d already drawn another 
primary education item: “teacher.”  Their drawing of “school bus” appears to re-use 
elements from their drawing of “teacher”, i.e. be strongly influenced by signs in 
pair’s shared interaction history.  In particular, note that a chalkboard in a drawing 
for “school bus” is not strongly motivated – none of the uninfluenced drawings of 
“school bus” include a chalkboard.  While one might expect that the first time 
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someone draws “school bus” with their partner, they would draw it no differently 
than if they were drawing with a new partner, instead it appears that the history of 
interaction shared by two people influences even new signs they create for use with 
each other. 
 
 teacher school bus 
Pair A  
 
Pair B  
 
Pair C  
 




Figure 11. The first drawings of “school bus” from five different games.  For pairs A – D, each 
was the first primary education item to be drawn in that game.  In contrast, Pair E drew 
another primary education item (“teacher”) before drawing “school bus”.  Their drawing for 
“school bus” appears to re-use elements from their drawing for “teacher”: the chalkboard, in 
particular.   
Note that most (at least 21 of the 26) initial drawings were produced after a related 
item (of either the same entity type or theme) had been drawn.  Thus, interaction 
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history can play a leading role in the earliest stages of the development of a sign 
system.    
Increasing systematic compositionality due to interaction history.  Another way 
we proposed that systematic compositionality could increase in a set of novel signs is 
that an element used in one sign could spread to others.  There is a clear example of 
this in one of the games.  Figure 12A shows the pair’s drawings for the activities 
“teaching”, “lecturing”, “fire-fighting”, “cooking”, and “farming” in the beginning of 
their game.  Note first that the pair is unsuccessful in each trial.  Also note that the 
drawings have little in common with each other. 
The next few of these activities to appear in their game happened to be “teaching” 
and “lecturing”.  Figure 12B shows these.  The pair established a drawing for 
“lecturing” which includes squiggly lines.  They then started to use those squiggly 
lines for “teaching” as well.   At this point, two of their drawings for activities share 
an element (the squiggly lines). 
In Figure 12C, we see this convention being extended to their drawings for 
“cooking”, “farming”, and “fire-fighting”: each now contains the squiggly lines.   
Figure 12D shows what was drawn for each of these items the last time it appeared in 
their game.  Each of the drawings includes the squiggly lines.  
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lecturing  
(guessed as “lecture”) 
cooking  
(guessed as “factory”) 
farming  




(guessed as “water”) 
teaching  
(guessed as “teacher) 
 
A   
   
lecturing lecturing teaching  
(guessed as “lecturing”) 
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farming cooking cooking 
   
farming fire-fighting 
(guessed as “teaching”) 
farming 
C   
   
teaching cooking lecturing 
  
 
farming fire-fighting  
D   
Figure 12.  One pair’s drawings for the activities “teaching”, “lecturing”, “fire-fighting”, 
“cooking”, and “farming” in the beginning (A and B), middle (C), and end (D) of their game.  
They began drawing squiggly lines first for “lecturing”.   The squiggly lines then became 
established for “teaching” as well.  Then, they extended the squiggly lines to their drawings for 
“fire-fighting”, “cooking”, and “farming”.  By the end of their game, the squiggly lines are a 
clear, distinct element shared by the drawings of these activities. 




4.4.2 Systematic compositionality due to motivatedness 
Another route to systematic compositionality that we discussed in Chapter 3 is 
categorization of motivated signs.  Consider Figure 13, which shows how one pair 
drew four vehicles (“school bus”, “ambulance”, “tractor”, and “fire engine”) in the 
beginning and end of their game.  In the beginning, there is no obvious shared 
element between the drawings – the drawings of the vehicles look different.  For 
example, the vehicles are drawn to be of different lengths.  By the end of their game, 
players have stopped making these distinctions, and this results in the drawings 
sharing an element. 
 









Figure 13. One pair’s signals for four different vehicles in the beginning and end of their game.  
Fine distinctions between the vehicles were represented in the drawings in the beginning of their 
game but collapsed by the end of their game. 
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4.4.3 Novel sets of signs were not completely systematically 
compositional. 
The reader should not take from these demonstrations of systematic compositionality 
that systematic compositionality is inevitable in our communication game.  The level 
of systematic compositionality in the sets never reaches 100%, and most sets include 
at least some completely idiosyncratic signs.  Thus, participants did not appear to feel 
any artificial pressure to create systematically compositional sets of signs.  For 
example, Figure 14 shows one pair’s first drawings of items relating to farming, 
which have very little in common. 
 
    
farmer farming barn tractor 
Figure 14.  One pair’s initial drawings for items relating to farming.  They have little in 
common. 
4.4.4 Sign elements can become arbitrary. 
The other component to the parallel theory of the emergence of the systematic re-use 
of arbitrary elements, in addition to the idea that novel (motivated) signs can be 
systematically compositional, is the idea that systematic compositionality can be 
maintained as signs become arbitrary.  (As a reminder, we aim to explain how the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements arises, not just how the systematic re-use of 
any elements arises.)   We did find this in Experiment 1.  Consider Figure 15, which 
shows some of one pair’s drawings for university items over the course of their 
game.  Figure 15A shows the pair’s initial drawings for university items.  The set is 
highly systematically compositional, in that each contains a stick figure with a 
mortarboard on its head, which (in three of the four drawings) is standing next to a 
chalkboard.  Figure 15B shows the drawings for the next eight university items to 
appear in the game (after the last initial drawing).  This shared element is becoming  
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lecturing professor university lecture theatre 
A     
    
university lecturing lecture theatre lecture theatre 
    
lecturing professor university university 
B    
    
lecture theatre university lecturing professor 
C    
Figure 15.  One pair’s initial drawings of university items (A), drawings of university items 
produced in the middle of the game (B), and final drawings of university items (C).  The initial 
drawings for university items are highly systematically compositional, in that they share an 
element.  Over the course of the game, this element becomes arbitrary.   
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arbitrary – the body, head, and chalkboard are being eliminated.  Figure 15C 
shows the pair’s final drawing of each university item.  The shared element is now 
very arbitrary – a filled-in diamond without the context of a body, head, and 
chalkboard has a weaker connection to the concept of university education.  
Crucially, the initial systematic compositionality of the signs was retained while the 
signs became arbitrary. 
4.4.5 Sometimes, whole signs become arbitrary. 
Lest the reader take from this that systematic compositionality was always 
maintained as signs became arbitrary, we present an example of whole signs – not 
sign elements – becoming arbitrary in Figure 16.  Figure 16A shows this pair’s initial 
drawings for farming items.  They are systematically compositional, in that a barn 
and tractor recur across the drawings.  Figure 16B shows the drawings for the next 
eight farming items to appear I the game (after the last initial drawing).  These 
drawings for farming items share elements with each other to a lesser extent.  Figure 
16C shows the pair’s final drawings for farming items, which exhibit little systematic 
compositionality.  Notice in particular their idiosyncratic drawings for “barn” and 
“tractor” – they don’t share any elements at all with the other drawings. 
4.5 Summary 
We’ve presented an experiment in which the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
emerges.  Final sets of signs are systematic, and becoming more arbitrary. 
The serial theory of the emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
predicts that a novel set of signs will first become arbitrary and then develop 
systematic compositionality.  The results from Experiment 1 support another 
possibility: the parallel theory of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.  Novel 
signs are systematically compositional immediately, and this systematic 
compositionality is maintained as the signs become arbitrary. 
Examples from Experiment 1 provided evidence for the various routes to the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements that we proposed in Chapter 3.  In particular, 
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the shared interaction history between players appears to play an important role in 
the emergence of systematic compositionality in their signs.  However, we also 
showed that our results are not trivial – subsets of novel signs sometimes exhibit very 
little systematic compositionality, and subsets of signs sometimes do become less 
systematically compositional as they become arbitrary. 
 
    
barn farmer farming tractor 
A     
    
farming farming tractor tractor 
    
farmer barn farmer farming 
B    
    
tractor barn farming farmer 
C    
Figure 16.  One pair’s initial drawings of farming items (A), drawings of farming items 
produced in the middle of their game (B), and final drawings of farming items (C).  The 
drawings for farming items are systematically compositional initially, but become less so over 




5 Experiment 2: Generalization 
The previous chapter presented Experiment 1, which demonstrated how the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements arises in novel sets of signs created by 
interacting communication partners.  In this chapter, we begin to explore how such 
sign systems could be extended beyond individual pairs.   
5.1 Rationale 
One might argue that the sets of signs that emerged in dyads in Experiment 1 could 
not lead to proper language, which is shared by large communities of people and also 
persists through generations.  Experiment 2 was designed to test whether new 
participants – who did not play any role in (indeed, did not even observe) the 
creation of the sets of signs – can nonetheless detect the systematic compositionality 
in them and generalize from it. 
5.2 Method 
In a nutshell, new participants learn subsets of systematically compositional (or 
control) sets of signs, and are asked to draw what they think the original participants 
drew for the missing items.  We then test whether two participants who learned the 
same set of signs draw the missing items the same way.  Specifically, we test 
whether their two sets of generalizations are more similar to each other than either is 
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to sets of generalizations made by participants who learned different sets of signs 
(i.e. sets of signs produced by different original pairs).  If so, we reason that there’s 
information in each observed subset of signs about the missing signs.  In particular, 
the observed subset is systematically compositional, in that signals for similar 
meanings share elements, and so a new participant can guess that an original pair’s 
signal for a similar item also included that element.  We will also know that the 
information is specific to the set of signs – it’s not that new participants all make the 
same guesses about how to draw the missing items.  In sum, this generalization 
experiment will establish whether new participants can detect and generalize from 
the (set-specific) systematic compositionality in others’ signs. 
5.2.1 Participants 
24 University of Edinburgh students participated in exchange for £12.  All were 
native British English speakers.  None had a background in Linguistics. 
5.2.2 Stimuli 
There were 12 stimulus sets: two different subsets of six sets of signs (four Normal 
sets, a Mixed set, and a Random set). 
The Subsets.   Each subset contained drawings for 21 of the 26 core items.  We call 
these 21 the Seen signs because these are the signs the generalization participants 
learned.  The five missing signs we call Unseen; the generalization participants were 
tested on these.  The five Unseen items were chosen at random, with the restriction 
that each entity type (person, building, etc.) and theme (primary education, fire-
fighting, etc.) included at most one Unseen item.  The Unseen items for subset #1 
were: “chef”, “hospital”, “fire-fighting”, “school bus”, and “lecture theatre”.  Those 
for subset #2 were: “farmer”, “hospital”, “lecturing”, “fire engine”, and “classroom”. 
Normal.  Four of the sets of signs were Normal.  These were the two most 
systematically compositional Final sets of signs from Experiment 1 and the two most 
systematically compositional Final sets of signs from Experiment 3.  We present 
Experiment 3 in the next chapter.  For now, it suffices to note that participants in 
Experiment 3 play the same game as in Experiment 1 but spend 15 minutes before 
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the game familiarizing themselves with another pairs’ signs.  To review, a Final 
set of signs consists of what was drawn for each core item the last time that item 
appeared in a pair’s game.  As the Normal sets we chose were highly systematically 
compositional, the drawings for similar items will often share elements.  For 
example, Figure 17 shows subset #1 of Normal set #2.  In it, we see that each 
drawing for an item relating to university education (in the third row) contains 
diagonal lines in the top left corner and a stick figure to the right of them.  Similarly, 
each drawing for a room (in the fifth column) includes a large box around a scene.   
Again, we predicted that one participant’s generalizations would be more similar to 
the generalizations made by the participant who learned the same set of signs than 
they are to generalizations made by any participant who learned a different set of 
signs.  We foresaw two possible objections to interpreting this result as indicating 
that the new participants are detecting and using systematic compositionality in the 
original pairs’ signs.   
First, participants might base their guess for an Unseen item on one particular Seen 
item, rather than on all Seen items similar in meaning. For example, when guessing 
what the original participants drew for “farmer”, we assume that the generalization 
participants look at all the drawings for items that relate to farming and all the 
drawings for activities/situations.  However, it’s possible that both generalization 
participants look only at the drawing for “farming” and modify that.  If so, the 
similarity of their generalizations for “farmer” would not imply systematic 
compositionality (a re-use of drawing elements across drawings for similar items) in 
the original pair’s set of signs, for they could make similar generalizations even if the 
set of signs exhibited no systematic compositionality. 
Second, participants might base their guess for an Unseen item on all of the Seen 
items, not just those that are similar in meaning to it.  For example, if the original 
pairs had particular drawing styles (e.g., a pair tended to use more or less ink, drew 
generally round vs. generally straight lines, tended to be sloppy and quick vs. 
careful), and the generalization participants used this information, then 
generalizations from participants who learned signs from the same original pair  
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firefighter fire station fire-fighting fire engine  
   
 ? 
professor university lecturing  lecture theatre 
 
? 
   





chef restaurant cooking  gourmet kitchen 
    
 
farmer barn farming tractor  
Figure 17.  Subset #1 of Normal set #2.  Each image shows what was drawn the last time that 
item appeared in this pair’s game.  Two generalization participants learned the signs shown and 
then were asked to guess what the original participants drew for the five Unseen items.  The 
Normal sets are highly systematically compositional.  For example, in this set, drawings for 
items relating to university education include three diagonal lines and a stick figure and 
drawings for rooms include a large box around a scene, so a generalization participant can 
make an informed guess of how the original participants drew “lecture theatre”. 




would be more similar to each other than they would be to generalizations from other 
participants.   
We constructed a Mixed set to address the first possible objection and a Random set 
to address the second. 
Mixed.  We constructed a Mixed set, which exhibited virtually no systematic 
compositionality.  It included signs from all four Normal sets, and so was analogous 
to the Mixed Final sets in Experiment 1, which exhibited little systematic 
compositionality.  However, this Mixed set was composed of signs from only four 
sets of signs.  Since there are more than four entity types and more than four themes, 
we additionally ensured little systematic compositionality by choosing signs so that a 
particular signal element appeared no more than once per row or column.  For 
example, no two drawings of items relating to university education included diagonal 
lines in the top left corner.  We also chose signs that were clear and understandable 
(rather than messy or obscure), so that participants could copy elements in them. 
Figure 18 shows subset #1 of the Mixed set. 
Generalizations made by participants who learn this Mixed set will be similar to the 
extent that participants are basing each guess for an Unseen item on one particular 
Seen item. 
Random.   We constructed a Random set, which exhibited little systematic 
compositionality but preserved information about how an original pair drew items in 
general.  The drawings in the Random set were exactly those of one of the Normal 
sets (Normal set #4), mapped at random to the items.  For example, the original 
pair’s drawing for “gourmet kitchen” was said to be for “firefighter”. Figure 19 
shows subset #1 of the Random set. 
If generalizations from participants who learn the same Normal set are more similar 
than generalizations from participants who learn the Random set, we know that the  
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chef restaurant cooking  gourmet kitchen 
    
 
farmer barn farming tractor  
Figure 18.  Subset #1 of the Mixed set.  Each image shows what was drawn the last time the item 
appeared in an original pair’s game, but the images are drawn from different games.  Any 
similarity in generalizations made by participants who learn this set is due not to systematic 
compositionality but perhaps to the participants generalizing from the same (single) Seen item. 
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chef restaurant cooking  gourmet kitchen 
    
 
farmer barn farming tractor  
Figure 19.  Subset #1 of the Random set, which consists of the drawings from one Normal set 
mapped randomly to the items.  Any similarity in generalizations made by the participants who 
learn this set is not due to systematic compositionality, but rather to the original pair having a 
distinctive drawing style. 




latter participants are using information about the mappings between drawings and 
items, not just information about the drawings. 
Thus there were 12 stimulus sets in total: two subsets each of six sets of signs (four 
Normal, one Mixed, and one Random).  Each participant learned one, assigned to 
him at random.  Each set was learned by two participants. 
5.2.3 Procedure 
The drawings were presented to the participant on a computer monitor, as a folder of 
images labelled with the items.  The images appeared in the folder in random order.  
Each subject had 15 minutes to learn the 21 drawings in any way he wanted.  He was 
told he would be tested: afterwards, the experimenter would present him with some 
items and he would have to draw what the original participants drew for them.   
Microsoft Paint, a simple graphics painting program, was running so that he could 
practice drawing the items if he wanted. 
Following this training, the first test was given.  The participant was asked to draw 
the five Unseen items in turn, presented to him in random order, using Microsoft 
Paint.  The participant was told that these were items that he did not learn, and that 
his task was to guess (by drawing) what the original participants drew for them.  The 
participant was encouraged to take as much time as he needed, was allowed to look 
at all of the Seen items while drawing the Unseen items, and was encouraged to 
explain to the experimenter what he was guessing and why during the test.  This first 
test was a practice test for the second test.   
For the second test, the participant was shown the Seen drawings arranged in a table 
on a printout.  The experimenter explained that the columns were entity types 
(people, buildings, etc.) and the rows were themes (primary education, fire, etc.)  The 
experimenter told the participant that looking at the drawings this way might give 
him more information.  The procedure for the second test was otherwise identical to 
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that for the first test.  (To be clear, the five Unseen items were in a different 
random order in the second test than they were in the first.) 
The full instructions to the participants are included as Appendix C. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Example generalizations 
Figure 20 shows the sets of generalizations made by six of the participants. Two of 
these participants learned one of the Normal sets (Normal set #2), two learned the 
Mixed set, and two learned the Random set.  Each of the six participants learned 
drawings for the same items (subset #1 of their respective sets of signs) and was 
tested on the same Unseen items.  Yet only the two who learned the (same) Normal 
set appear to be drawing the items the same way.  The participants who learned the 
Mixed or Random sets do not appear to agree on how the original participants drew 
the Unseen items.    
5.3.2 Similarity judgments 
Six volunteers provided similarity judgments on the sets of generalizations produced 
in the second test of the experiment.  For each of the two subsets, there were 12 sets 
of generalizations, one per participant: 
Participant A learned subset #1 of Normal set #1 
Participant B learned subset #1 of Normal set #1 
Participant C learned subset #1 of Normal set #2 
Participant D learned subset #1 of Normal set #2 
Participant E learned subset #1 of Normal set #3 
Participant F learned subset #1 of Normal set #3 
Participant G learned subset #1 of Normal set #4 
Participant H learned subset #1 of Normal set #4 
Participant I learned subset #1 of the Mixed set 
Participant J learned subset #1 of the Mixed set 
Participant K learned subset #1 of the Random set 
Participant L learned subset #1 of the Random set 
For each volunteer, the 12 sets of generalizations (of five drawings each) for a given 
subset were printed onto strips of paper, and these strips of paper were arranged on a 
table in random order.  First, the volunteer paired the sets by similarity, i.e. he 
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formed most-similar pairs of sets.  He then rated the degree of similarity between 
the sets that he paired, with 1 meaning there was no similarity at all between the 
drawings, and 10 meaning the drawings were exactly the same.  This procedure was 
repeated for the 12 sets of generalizations made from the second subset. 
The full instructions to the similarity judges are included as Appendix D. 
 chef hospital fire-fighting school bus lecture theatre 
     
Normal  
     
     
Mixed 
     
     
Random 
     
Figure 20.  Sets of generalizations from six of the participants: two who learned the same 
Normal set, two who learned the Mixed set, and two who learned the Random set.  Each learned 
signs for the same items and was tested on the same Unseen items.  Despite this, only the 
generalizations from the two who learned the (same) Normal set are very similar. 




We call a pairing of the generalizations produced by two participants who learned the 
same set of drawings “correct”.  Table 1 shows, for each subset of each set, how 
many of the six judges made the correct pairing.  No judge ever paired 
generalizations made by the two participants who learned the Mixed set or 
generalizations made by the two participants who learned the Random set as most 
similar.  In contrast, generalizations produced by two participants who learned the 
same Normal set were often paired as most similar.  For example, all six judges 
paired the sets of generalizations made by the two participants who learned subset #1 
of Normal set #1 as most similar.  A Chi-square test confirmed that the frequency of 
correct pairings differed between the three types of set (Normal, Mixed, and 
Random): " 2 (2, N = 72) = 36, p < 0.001. 
 
 Normal 
 #1 #2 #3 #4 Mixed Random 
Subset #1 6 6 3 4 0 0 
Subset #2 5 2 5 5 0 0 
Total 11 8 8 9 0 0 
Table 1.  Correct pairings of generalizations.  Each cell displays the number of judges (out of 
six) who paired the correct pairing as most similar.  No judge paired the generalizations from 
two participants who learned the Mixed set or the Random set as most similar, while many 
paired generalizations produced by two participants who learned the same Normal set as most 
similar. 
Generalizations from participants who learned the same Normal set are more similar 
than generalizations from the participants who learned the Mixed set and 
generalizations from the participants who learned the Random sets.  But are the 
generalizations from participants who learned the same Normal set more similar than 
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generalizations incorrectly paired?  While the task of the similarity judges is to 
pair the generalizations according to similarity, they must pair all of the 
generalizations.  This means they may be forced to pair generalizations they do not 
find particularly similar.  We elicited the similarity ratings from the judges to test 
that correct pairings (of Normal sets, as correct pairings were never made of the 
Mixed and Random sets) are indeed more similar than incorrect pairings.  Table 2 
shows the mean similarity ratings for each type of pairing.  Correct pairings of 
generalizations (from the same Normal sets) are rated more similar than other 
(incorrect) pairings.  (MCorrect = 7.42, SD = 1.48; MIncorrect = 4.42, SD = 2.13) A 
Mann–Whitney U Test19 confirmed this difference between the similarity ratings for 









one Normal, one Control 
7.42 (none) 4.33 4.00 4.06 
Table 2. Mean similarity ratings for correct and incorrect pairings of generalizations.  Judges 
rated their correct pairings of generalizations produced by participants who learned Normal 
sets as most similar. 
Thus, generalizations produced by participants who learned the same Normal set 
were paired as most similar often, while generalizations made by participants who 
learned either the Mixed or Random set were never paired as most similar, by any of 
the six judges, for either of the two subsets.  Further, judges rated the correct pairings 
of generalizations produced by two participants who learned the same Normal set as 
more similar than any incorrect pairings. 
 
                                                
19 The similarity ratings for the incorrect pairings failed standard tests for normality. 
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This tells us: 
• There’s something in each of the Normal sets of signs, but not in the Mixed 
or Random sets of signs, that gives the participants information on how to 
draw the Unseen items.   
• This information is specific to the set, for a participant’s generalizations are 
judged to be most similar to the generalizations from the participant who 
learned the same Normal set, not just any Normal set.   
• Participants are not basing their guess for a particular item (say, “lecture 
theatre”) on one particular Seen item (say, “university”).  If they were, 
generalizations from the two participants who learned the Mixed set would be 
paired as most similar, as would the generalizations from the two participants 
who learned the Random set20.  
• Generalizations from participants who learned the same Normal set are not 
most similar simply because they are detecting drawing styles unique to the 
original pairs.  If this were the case, the generalizations from participants who 
learned the Random set would also have been paired as most similar, for the 
Random set consists of signs produced by the same original pair.  
5.4 Observations 
Here we make some observations about how the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements produced by a pair was adopted by others. 
                                                
20 It’s possible that each participant bases a guess on one Seen item, but that that Seen item varies 
across participants.  The difference between Normal sets on the one hand and Mixed and Random sets 
on the other still indicates that the Normal sets were highly systematically compositional – the two 
Seen items the Normal participants based their guesses on must have something in common. 
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5.4.1 Systematic compositionality 
A qualitative analysis of the data generated in Experiment 2 provides further 
evidence of the systematic compositionality in the original pairs’ signs. 
Choice of subset may not affect whether participants reproduce the sign 
elements.  One might wonder whether the choice of subset of a given set affected 
how participants generalized from it.  The more systematically compositional a set of 
signs, the less the choice of subset should affect generalizations made from it.  For 
example, in Normal set #2, each drawing of an item relating to university education 
includes three diagonal lines in the top left corner.  A new participant could learn any 
subset of these and still detect the systematic compositionality. 
There is some evidence that the same sign elements were detected, regardless of 
subset.  For example, the four Normal sets of signs each signalled that an item relates 
to university education using a different element: a head with mortarboard, three 
stripes for lecture theatre seats, a diagonal row of small circles, and a man with a 
bowtie. Figure 21 shows how the participants who learned the two different subsets 
of the four Normal sets drew their item relating to university education.  Those who 
learned subset #1 were asked to guess what the original participants drew for “lecture 
theatre”, while those who learned subset #2 were asked to guess what the original 
participants drew for “lecturing.”  The generalizations of “lecture theatre” share an 
element (such as a head with a mortarboard) with the generalizations of “lecturing” 
when those participants learned signs from the same original pair.  Regardless of the 
subset observed, participants who learned Normal set #1 include a head with a 
mortarboard in their drawings, the participants who learned Normal set #2 include 
three diagonal lines in the top left corner, the participants who learned Normal set #3 
include a diagonal row of small circles, and the participants who learned Normal set 
#4 include a man with a bowtie.  This is further evidence of the strength of the 
systematic compositionality in the original sets of signs. 
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 lecture theatre lecturing 
  Normal set #1 
  
  Normal set #2 
  
  Normal set #3 
  
  Normal set #4 
  
Figure 21.  Generalizations for two different items relating to university education.  Despite 
learning different subsets thereof, participants who learn the same set of signs include the same 
elements in their generalizations. 
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The experiment was not designed to allow a test of this, though.  Recall that each 
subset’s five Unseen items were chosen at random, in order to eliminate any 
experimenter bias.  They were: 
• subset #1: chef, hospital, fire-fighting, school bus, lecture theatre 
• subset #2: farmer, hospital, lecturing, fire engine, classroom 
The first problem is that the two Unseen sets share an item: hospital.  Thus we don’t 
know whether participants who learn the drawings for different subsets of medical 
items and are tested on different new medical items would nonetheless reproduce the 
same drawing element.  The same holds for a drawing element indicating that an 
item is a building.   
The second problem is that only one of the Unseen sets contains an item that relates 
to cooking, and only one of the Unseen sets contains an item that relates to farming.  
Obviously, we cannot test whether the choice of subset affects how people 
generalize to new cooking or farming items in this case. 
Participants’ verbal feedback indicates that they are detecting systematicity.  
Another piece of qualitative evidence for the strength of the systematic 
compositionality in the sets of signs comes from participants’ comments while 
they’re making their generalizations.  Despite never being explicitly instructed to 
look for systematicity in the set of signs they’re learning, they very often explicitly 
state what rules they're following.  Examples include:  
• [The original participants have] “obviously got some kind of system going.” 
• [The few lines in a circle are] “code for doing.” 
• “Lines coming out of him means doing things.” 
•  “People have quite often got a circle around them, but not when it has to do 
with “ing”.” 
• “When it's the room that's the word to be conveyed, put a box around the 
entire picture.”   
• “…put the other specific on the left.”  
• “The difference between verb and noun seems to be what gets circled.” 
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•  “The guy with the bump on his leg features as indicating some kind of 
illness.”   
•  “That's their vehicle.” 
•  “...their school and university principle” 
• [The] “board symbolizes it's something educational.” 
5.4.2 Arbitrariness 
The relative arbitrariness of the signs affected whether the new participants used the 
systematic compositionality in them.  Their comments indicate that they are 
sometimes willing to copy somewhat arbitrary elements but other times not. 
Participants sometimes copy things that don't make sense to them.  For example, 
one participant drew a farmer “with four arms” even though he admitted not knowing 
why he would have four arms, even joking that the farmer might live in Chrnobyl.  
(The participant was using the drawing of “farming” that he learned, in which the 
original participants put emphasis on the arms to indicate an activity.)  Another 
participant reported that the original pair’s drawing for “professor” looks like a moth, 
and another that their doctor has “circle hands”, but they copied these elements 
nonetheless. 
Participants sometimes change the drawing elements they learned to make more 
sense to them.  For example, one participant used an arrow “to highlight [that it's a] 
room because circling it would be strange” – despite the fact that she knew that the 
original participants never used an arrow and often used circles.  Another said all the 
original participants' vehicles looked a certain way but drew school bus bigger than 
that because it “needs a bit of space for people”.  Another said she copied the 
drawing of farming she learned except for a circle off to the side which never made 
sense to her.  Participants may assume they are misunderstanding the original pair’s 
drawings somehow. 
Participants sometimes report producing motivated drawings for the items.  For 
example, one participant said his drawing of “hospital” was “definitely going to have 
a big building because a hospital is a big building” so that's the first thing that came 
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to his mind.  For “lecturing”, one participant put a professor in the drawing 
because “someone has to do the lecturing.”  Even though three out of four medical 
items he learned had a patient with an injured knee, one participant put a doctor by 
his hospital instead of the patient with injured knee because the “natural assumption 
would be that the doctor would be in the picture as well.”  
Participants sometimes misunderstand drawing components.  For example, the 
second participant to have learned the drawing of “farming” that included the man 
with heavy emphasis on his arms understood that man to be crops.  When he drew 
“farmer”, he drew a new stick figure next to these crops.   
Thus, generalizing from a set of systematically compositional signs that have become 
somewhat arbitrary is no trivial task. 
5.5 Summary 
This thesis aims to address how the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements can arise 
in a language.  We saw it arise in Experiment 1 within dyads.  Experiment 2 has 
shown that this could be the start to proper language, which is used by entire 
communities of people and over generations. While the systematic compositionality 
in the sets of signs may have emerged within a dyad, people who did not help create 
the signs – or even observe their creation – nonetheless can detect it and use it. 
Specifically, new participants are able to detect the systematic compositionality in 




6 Experiment 3: Observation 
This thesis considers the evolution of arbitrariness and the evolution of systematic 
compositionality together, and proposes that the two are not serial developments but 
rather parallel.  In Chapter 4 we presented Experiment 1, which showed the 
emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements in novel signs created by 
pairs of interacting communication partners.  The emergence of systematicity and the 
emergence of arbitrariness were parallel, not serial, developments: systematicity 
emerged immediately, while signs were still highly motivated.  One might argue that 
the communication systems that emerged in Experiment 1were just conceptual pacts 
that could not extend beyond the dyad, i.e. that these communication systems are not 
relevant to proper language, which is used by large communities and generations of 
people.  So in the previous chapter, we began to explore whether these 
communication systems could be extended beyond the dyad.  We presented 
Experiment 2, the generalization experiment, that showed that people who had no 
hand in – indeed, did not even observe – the development of the sets of signs can 
nonetheless detect the systematic compositionality in them and generalize from it 
when producing signs for unobserved items.  In short, people can adopt the 
systematic reuse of arbitrary elements that emerged from motivated signs.    
Chapter 6.  Experiment 3.  
 
102 
In this chapter, we present an experiment which tests whether people actually do 
adopt the systematic reuse of arbitrary elements that emerged, when faced with the 
task of not learning and reproducing, but rather communicating. 
6.1 Rationale 
The goal of the experiment was to test whether the systematicity that developed in 
Experiment 1 – that which persisted from motivated signs –persists through 
generations of participants whose task was communication. 
6.2 Method  
Experiment 3 is almost identical to Experiment 1.  The first exception is that the 
participants spend 15 minutes observing another pair’s signs before playing their 
own game.  The second exception is that the pairs of participants are organized into 
chains of generations, so that a pair observes signs produced by a pair who played 
before them, who in turn observed signs from a pair who played before them, and so 
on. 
Below, we note only the differences from Experiment 1. 
6.2.1 Participants 
24 University of Edinburgh students were recruited.  
Participant pairs were organized into 4 chains of 4 generations each.  Generation 1 is 
an original pair from Experiment 1 (who did not observe anyone else’s drawings 
before playing), Generation 1’s last drawings are observed by Generation 2, 
Generation 2’s last drawings are observed by Generation 3, and Generation 3’s last 
drawings are observed by Generation 4. 
6.2.2 Stimuli 
The drawings observed in the familiarization phase.  The first generation of each 
of the 4 chains was chosen at random from the 12 games of Experiment 1.  Each 
subsequent generation observes what was drawn for the last 30 trials of the previous 
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generation’s game.  In practice, this amounts to observing the signs for 15 – 20 
(M = 18.25) of the 26 core items from the previous generation. 
The items communicated in the game.  These were exactly the same as in 
Experiment 1. 
6.2.3 Procedure 
Participants first read instructions.  The full instructions to the game are included as 
Appendix E.  They are identical to those for Experiment 1, except that they include 
information about the familiarization phase.  Each participant reads that, during the 
familiarization phase, he and his partner will see what another team was drawing at 
the end of their game.  Importantly, each participant reads “Seeing what another team 
did may or may not help you in your game.  When you're the Drawer, just do 
whatever will get your partner to guess correctly and quickly.” 
The familiarization phase lasts 15 minutes.  Each subject in a pair sees screenshots of 
what was drawn for the last 30 trials of the previous generation’s game, in the order 
they occurred in the original game.  For each screenshot/trial, the subjects read what 
the item was, who drew it, and what the Guesser guessed for it.  The participants 
study each screenshot and its associated information for 20 seconds each. 
The pair of participants then plays the same communication game used in 
Experiment 1 (again, for two hours). 
6.3 Analysis 
As in Experiment 1, the Initial and Final sets of signs were coded for systematic 
compositionality. 
In addition, the observed sets were coded for systematicity.  As pairs observed the 
last 30 trials of another pair’s game, and the items occur with varying frequency and 
in random order, each observed set consists of several drawings for some core items 
and no drawings for other core items.  We reasoned that the last trial observed would 
be most salient to the current pair, and so coded the last drawing for each item that 
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occurred in the observed set.  There were just two amendments to the coding 
instructions used in Experiment 1.  First, if the drawings in a category shared an 
element that was prohibited (e.g., the cross for medical items), those drawings were 
excluded from the systematicity analysis.  (The number of drawings was subtracted 
from the total possible systematicity score.)  This is because the next generation was 
not allowed to copy a prohibited element, and here we are interested in how well one 
generation’s systematicity persists through the next generation.  This only happened 
once.  Second, the observation bottleneck sometimes results in there being just one 
drawing in a category.  Of course there can be no element shared across drawings in 
this case, so these drawings were also excluded from the systematicity analysis.  This 
happened just six times, in just four sets of signs. 
As in Experiment 1, the sets were coded blind and in random order.  In addition, the 
full sets were coded before any of the observed subsets.  This was to prevent the 
coder from inadvertently looking for sign elements she marked in the subsets while 
coding the full sets. 
As reported for Experiment 1 (in Chapter 4), we established inter-coder reliability for 
the coding procedure. 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Systematicity increases over generations 
We asked whether the systematic compositionality that emerged in Experiment 1 
could be maintained through generations.  In particular, do new people, faced with 
the task of communicating, choose to use the (often arbitrary) systematic 
compositionality they observed? 
Figure 22 shows the systematic compositionality in each pair’s final set of signs, 
organized by chain and generation.  It’s clear from this that systematic 
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compositionality is being maintained over generations within a chain.  In fact, it 
tends to increase21.  
 
 
Figure 22.  Systematic compositionality of final sets of signs by generation.  There is a (non-
significant) increase in systematic compositionality over generations. 
 
Let’s look at the chains step-by-step to determine the origin(s) of this increase in 
systematicity. 
6.4.2 From a generation’s final set of signs to the subset of it that 
the next generation observes 
It could happen that a set of signs has less systematicity than a particular subset of it.  
For example, by chance, the idiosyncratic signs may not be observed.  Since our 
systematicity measure is a proportion, this would make the systematicity of the 
subset greater than that of the set.   
This turns out not to be the case.  A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test found no significant 
difference between the systematic compositionality scores of Final sets of signs and 
that of their associated subsets (p= 0.2238). 
                                                
21 This increase is not significant.  This may be due to the small sample sizes. 
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6.4.3 From the set of signs a generation observes to the first 
signs they produce 
Instead, the increase in systematic compositionality occurs when pairs produce their 
Initial signs, after observing the previous generation’s signs.  The systematic 
compositionality in the Initial sets of signs pairs produced is greater than that of the 
set of signs they observed. (MInitial = 0.44, SD = 0.13; MObserved = 0.36, SD = 0.2)  A 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test confirmed this.  (p < 0.05)   
The fact that the systematic compositionality is increasing at this stage suggests that 
people are generalizing: they are drawing unobserved items in a way that is more 
systematic than the original pair drew them.  
6.4.4 From a pair’s initial signs to their final signs 
As in Experiment 1, pairs tended to maintain the systematicity they produced in their 
Initial signs through to their Final signs.  A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test found no 
significant difference between the amount of systematic compositionality in pairs’ 
Initial sets of signs and that of their Final sets of signs. (p = 0.82, MInitial = 0.4322, SD 
= 0.13; MFinal = 0.44, SD = 0.17) 
6.4.5 Summary of systematicity results 
Systematicity is not only maintained over generations; it increases.  The increase 
doesn’t happen as a result of taking a subset of the signs to be observed.  That is, one 
generation’s final signs are no less systematic than the subset of them that the next 
generation observes.  Nor does the systematic compositionality increase over the 
course of a generation’s game - the final signs a generation produces are no more 
systematic than their initial signs.  Rather, systematic compositionality is increased 
from pairs’ observed subsets to their initial signs.  This suggests that, with each 
                                                
22 This mean is slightly different than the mean reported in the previous paragraph because that was 
the mean systematic compositionality of the Initial sets of signs produced by pairs who had observed 
another pair’s set.  The current mean is the mean systematic compositionality of the Initial sets of 
signs produced by all pairs (including the first generation, who did not observe anyone’s signs. 
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generation, some idiosyncratic signs (perhaps those not observed) are being 
replaced with systematic ones. 
6.5 Transmission possibilities and issues 
Here we offer a more qualitative analysis of when and how individual sign elements 
(conventions for representing semantic features) are adopted by subsequent 
generations.   
Note that the drawings for a category of items sometimes have more than one 
element in common, exhibiting a family resemblance.  When coding for 
systematicity, we focused on just the strongest shared element.  Here we looked at all 
of the shared elements.   
We found that subjects exhibited a wide range of behaviors. 
6.5.1 Similarity of drawings to the previous generation’s 
Participants often draw an item the same way as they observed.  Further, they are 
comfortably copying even pretty arbitrary drawings.  (Based on their feedback, this 
may depend on whether they can make sense of them enough to memorize them.)  
  
observed drawing of 
gourmet kitchen  
first drawing of  
gourmet kitchen 
Sometimes this involves re-interpretation of the observed drawing.  In the case 
below, the observed pair was drawing corn in the farmer's mouth, but the next 
generation understood this as a rake: 
  
observed drawing of  
farmer 
first drawing of 
farmer 
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Also, one pair observed this for doctor: 
 
The one participant in the pair understood it as a stethoscope but the other reported 
after the experiment: “I just thought it was a guy upside down”, that he never 
understood what it had to do with doctor, and but just copied from the other pair. 
6.5.2 Adding detail to observed signs 
Participants often add detail to the signs they observe.  It could be that the Drawer 
remembers the sign he observed exactly but isn't sure that the Guesser will, that the 
Guesser doesn’t guess quickly enough so the Drawer adds detail, or that what the 
Drawer “remembers” is not the exact drawing but his interpretation of it.  Here's an 
example: 
  
observed drawing of 
doctor 
first drawing of doctor 
 
6.5.3 Cumulative simplification of signs 
Cumulative simplification can be observed in one chain’s initial drawings of doctor: 
    
generation 1’s initial 
drawing of doctor 
 
generation 2’s initial 
drawing of doctor 
generation 3’s initial 
drawing of doctor 
generation 4’s initial 
drawingo of doctor 




6.5.4 Systematic compositionality is not always maintained. 
Regarding systematic compositionality, there was at least one example of a highly 
systematically compositional system being abandoned by the next generation.  One 
generation’s final drawings for fire items were: 
    
firefighter fire station fire-fighting fire engine 
They each include the same wave-like figure on the left. 
Each of these was observed by the next generation one or two times.  Yet here are 
that generation’s initial drawings for the fire items: 
    
firefighter fire station fire-fighting fire engine 
 
And here are their final drawings for the fire items: 
    
firefighter fire station fire-fighting fire engine 
These signs are much less systematically compositional. 
This may have been due to some combination of the participants adding detail to 
drawings they observed (later cutting the regular/systematic detail out, leaving just 
idiosyncratic elements) and them not picking up on distinctions the previous 
generation made. 
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As another example, a sign for university items emerged, was just transparent 
enough to be copied by the next generation, but then became too obscure to be 
copied by the following generation.  Here are some of the drawings of university 
items that the third generation observed from the second: 
    
professor university lecturing lecture theatre 
 
The third generation kept the bowtie.  Here are some of the third generation's 
drawings of university items that the fourth generation observed: 
   
professor university lecturing 
 
But then the fourth generation didn't use the bowtie.  After the experiment, they 
reported that they didn’t know what it was.  Here's the fourth generation's initial 
drawing of each university item: 
    
professor university lecturing lecture theatre 
 
And here's their final drawing of each university item: 
    
professor university lecturing lecture theatre 
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The bowtie has been completely lost. 
6.5.5 Collapsing distinctions observed 
Participants often don't pick up on distinctions they observed.  For example, one 
generation was distinguishing the primary education items from the university items 
by drawing the professor with a mortarboard and the teacher with a chalkboard and 
children.  Here are the examples the next generation observed: 
    
teaching school lecturing university 
    
lecture theatre teacher professor school bus 
   
 
teacher classroom lecturing  
 
Below are the first drawings for each of the primary education and university items 
from the next generation.  Drawings for both primary education and university items 
include the mortarboard, chalkboard, and children – the distinction between 
university and primary education items has been lost. 
     
teacher school teaching school bus classroom 
   
 
 
professor university lecturing  lecture theatre 
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6.5.6 Increasing systematicity in unobserved items 
Sometimes drawings for unobserved items are fairly systematic.  One pair's initial 
drawing of hospital is a good example.  Here some of the buildings (first row) and 
medical items (second row) that they observed: 
     
fire station school university restaurant barn 
   
  
doctor medical emergency ambulance   
 
Strikingly, their initial drawing of hospital (which they had not observed) has the 
building component and the medical component: 
 
It’s perfectly systematically compositional. 
6.5.7 Increasing systematicity in observed items 
Participants have changed even observed signs to be more regular.  The pair above 
added the medical component to their initial drawing of doctor (which they had 
observed as just a person with a stethoscope): 
 
 
Chapter 6.  Experiment 3.  
 
113 
Here's another example of participants regularizing a drawing they had observed: 
all drawings of buildings which one pair observed from another 
     
fire station barn school hospital hospital 
    
 
barn school hospital university  
 
that pair’s initial drawings of buildings 
     
fire station hospital restaurant university school 
 
    
barn     
 
Notice how university and fire station have changed.  Even school has lost the 
horizon line.  (Note that, as here, restaurant is often an exception – participants 
reported not thinking of it as a building.) 
6.5.8 The role of arbitrariness 
Subjects provided informative feedback about what they copied and why.  Strikingly, 
the degree of (perceived) motivatedness of the whole signs or sign elements was 
often reported as a major factor. 
Whether an element gets adopted or not seems to interact with arbitrariness.  This is 
an issue that previous work on the evolution of systematicity, which started from a 
set of arbitrary signs, was unable to address.  Under the current view, in which signs 
Chapter 6.  Experiment 3.  
 
114 
do not necessarily become totally arbitrary before systematicity evolves, we see 
that people have an alternative to adopting any arbitrary systematicity they observe: 
they may decide that a novel, motivated sign is more likely to be successful. 
6.6 Summary 
Thus, conventions developed in a dyad which make sets of signs systematically reuse 
arbitrary elements aren’t lost to subsequent generations, but rather can be seen as the 
start to real languages which are used in communities and generations of people. 
When faced with the task of communicating quickly and accurately, subjects will 
sometimes adopt other’s conventions for representing semantic features.   
In addition, qualitative analysis of some of the signs produced in this experiment 
give us a sense of the issues that might be addressed in future work.  Exploring the 
evolution of systematicity starting from a set of arbitrary signs has allowed us to 





7.1 Our contribution 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
arises in a language.   
In Chapter 1, we argued that two common ways of characterizing signs – by the 
degree of motivatedness they exhibit and by the degree of systematic 
compositionality they exhibit – are not necessarily orthogonal.  Thus, the emergence 
of arbitrariness and of systematic compositionality in language should be studied 
together.  We focused on a particular interface of the two properties: the systematic 
re-use of arbitrary elements.   
In Chapter 2, we noted that previous work that demonstrates how novel signs can 
emerge and then evolve to become arbitrary does not measure systematic 
compositionality.  On the other hand, previous work on systematic compositionality 
proposes a mechanism for the evolution of systematic compositionality and a 
measure of the property, but does not address the evolution of arbitrariness.  
We introduced a ‘parallel theory’ of the emergence of the systematic re-use of 
arbitrary elements in Chapter 3, in which arbitrariness and systematic 
compositionality arise in a parallel, rather than serial, manner.  We argued 
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specifically that systematic compositionality can emerge before signs have 
become completely arbitrary and that this systematic compositionality can be 
maintained as signs become arbitrary. 
In Chapter 4, we reported the first of a series of experiments that probe how the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements arises in novel communication systems.  In 
Experiment 1, partners communicated items to each other by drawing on a 
whiteboard.  They were prohibited from using conventional language or any pre-
existing symbols, so they had to create their signs from scratch.  They communicated 
about the same limited set of items over a long period of time.  In this way, we were 
able to examine how their drawings for the items changed over the course of 
interaction.  The items they communicated about were structured, i.e. they shared 
semantic features with each other.  In this way, we could examine the degree of 
systematic compositionality in the sets of signs.  We found that the systematic re-use 
of arbitrary elements emerged.  Further, the evolution of arbitrariness and systematic 
compositionality were parallel: even participants’ first drawings of items were 
systematically compositional, and this systematic compositionality was maintained 
as the signs became more arbitrary. 
Chapter 5 presented Experiment 2, in which we began to explore how the systematic 
re-use of arbitrary elements that arises could be extended beyond pairs of closely 
interacting communication partners.  Naïve participants were trained on a subset of a 
very systematically compositional set of signs and asked to guess what the original 
participants drew for the missing items.  Despite the fact that the naïve participants 
played no role in – indeed, did not even observe – the creation of the sign systems, 
they could detect the systematic compositionality in them and generalize from it. 
Chapter 6, the previous chapter, presented Experiment 3, which tested whether 
participants actually do make use of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements that 
they observe in others’ sign systems, when faced with the task of communicating 
(rather than learning and reproducing signs).  Participants played the same game as 
in Experiment 1 but observed the end of another pair’s game for 15 minutes before 
starting their own.  Pairs of participants were organized into generations, so that a 
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pair observed signs produced by a pair who played before them, who in turn 
observed signs from a pair who played before them, and so on.  The systematic 
compositionality was not only maintained, but appears to have increased, over 
generations.  The increase in systematic compositionality occurred when pairs 
created signs for items they did not observe – presumably, as they generalized using 
the systematic compositionality they observed. 
In sum, the main contribution of this thesis has been to explore an alternative 
mechanism for the emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements: 
arbitrariness and systematic compositionality emerge in a parallel fashion within the 
dyad, and subsequent communicators maintain – or even increase – the structure they 
have observed.   
7.2 Broader implications 
Our results carry some broader implications.  We’ll examine the relevance of our 
work beyond the graphical modality and how our work might contribute to a more 
general theory of the evolution of signs. 
7.2.1 Beyond the graphical modality 
Our experiments were designed to demonstrate how the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements can arise in sets of signs.  While our experiments used a novel 
communication medium (graphics), our demonstration applies to communication in 
general, and spoken language in particular.  We hypothesized (in Chapter 3) and then 
demonstrated (in Chapter 4) how systematic compositionality could emerge in novel 
signs.  Motivatedness and interaction history were identified as key factors.  There is 
no reason to believe that either of these factors is specific to the graphical modality.  
Consider interaction history first, and recall the pair who drew “school bus” as a 
school bus next to a chalkboard because they had earlier drawn “teacher” as a stick 
figure next to a chalkboard (resulting in the signals for similar meanings sharing an 
element).  We could see the same effect in the spoken modality: if a pair’s 
vocalization for a meaning included a certain sound, one person in the pair could 
very well produce that same sound in the vocalization for a related concept later, as a 
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way of referencing the first.  As for the second factor, motivatedness, recall our 
various demonstrations of how the beginnings of spoken language could have been 
motivated (in Chapter 2).  To name just a few, some sounds carry meaning cross-
linguistically, some sound-meaning correspondences that appear in one language are 
actually recognized universally, and experiments show that people associate many 
different aspects of sound with many different aspects of meaning. 
Interestingly, along the way we have also discovered some clues about how spoken 
language might have gotten off the ground.  First, we have shown that there are many 
motivated ways to refer to a given item.  We discussed this while reviewing previous 
work on how the beginnings of spoken language could be motivated in Chapter 2.  
We then found in our experiments that, for a given meaning, there are many signals 
that have some kind of inherent connection to it.  Recall, for example, the great many 
associations that participants made to the item “farmer”, which we illustrated in our 
discussion of Experiment 1 in Chapter 4.  This lends additional support to the idea 
that a speech signal need not sound like the actual meaning, but rather could sound 
like some association to the meaning. 
Second, it seems that motivatedness is crucial only for the very first signs.  Once 
several signs have been established, new signs can be built off of those.  While 
presenting our hypothesis in Chapter 3, we proposed that initial systematic 
compositionality in signs could be due to the interaction history shared by partners.  
Experiment 1 confirmed that interaction history was indeed a very important factor: 
the systematic compositionality we see in initial sets of signs is specific to the pairs.  
There seems to be a tendency of communication partners to re-use elements from 
signs they already have when creating new signs.  Thus, people creating a 
communication system don’t need to find a motivated way of expressing every 
meaning.   
Considering all the ways sound can map to meaning and how small a role 
motivatedness need play in the creation of signs, we can see how spoken language 
might have evolved.  Thus, although we have demonstrated the emergence of the 
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systematic re-use of arbitrary elements in the graphical modality, our results 
apply to communication in general, including spoken language. 
7.2.2 A more general theory of the evolution of signs 
We designed an experimental paradigm that allowed us to explore the emergence of 
arbitrariness and the emergence of systematic compositionality together, and found 
that the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements can emerge in a way not previously 
suggested.  Looking at the emergence of the two properties together was informative 
because, based on previous work, one might have assumed that novel signs are not 
systematically compositional or that, as signs become arbitrary, they would lose any 
systematic compositionality they had. 
The broader implication of this finding is that there may be much to be gained from 
examining the evolution of linguistic properties together.  Now that significant work 
has been done to establish how linguistic properties evolve independently, the field 
of evolutionary linguistics may be ready to explore interactions between them.  As 
just one example, we might also explore how the emergence of combinatoriality 
interacts with the emergence of arbitrariness. 
Experiments like those could contribute to a more general theory of the evolution of 
signs.  It might predict what constrains the signal that one produces for a given 
meaning (in a particular context).  For example, one might aim to produce a signal 
that resembles the meaning (motivatedness), that resembles the signal previously 
produced by one’s communication partner for that meaning (interaction history), 
and/or that fits in with other signs one uses (systematic compositionality).  In our 
experiments, we have witnessed these three particular constraints at work, but there 
are surely others.  The relative weighting of these constraints may depend on what’s 
in the common ground between the people communicating.  For example, perhaps 
the only things someone can expect to share with a stranger is universal information.  
If so, motivatedness may be the strongest constraint.  Between members of the same 
speech community, systematic compositionality may carry more weight. 
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7.3 Future Work 
Our results have raised some important issues, which the experimental paradigm we 
presented in this thesis could be straightforwardly extended to address.  The issues 
cluster around the emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements and the 
maintenance of systematic compositionality as a set of signs developed by some 
people is transmitted to others. 
7.3.1 Emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
Now that we have demonstrated an additional route to the systematic re-use of 
arbitrary elements, the obvious question is: are there others?  That is, how else might 
the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements emerge in a language?  Let’s compare the 
most influential human experiment on the evolution of the systematic re-use of 
arbitrary elements, Kirby, et al. (2008)’s, with ours.  We’ll see they differ in a 
number of ways: the role of a bottleneck in the transmission of signs, how compelled 
the participants feel to copy others’ signs (as opposed to creating their own), and the 
degree of feedback the participants receive about whether their signs were 
understood. We’ll then suggest experiments that could bridge the gap. 
What role need a bottleneck play in the emergence of systematic 
compositionality?  In Kirby, et al. (2008), the participant representing the first 
generation learned some of the signs of an alien language and then was asked to 
recall all of them, the second generation participant learned some of the signs the 
first participant produced and then was asked to recall all of them, and so on.  Thus 
there was a transmission bottleneck – not all of the signs were transmitted from one 
generation to the next23.  This bottleneck created systematic compositionality – the 
initial alien languages consisted of arbitrary signs (which exhibited only chance 
recurrences between signal elements and meaning elements), while the final 
generations’ languages were highly systematically compositional.  This happened 
because each generation replaced some of the previous generation’s arbitrary signs – 
                                                
23 There can also be a memory bottleneck, in which each participant is exposed to all of another 
participant’s signs but cannot retain all of them in his memory. 
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presumably, those they did not observe – with signs that followed rules they 
noticed in the signs they did learn (viz. that some signals for similar meanings shared 
elements). 
In contrast, there was no such bottleneck in Experiment 1.  There was no language 
that the participants were supposed to learn but were only partially exposed to – our 
participants weren’t exposed to any language; they knew they had to create the signs 
they would use.  Despite the lack of a bottleneck in Experiment 124, systematic 
compositionality emerged.  
Our Experiment 3 began to bridge the gap between Experiment 1 and Kirby, et al. 
(2008), showing how the mechanisms for the creation of systematic compositionality 
in each can work in tandem.  Pairs of participants in Experiment 3 were tasked with 
communicating with each other (as in Experiment 1) but both observed another 
pair’s signs for some of the items they would communicate.  Over generations of 
this, the systematic compositionality in novel signs was maintained or increased.  
More work is needed to determine exactly what role a bottleneck need play in the 
creation of systematic compositionality. 
When do people communicate by copying others’ signs, as opposed to creating 
their own? 
In our Experiments 1, the task of the participants is to communicate items to their 
partner.  They are prohibited from using any pre-existing symbols, and so they create 
motivated signs.  The motivatedness appeared to aid the emergence of systematic 
compositionality. 
Kirby et al. (2008)’s experiment stands in contrast.  The task of their participants was 
to learn and then recall someone else’s signs for items.  Systematic compositionality 
                                                
24 There appeared to be no memory bottleneck in the game either.  Pairs did not appear to forget how 
they draw any of their items.  A programming error resulted in one of the filler items appearing twice 
in one pair’s game, the second occurrence 44 trials after the first.  The second drawing of that item 
was strikingly similar to the first, suggesting that the Drawer remembered how they had drawn the 
item the first time. 
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emerged as the participants based their guesses about signs they didn’t learn on 
signs they did learn. 
These two tasks – communicating with someone vs. reproducing someone’s signs – 
are actually quite different.  Today, with conventional language, the best way to 
communicate with someone is very often to use the language one copied from others.  
But before a community shares linguistic conventions, the pressure to communicate 
may often have been in conflict with the pressure to reproduce others’ signs.  
Imagine a language is just getting off the ground, and Adam has learned signs from 
(or co-created signs with) Bob.  Adam cannot be sure that Chris has also learned 
these signs.  Assuming the signs that Adam learned have lost some transparency (due 
to simplification), the signs best for communication with Chris are not necessarily 
the signs he can reproduce from Bob.  
So we ask: what if the task of Kirby et al. (2008)‘s participants had been to 
communicate any way they liked?  Experiment 3 moved us in the direction of 
addressing this, as participants in that observed others’ signs (although they were not 
instructed to copy them).  Those participants, given the task of communication, 
sometimes copied signs, but sometimes either created novel motivated signs or made 
the signs they copied more motivated.  Even in Experiment 2, when the participants 
were tasked with guessing what a pair drew for some items (i.e. not with 
communicating), motivatedness played a role in their guesses.  
While there’s surely a strong pressure to copy signs from others once a language is 
established, that pressure may not be as strong from the very first signs.  When 
people are able (i.e. allowed) to create novel, motivated signs, they may not copy 
others’ arbitrary signs.  Thus, it’s an open question when the best way to 
communicate is by copying others’ signs, as opposed to creating your own signs.   
What role does the level of feedback from one’s communication partner play? 
In Experiment 1, partners communicated the same items to each other over a long 
period of time.  When a participant was the Drawer, he saw what his partner guessed.  
When he was the Guesser, he learned what the actual item was that trial. 
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Kirby, et al. (2008)’s participants interacted much less directly.  Each participant 
learned the signs produced by the previous participant, was instructed to reproduce 
the previous participant’s signs, but did not learn whether or not he was successful.  
We know that systematic compositionality emerges under these circumstances, but 
what about arbitrariness?  The initial languages in these experiments are arbitrary, so 
the experiments don’t address the emergence of arbitrariness.  In (Garrod, et al., 
2007)’s experiments, signs became arbitrary only in the conditions in which 
participants received feedback about the success of their signs.  However, it’s 
possible that there are other pressures towards arbitrariness.  Future work could 
probe what effect these different levels of feedback have on the emergence of the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements. 
Extensions to our experimental paradigm could answer the questions outlined 
above.  With Experiment 1, we offer a novel experimental paradigm to investigate 
how and when systematic compositionality and arbitrariness emerge in novel 
communication systems. This could be extended to address the above issues.  Here 
we present three possible experiments.  We name these the “transmission chain”, 
“replacement”, and “closed-group” experiments, borrowing Mesoudi & Whiten 
(2008)’s classification of methods of cultural transmission. 
The transmission chain experiment.  Essentially, this is a graphical communication 
version of Kirby, et al. (2008)‘s experiment.  The first participant draws the (26 core) 
items used in our experiments on a whiteboard.  To induce the move towards 
arbitrariness (that signs make over a longer period of time than an experiment can 
capture), he is instructed to draw as quickly as he can.  He is told to draw the items 
for someone to later identify.  The next participant learns some of the first 
participant’s signs, e.g., the drawings for 13 of the 26 items, selected at random.  
This second participant then draws all of the items for the first participant to identify, 
as quickly as she can.  The third participant learns some of the second participant’s 
signs (a different, randomly-chosen subset) and then draws all of them, for the 
second participant to identify, as quickly as he can, and so on. 
Chapter 7.  Conclusions.  
 
124 
This experiment is similar to Kirby, et al. (2008)’s in that there is a transmission 
bottleneck – a participant doesn’t learn a drawing for every item he will later have to 
express – and in that the participant producing the signals does not receive feedback 
on whether he successfully communicated.  However, in terms of whether one 
communicates by copying others’ signs, this experiment is somewhere in between 
Kirby, et al. (2008)’s and ours.  The task of the participant is to communicate to the 
previous participant, not to reproduce the previous participant’s signs.  However, 
drawing items the way the previous participant did may be precisely the best strategy 
for communicating to that participant.  Thus, the main motivation for this experiment 
would be to test the role of feedback in the emergence of the systematic re-use of 
arbitrary elements. 
The replacement experiment.  The replacement experiment begins with two people 
(A and B) playing the graphical communication game introduced in our Experiment 
1 (communicating the same set of items to each other using the whiteboard, 
switching roles often, receiving immediate feedback about their communicative 
success, etc.).  However, just before the end of A and B’s game, a new player (C) 
begins to observe them play25.  After a while, C replaces A, and B and C continue the 
game.  A new player (D) eventually begins to observe them and then later replaces B 
so that C and D are playing, and so on.   
How could this experiment address our open questions?  The design is very similar 
to our Experiment 3.  In particular, there is a bottleneck on transmission of a set of 
signs from one pair to the next, as the observer will not observe and remember all of 
the pair’s signs.  Further, participants receive immediate feedback about their 
communicative success.  This should allow sign elements to become more arbitrary. 
The point of this experiment, thus, would be to address our question about when 
people decide to communicate by copying others’ signs as opposed to creating novel, 
                                                
25 Participants should be told that they may be observed and may or may not swap partners during the 
game.  In this way, a participant won’t be confused when his partner is swapped, but participants also 
won’t try to design a set of signs that would be useful with strangers. 
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motivated signs.  The task is to communicate, not explicitly to copy someone 
else’s signs.  The pressure to copy someone else’s signs is greater than in our 
Experiment 3, as all but the first participants will begin the game playing with 
someone who already has signs, and so it would be very useful to simply copy his 
signs.  The pressure to copy someone else’s signs is less than in Kirby, et al. (2008), 
though.  First, the participant has a greater sense of co-creating the set of signs.26  
Second, the participant is generally freer to draw what he wants and simply add 
information if his partner does not guess from that. 
The closed-group experiment.  In the closed-group experiment, participants always 
play in pairs, and their task is exactly as in Experiment 1.  The difference is that 
participants switch partners each round (say, six trials).  There could be, for example, 
a community of four participants in each run of this experiment.   
This experiment would explore the role of the bottleneck in the emergence of the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.  The bottleneck introduced would be a 
memory bottleneck – a participant may forget how to draw a given item with a given 
partner (viz. how the two participants have drawn that item with each other in the 
past).  This may result in increasing systematic compositionality in the set of signs 
because idiosyncratic signs are less likely to be remembered than elements used in 
multiple signs.  On the other hand, the participants may simply assume that, since 
they are all playing with each other, they are all using the same signs.  In that case, 
there’d be no more of a bottleneck than in our original game. 
This closed-group experiment would additionally explore the pressure to copy 
others’ signs in an interesting way.  Since players would switch partners often, there 
may be a pressure on the signs to retain a degree of motivatedness (Fay, Garrod, 
MacLeod, Lee, & Oberlander, 2004).  This is, again, because one cannot be sure that 
                                                
26 The experimenter could further manipulate the pressure to copy vs. create novel, motivated signs by 
changing which of the players draws each item first. If the retained player draws a given item first, he 
may simply draw what he had been drawing with his previous partner.  However, if the new player 
draws a given item first, and he has not observed or does not remember how that item had been 
drawn, he is likely to re-invent the sign for that item. 
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his current partner will understand a certain sign, because he cannot remember if 
they used it together, so he will err on the side of transparency.  On the other hand, 
being part of a community may provide a pressure to copy the signs everyone else is 
using, whether or not they are transparent. 
In fact, we have piloted the three possible future experiments just outlined.  The 
basic designs are sound, but there are logistical issues to resolve.  For example, 
because participants interact with many new people in these, the signs don’t appear 
to simplify as quickly.  Thus, the game time should be extended. 
With these three experiments we can begin to explore the factors governing the 
emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.  One can imagine many 
other straightforward – yet highly informative – extensions to the experimental 
paradigm we have presented in this thesis.   
7.3.2 Transmission of systematic compositionality 
In addition to exploring other routes to the emergence of the systematic re-use of 
arbitrary elements, future work should probe deeper into the transmission of sets of 
signs that exhibit this property. 
We began this thesis by arguing that there is good reason to explore the evolution of 
arbitrariness and the evolution of systematic compositionality together.  Indeed, in 
our experiments, we consistently found that the degree of residual motivatedness of 
signs affected the transmission and maintenance of systematic compositionality in 
them.  For example, in Experiment 2, participants sometimes reported using their 
own understanding of the drawings they learned, and of how they would draw the 
items themselves, in making guesses about how another pair drew the items.  Thus, 
our experiments have demonstrated that the relationship between motivatedness and 
systematic compositionality is far from straightforward. 
Future work could pit motivatedness against systematic compositionality in order to 
gain a better understanding of how they interact.  We suggest an experiment that we 
name the “anti-motivated but systematically compositional mapping” experiment. 
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The anti-motivated but systematically compositional mapping experiment.  
In this experiment, a participant learns a highly systematically compositional set of 
signs, taken from the end of a pair’s game.  The catch is that drawings are mapped to 
the items in the wrong way, e.g., the original pair’s drawing for “lecture theatre” is 
said to be what they drew for “fire-fighting”.  This is much like the Random set used 
in Experiment 2, except that the drawings are mapped to the items in a way that 
preserves systematic compositionality.  For example, all of the original pair’s 
drawings for rooms are said to be their drawings for activities, and all of the original 
pair’s drawings for university items are said to be for items relating to fire-fighting. 
Figure 23 shows how an anti-motivated but systematically compositional set of signs 
might look. 
As in Experiment 2, the participants’ task is to learn most of the signs in the set and 
then to guess what the original players drew for the missing items.  To the extent that 
residual motivatedness plays a role in the transmission and maintenance of 
systematic compositionality, the participants will make the wrong generalizations.  




Figure 23.  An example of an anti-motivated yet systematically compositional set of signs.  The 
drawings are one pair’s final signs for the items, but mapped to the wrong items.  This anti-
motivated mapping preserves systematic compositionality, though, in that the drawings for one 
semantic feature are said to be for another. 
A pilot of this experiment produced interesting results.  The participant was able to 
correctly generalize in some cases, but not all.   In this, and similar pilots, 
participants reported seeing the iconicity in signals mapped incorrectly to their 
meanings.  However, some incorrect mappings were rejected.  For example, the pilot 
participant could not accept that a drawing of what was obviously a vehicle could be 
someone’s sign for, say, building, even though she could see that it always occurred 
in signs for buildings and never occurred in signs for vehicles.  Thus, while a signal 
element can be arbitrarily mapped to a semantic feature (as they are in morphology), 
there appear to be constraints on the form of the signal element, viz. it cannot have a 
strong natural connection to a different meaning.  This is just one example of ways 
we might see motivatedness and systematic compositionality interact.   
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7.4 Concluding remarks 
In sum, we hope that this thesis is just the beginning of an interesting and important 
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Appendix A: Instructions to participants in 
Experiment 1. 
You two are going to communicate items to each other by drawing.  You'll take turns 
being the Drawer and the Guesser. 
When you're the Drawer, you'll see an item (such as Arnold Schwarzenegger) at the 
top of your screen. You want your partner to guess exactly that.  You may NOT use 
any symbols or drawing conventions, such as: 
• letters 
• numbers 
• punctuation (?, !, etc.) 
• mathematical signs (+, =, <, etc.) 
• pointing with arrows 
• universal signs (the cross for first aid, a skull and cross-bones for danger, 
etc.) 
• drawing conventions (a heart to represent love, + over the eyes to show that 
someone is dead, etc.) 
Imagine your partner is an alien who has spent time on Earth but has never drawn, 





When you're the Guesser, as soon as you can, guess by typing into the chat 
window. You may not type anything other than your actual guess. (For example, you 
may NOT type I think it's Arnold Schwarzenegger or Arnold Schwarzenegger?)  You 
may not scroll up in your chat window to remind yourself of previous guesses.  Your 
team gets just one guess per item. 
As the Drawer, you must stop drawing immediately. Type exactly what your item 
was, and nothing else. (For example, you may NOT type Right! or You were close - it 
was Arnold Schwarzenegger.) 
Your team gets 1 point for every correct guess and loses 1 point for any incorrect 
guess or drawing that included a symbol or convention.  Your team's goal is to get as 
many points as possible in the allotted time. Subjects from the top three teams will be 
entered into a prize draw for an additional 20 GBP! 






Appendix B: Instructions for coding systematic 
compositionality. 
 
You’re going to see sets of drawings from a communication game.  In it, pairs of 
people communicated items (such as “teacher” or “medical emergency”) to each 
other by drawing on a whiteboard. Partners played with each other for a very long 
time, drawing the same 26 items for each other over and over again. 
You’re going to see sets of drawings.  Each set contains a drawing for each of the 26 
items (below), and represents what players were drawing at a point in time in their 




buildings rooms vehicles 
primary 
education 
teacher teaching school classroom school bus 
university 
education 













fire-fighting firefighter fire-fighting fire station  fire engine 
farming farmer farming barn  tractor 









I want to know how systematic each set of signs is, i.e. to what extent drawings for 
similar items have an element in common.  Notice that the drawings in each row and 
in each column will be for similar items.  For example, the drawings in the fourth 
row of each set will be for items that relate to fire-fighting.  You’re going to look at 
each row and each column and tell me if any of the drawings in it have an element in 
common.  If so, briefly describe or draw the element and mark which of the drawings 
have it. 
Only pick out an element if you’re sure that there was a special understanding 
between the players to draw a certain thing (or things) a certain way to mean that 
those items relate to fire-fighting, that those items are buildings, etc.  
It’s completely fine if the drawings in a row or a column have nothing at all in 
common.  You may even see totally unsystematic sets of signs, in which none of the 










Two people played a game where they had to communicate items to each other by 
drawing on a whiteboard.  It was sort of like Pictionary, except they communicated 
the same 40 items over and over to each other, for about 2 hours.  They took turns 
drawing and guessing.    
 
I'm going to show you some of the signs these people were using at the very end of 
their game.  You'll see a screenshot of the whiteboard at the moment the guesser 
guessed.  You'll see what the item was (e.g., “root canal”) and which player was 





  root_canal-D1.jpg  
 
You'll only see signs that were guessed correctly.  (The above “root canal” was not!)  
your task 
You have 15 minutes to learn these signs.   
 
After your 15 minutes, you'll be tested - you'll have to draw these players' signs for 
some of the items.  For example, I might give you “root canal” and you'd have to 
draw the sign above.  The better you copy their signs, the better your chances of 
winning the 20 pound prize draw! 
 
Look at the signs as many times, for however long, and in any order you want.  You 
may want to copy the signs (in the Paint window), to practice drawing them. 
 
While you're learning the signs, note: 
 
! You're seeing only some of their signs - they had to communicate about more 
items than you see.  






! Some of the signs you'll see are from player 1 and some from player 2.  You 
may notice slight differences in their styles.  (For your test, you can draw the 
items either way.)   
! You'll see the signs in a different order than they appeared to them in their 
game.   
! A player stopped drawing the moment his partner guessed.  Some of the signs 
you're seeing might be interruptions. 
Ready? 
When you're ready, start the timer and start looking through the signs.   After your 15 
minutes is up, scroll down for the test instructions. 
 
[on the next page] 
the test 
your task 
Your task now is to draw what these people drew for some items. 
 
Recall that you saw only some of their signs - they had to communicate about more 
items than you saw.  You're going to draw items you didn't see.  I will compare your 
guess with their actual sign.  The closer the match, the better your chances of 
winning the 20 pound prize draw! 
 
You can look at the drawings you just studied when making your guess. 
 
If you can, please explain your guesses to me. 
 
Take your time! 
You only have a handful of items to draw.  That means you have several minutes to 
draw each.  It's important for my research - and your chances in the prize draw - that 







Appendix D: Instructions to similarity judges in 
Experiment 2. 
 
You have two sets of strips of drawings (B & C).  Do the following for one set at a 
time: 
 
1. Organize the 12 strips into 6 pairs of strips.  Group strips together if they are 
more similar to each other than they are to any other strips. 
 
That is, make strip X and strip Y a pair if strip X is more similar to strip Y 
than it is to any other strip, and strip Y is more similar to strip X than it is to 
any other strip. 
 
It may be hard to decide.  Just do your best to pair the strips according to 
similarity. 
 
2. Write down your 6 pairs of strips. 
 
3. For each of your 6 pairs of strips, rate how similar they are to each other on a 
scale of 1 to 10.  1 means there’s no similarity at all between the drawings in 
the strips.  10 means the drawings in the strips are exactly the same. 
 






Appendix E: Instructions to participants in 
Experiment 3. 
 
how to play the game 
You two are going to communicate items to each other by drawing.  You'll take turns 
being the Drawer and the Guesser. 
When you're the Drawer, you'll see an item (such as Arnold Schwarzenegger) at the 
top of your screen. You want your partner to guess exactly that.  You may NOT use 
any symbols or drawing conventions, such as: 
• letters 
• numbers 
• punctuation (?, !, etc.) 
• mathematical signs (+, =, <, etc.) 
• pointing with arrows 
• universal signs (the cross for first aid, a skull and cross-bones for danger, 
etc.) 
• drawing conventions (a heart to represent love, + over the eyes to show that 
someone is dead, etc.) 
Imagine your partner is an alien who has spent time on Earth but has never drawn, 





When you're the Guesser, as soon as you can, guess by typing into the chat 
window. You may not type anything other than your actual guess. (For example, you 
may NOT type I think it's Arnold Schwarzenegger or Arnold Schwarzenegger?)  You 
may not scroll up in your chat window to remind yourself of previous guesses.  Your 
team gets just one guess per item. 
As the Drawer, you must stop drawing immediately. Type exactly what your item 
was, and nothing else. (For example, you may NOT type Right! or You were close - it 
was Arnold Schwarzenegger.) 
Your team gets 1 point for every correct guess and loses 1 point for any incorrect 
guess or drawing that included a symbol or convention.  Your team's goal is to get as 
many points as possible in the allotted time. Subjects from the top three teams will be 
entered into a prize draw for an additional 20 GBP! 
The items are generated randomly. You may get the same item twice, even in a row. 
familiarization 
Before you play your game, I'll show you and your partner what another team was 
doing at the very end of their game. 
 For each of the last 30 items of their game, you'll see a screenshot of the whiteboard 
at the moment the Guesser guessed. 
 Remember that the Guesser guessed as soon as possible - possibly "interrupting" the 
Drawer. 
 At the top of each screenshot, you'll read: 
• who was the Drawer (Player 1 or Player 2), 
• what item the Drawer was trying to communicate, and 
• if the guess was incorrect, what the Guesser guessed. (If you don't read this, 





 Seeing what another team did may or may not help you in your game. When 







Appendix F: Publications 
In this section I include two publications:  
 
Theisen, C., Oberlander, J., & Kirby, S. (2009). Systematicity and Arbitrariness in Novel 
Communication Systems. Proceedings of CogSci 2009. 
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Human languages include vast numbers of learned, arbitrary 
signal-meaning mappings but also many complex signal-
meaning mappings that are systematically related to each 
other (i.e. not arbitrary).  Although arbitrariness and 
systematicity are clearly related, the development of the two 
in communication systems has been explored independently.  
We present an experiment in which participants invent signs 
from scratch to refer to a set of real concepts that share 
semantic features.  Through interaction, the systematic re-use 
of arbitrary elements emerges.   
Keywords: arbitrariness; systematicity; signs; language 
evolution; emergent communication 
Introduction 
Two of language’s most fascinating properties, arbitrariness 
and systematicity, characterize the nature of the mappings 
between signals and meanings. A sign is arbitrary when 
there is no inherent relationship between the signal and its 
meaning.  For example, the sounds in the word “house” 
have nothing to do with what the word means.  In contrast, 
some subsets of signs in a language are systematic, in that 
signals for similar meanings share an element.  The 
referring expressions “big house”, “red house”, “big apple”, 
and “red apple” are an example.  In language, words are 
often arbitrary while multi-word phrases are systematic.  
How does this property, the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements, emerge in communication systems? 
Recent experimental work has shown that people are able 
to successfully communicate in the absence of conventional 
communication systems, often by creating novel signs.  (de 
Ruiter et al., 2007; Galantucci, 2005; Garrod et al., 2007; 
Healey et al., 2002; Scott-Phillips, 2009).  The first signs 
people produce in these situations are often not arbitrary, 
but rather iconic or motivated in some other way.  
(Galantucci, 2005; Garrod et al., 2007)  
Psycholinguistic work has demonstrated how referring 
expressions can change during dialogue.  (Garrod & 
Doherty, 1994; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  In particular, 
conversational partners collaborate to establish definite 
references, and allowing their referring expressions to 
shorten.  (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).  This simplification 
causes iconic signs in novel communication systems to 
become more arbitrary.  (Garrod et al., 2007)  
Kirby (2001) demonstrated how, given a set of arbitrary 
signs, systematicity might evolve.  Simple artificial agents 
learn sets of signs and detect chance regularities in them 
(e.g., that the words for two red items both contain the 
syllable “ka”).  Over many generations of agents producing 
signals for new meanings (meanings they didn’t learn 
signals for) according to the regularities they observed, a set 
of signs can become systematic.  Kirby et al. (2008) 
confirmed the result in human experimental participants.   
Taking these two lines of research together, we have one 
route to the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements: people 
generate signs that are non-arbitrary, those signs become 
arbitrary as they simplify, by chance there are a few signal-
meaning regularities, generations of people propagate these 
regularities, and the language becomes systematic.  It’s this 
longer history of a communication system, from the birth of 
the first sign to a set of signs which systematically re-uses 
arbitrary elements, that the current work aims to explore. 
Goldin-Meadow et al. (1995)’s study on the emergence of 
systematicity in homesign (gestures created by deaf, non-
signing children for use with their caretakers) covers this 
range. They found that, in the early stages of the homesign 
systems, a particular value of a particular gesture component 
(such as a 1” distance between the thumb and index finger) 
was used in gestures for just one object.  In the later stages, 
the homesigners apparently collapsed some distinctions 
between objects and applied some values of gesture 
components to more than one object, increasing the 
systematicity of his or her set of gestures.  This work shows 
that systematicity doesn’t require complete arbitrariness – 
the recurrences between signal components and meaning 
components weren’t chance.  Unfortunately, we cannot 
know whether homesigners systems would have been 
systematic from the earliest stages, given similar-enough 
objects. 
Here we present an exploration of the emergence of the 
systematic re-use of arbitrary elements in one controlled 
experiment.  In this way, we can probe the relationship 






Participants  32 University of Edinburgh students 
participated in exchange for £12.  All were native British 
English speakers.  Participants who played together didn’t 
know each other. 
 
Apparatus Partners were seated in separate soundproof 
booths with computers.  The experiment was run using the 
Pigeon software (Healey et al., 2002), which presented the 
item to draw each trial and provided a shared online 
whiteboard.  Participants guessed and corrected their 
partners’ guesses in an MSN Messenger chat window. 
 
Stimuli The items were chosen to share salient semantic 
features; each item can be thought of as one of five entity 
types (such as person or building) that relates to one of ten 
themes (such as education or agriculture).  There were 26 
core items, appearing with different frequencies.  These are 
shown in Figure 1.  Additionally, there were 14 filler items, 
occurring just once per game, intended to prevent 
participants from assuming that their set of items was 
closed. The items occurred in random order.  Participants 
knew nothing about the items in advance.  In particular, 




Figure 1.   One set of signs that emerged from the experiment.  Each sign is the last occurrence of that item in the game.  
Signs are arranged according to the semantic features of the items, not by chronological order of the trials.  Italics 
distinguish which participant was the Drawer that trial.  The set is highly systematic, in that signs in many of the rows and 
columns share an element.   Also notice how arbitrary the elements have become. 
1972
Game  A team was allowed just one guess per trial.  A team 
won 1 point for every correct guess but lost 1 point for any 
incorrect guess or drawing that included a symbol or 
convention.  The goal was to win as many points as possible 
in the two hours of play.  Participants from the three top-
scoring teams were entered into a prize draw for an 
additional £20. 
 
Procedure  Each trial, one participant was the Drawer and 
other was the Guesser.  The Drawer saw an item (such as 
professor) on his screen and was allowed to draw 
immediately.  The Drawer drew with a mouse, had only 
black ink, and could not erase anything.  The Guesser saw 
everything the Drawer drew immediately, on her screen.  
The Guesser did not see the Drawer's mouse movements 
when he was not drawing, and could not draw herself.  
When she was ready, the Guesser guessed by typing into a 
chat window.  The Drawer stopped drawing immediately 
and either confirmed or corrected the guess in the chat 
window.  Players advanced themselves to the next trial. 
Every six trials, the participants switched Drawer and 
Guesser roles.  The participants played for two hours. 
Results: Systematicity 
Figure 1 shows one of the systems that emerged from this 
game.  Notice how systematic it is: the drawings in many of 
the rows and columns share an element.  For example, the 
drawings for items relating to university education (in the 
second row) each have a filled-in diamond.  As another 
example, four of the drawings for activities/situations (in the 
second column) have rows of squiggly lines.  
To enable analysis of systematicity, each set of drawings 
was printed on a page in a table, organized so that rows and 
columns contain drawings for similar items (as in Figure 1).  
A single coder examined each row and each column for any 
element shared among two or more drawings.  If there was a 
 
 
Figure 2.  One Mixed Last set of signs.  Each drawing in a row or column is the last from a different game of the experiment 
(i.e. from different pairs of players).  Notice how little systematicity the set has. 
1973
shared element, the coder marked which of the drawings in 
that row or column included it. 
There are 26 drawings and each drawing is inspected 
twice – once as a member of its row and once as a member 
of its column.  Thus, each set of drawings can receive a total 
score of 52.  The total score divided by 52 is our 
systematicity score (a percentage). 
For each of the 12 games from the experiment, we coded 
the set of First drawings (the first drawing of each item from 
that pair of participants) and the set of Last drawings (the 
last drawing of each item).  To put their systematicity scores 
in context, we constructed 12 sets each of two kinds of 
comparison sets: Mixed First and Mixed Last.  The Mixed 
First (or Last) sets were each composed of the First (or Last) 
drawings from different games of the experiment (i.e. from 
different pairs of players).  For each Mixed set, for each 
item (e.g., teacher), we choose at random which of the 
games the drawing would be from, with the restriction that 
the drawings in each row and each column would be from 
different games.  Figure 2 shows one Mixed Last set.  
The coder marked these 48 sets in random order and 
blind. 
A different coder marked three randomly chosen sets of 
each category independently.  Her scores were strongly 
correlated with those of the original coder (Spearman’s !  = 
0.82, p = 0.001). 
Figure 3A shows the mean systematicity for the Last and 
Mixed Last sets of signs.  (MLast = 42.79, SD = 18.95; 
MMixed Last = 19.39, SD = 6.32) Last sets of signs are more 
systematic than Mixed Last sets of signs.  That is, signs 
drawn at the end of the games re-use elements more than 
can be attributed to the tendency across pairs of players to 
draw these items the same way (roughly, iconicity) – they 
are truly systematic.  A Mann–Whitney U Test confirmed 




Figure 3.  Mean systematicity (%) and confidence 
intervals (confidence level = 95%) for First, Mixed First, 
Last, and Mixed Last sets of signs. Last sets are more 
systematic than Mixed Last.  First sets are more systematic 
than Mixed First. 
 
How did Last sets of signs get to be systematic?  It turns 
out that First sets of signs are also truly systematic.  Figure  
2B shows the mean systematicity for First and Mixed First 
sets of signs. (MFirst = 47.76, SD = 11.85; MMixed First = 22.28, 
SD = 11.67)   A Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that the 
First sets of signs have significantly higher systematicity 
scores than the Mixed First sets of signs (p < 0.001).  
Further, as Figure 4 illustrates, there’s a strong correlation 
between the First and Last systematicity of the sets.  
(Spearman’s !  = 0.62, p <  0.05). 
 
 
Figure 4.  Scatterplot of Last against First Systematicity 
(%).   The ranking of the First sets of signs by systematicity 
correlates with that of the corresponding Last sets of signs. 
Results: Arbitrariness 
To measure the arbitrariness of the signs produced in the 
experiment, we followed Fay et al. (2008) and had new 
participants guess what they meant.  12 University of 
Edinburgh students, all native British English speakers, 
participated in exchange for one chance in a £25 prize draw 
for each correct guess.  The experiment was run online, and 
lasted approximately 15 minutes.  Participants learned about 
the original game, and that the drawings they’d see would 
be from different games and different points in the games, 
in random order. Each trial, a participant saw a screenshot 
of the whiteboard at the end of the trial in the original game.  
He guessed the meaning of it by clicking on one of 26 
buttons, one for each possible item.  Each participant was 
presented with the First drawings of each core item from 
one randomly-assigned original game and the Last drawings 
of each core item from a different randomly-assigned 




Figure 5.  Mean identification accuracy (%) and 
confidence intervals (confidence level = 95%) for First and 
Last sets of signs.  First sets of signs are more accurately 




























































































































Figure 5 shows the mean identification rates (as 
proportions correct) for First and Last sets of signs. (MFirst = 
64.08, SD = 12.37; MLast = 45.42, SD = 6.86)  First sets of 
signs were more accurately identified than Last sets of 
signs.  A Mann–Whitney U Test confirmed this (p < 0.001).  
This suggests that the signs became more arbitrary over the 
course of the games.  
Discussion 
We’ve presented an experiment in which the systematic re-
use of arbitrary elements emerges.  Last sets of signs are 
systematic, and becoming more arbitrary. 
While previous work has explored the “evolution” of 
systematicity, this experiment has shown systematicity in 
the very first signs people use with each other.  It appears to 
simply emerge, without explicit design on the part of the 
participants, as a natural part of dialogue. 
Where does this initial systematicity come from? One 
might expect that the first time a player draws a certain item 
(say, school bus) with his partner, he draws it no 
differently than if he were drawing with a new partner.  But 
if this were the case, the First sets would have been no more 
systematic than the Mixed First sets.  Instead, when drawing 
items for the first time, players seem to have referenced 
previous drawings of related items.  Consider Figure 6, in 
which one pair’s first drawing of school bus, which 
occurred after another primary education item (teacher) 
had been drawn, is contrasted with three pairs’ first 
drawings of school bus, each of which occurred before 
any other primary education item had been drawn.  The 
former drawing for school bus includes elements found 
in the previous drawing of teacher, viz. the chalkboard 
and two children - elements not found in the other pairs’ 
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Figure 5.  One pair’s first drawings for teacher (A) 
and then school bus (B), contrasted with three other 
pairs’ first drawings for school bus (C – E). 
 
Thus, the systematicity results presented here apply not just 
to iconic reference to tangible objects, but to communication 
in general.  
A common (albeit often implicit) assumption in the 
literature is that a novel communication system will first 
become arbitrary and then develop systematicity. For 
example, Garrod et al. (2007) say they offer an account of 
the “evolution of sets of icons into sets of symbols, and of 
sets of symbols into symbol systems.”  In contrast, the 
current work suggests that proper systematicity need not 
wait for arbitrariness.   
Similarly, the current work shows that, as sets of signs 
become more arbitrary, they don’t necessarily become less 
systematic.  Structure can be retained while the elements 
become arbitrary. Garrod et al. (2007) suggested this, but 
didn’t explore systematicity directly. 
We’ve presented a paradigm that allows one to explore 
arbitrariness and systematicity in one experiment.  Future 
work should explore the many issues surrounding the 
interaction of the two properties, as well as the transmission 
to others of communication systems which make systematic 
re-use of arbitrary elements. 
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Two of language’s most fascinating properties, arbitrariness and systematicity, are 
characterizations of the mappings between signals and meanings.  Think of a language 
as a set of signs, or signal-meaning mappings, at different levels, e.g., morphemes, 
words, phrases, etc.   A sign is arbitrary when there is no inherent relationship between 
its signal and its meaning.  For example, the sounds in the word “house” have nothing 
to do with what the word means.  Rather, the signal is attached to the meaning by 
convention.  Following Peirce (1955), we can contrast arbitrary signs with icons (in 
which the signal resembles its meaning, as a sketch of an item does) and indices (in 
which the signal is directly connected to its meaning, e.g., physically or causally, as 
smoke signals fire because fire causes smoke).   
We can also consider how sets of signals relate to their meanings.  Some sets of 
signs in a language are systematic, in that signals for similar meanings share an 
element.  For example, the phrases “small house”, “expensive house”, and “red house” 
all include “house” and all refer to buildings in which people live.  In contrast, idioms 
make a language less systematic.  For example, “bought the farm” means something 
completely different from what similar signals (such as “bought the house” or “saw the 
farm”) mean.  Likewise, signals with meanings similar to “bought the farm” (such as 
“died”) bear no similarity to it. 
The “small house”, “expensive house”, and “red house” examples above 
illustrate a particular way arbitrariness and systematicity work together in language: we 
often find that words are arbitrary while multi-word phrases are systematic.   How does 
this property, the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements, emerge in a communication 
system? 
Previous Work 
Recent work has pioneered the experimental study of how communication systems 
emerge and evolve.  A fundamental result of this work is that people can find ways to 
successfully communicate in the absence of conventional communication systems, 
often by creating novel signs.  For example, de Ruiter et al. (2007) had subjects play a 
video game in which they had to cooperate in order to move their tokens into the 
correct orientation and location.  Similarly, partners in Scott-Phillips et al. (2007)’s 
game were to move to rooms of the same color, but could not see the colors of each 
other’s environments.  In both cases, although players had only the motion of their own 
tokens with which to communicate, most were eventually successful.  
The first signs people produce in these situations are usually iconic or motivated 
in some other way, i.e. not arbitrary
1
.  For example, the task of Galantucci (2005)’s 
subjects was to bring their agent into the same room as their partner.   Each of the 
rooms was marked with an icon, but partners could communicate using only a novel 
graphical channel that transformed their signals in an obscure way.   After a number of 
attempts, some subjects established signs that allowed them to win the games.  The 
signals for the rooms varied widely across the games but many had inherent 
connections to their meanings: representing the room’s location in the environment or 
the shape or the number of vertices of the room’s icon.  People can find ways to 
graphically represent even music.  Healey et al. (2007) presented a Music Drawing 
Task, in which subjects refer to short pieces of unfamiliar music with their partners.  
They can draw on a virtual whiteboard, but may not write letters or numbers.  Most of 
the signals they produce to solve the task make use of one of two strategies.  Some 
drawings consist of recognizable objects, figures, or scenes – these are iconic drawings 
of associations one might make to the pieces of music, e.g. a racecar for a piece of 
music with a fast tempo.  Other drawings represent the structure of the pieces, e.g. 
drawing a curve with peaks and valleys that match the high and low notes in the piece.  
Clearly, people can exploit a wide range of connections between signals and meanings 
to get communication systems off the ground. 
If the first signs people create are not arbitrary, how do they become arbitrary?  
Some of this new experimental work has subjects refer to the same item several times, 
giving us the opportunity to examine how a signal for a given meaning evolves.  The 
Concept Drawing Task (Garrod et al., 2007; Healey et al., 2002) is particularly 
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promising.  Each round, one of the subjects (the “Drawer”) has an ordered list of 
concepts and the other (the “Chooser”) has an unordered list of the same concepts.  The 
Drawer takes each of the concepts in turn and produces a sketch for it on virtual 
whiteboard they share, so that the Chooser can identify the concept.  Players can draw 
whatever they like but may not write anything, such as letters or numbers.  Pairs play 
for a number of blocks, so that each concept is drawn and identified several times over 
the course of the game.  Among other measures of how the signals for the items 
changed with interaction, Garrod et al. (2007) found that graphical complexity 
(roughly, the amount of virtual ink used) decreases.  They argue that this complexity is 
a measure of iconicity – all else equal, the less information there is in the signal, the 
less the signal can resemble its meaning – thus showing that signs become more 
arbitrary with interaction.  
We now see how arbitrariness can emerge in a novel communication system; 
what about systematicity?  These above studies don’t measure the degree to which 
signals for similar meanings share an element.
2
  Some provide examples of novel sets 
of signs that appear to exhibit systematicity (Galantucci, 2005; de Ruiter et al., 2007; 
Healey et al., 2007), but the recurring elements appear to be iconic.   
Garrod et al. (2007) provide an example of the systematic re-use of arbitrary 
elements: one pair’s successive drawings for “art gallery”.  Each contains three 
elements: an iconic drawing of a building, something like a “less than” symbol, and an 
iconic drawing of a painting.  They note that the building element became associated 
with all and only the institutions in the set of concepts, and describe how the building 




measure systematicity, it’s left open how common this systematicity is across pairs, and 
how early this systematicity emerges with respect to the evolution of arbitrariness.  For 
example, did the building element occur in drawings for institutions other than “art 
gallery” (say, “parliament”) while it was still very iconic?  Or did the pair change its 
drawings for the other institutions later in the game? 
Kirby (2001) simulates how systematicity can evolve.  Simple artificial agents 
learn sets of arbitrary signs.  The set of meanings and the set of signals are both highly 
structured.  The agents detect chance regularities in them (e.g., that the words for two 
red items both contain the syllable “ka”).  Over many generations of agents producing 
signals for new meanings (meanings they didn’t learn signals for) according to the 
regularities they detected, sets of signs become more systematic.  Kirby et al. (2008) 
confirmed the result in human experimental participants.  This work takes a set of 
arbitrary signs as its starting point, but we saw above that the first signs people create 
are not arbitrary.  They can become arbitrary by simplifying, but it’s not clear that the 
signals would still share elements once they did.  (Of course, the signals need to share 
elements if the language is to become systematic.)  Further, if the first signs that people 
create can be systematic (using iconic elements), it seems odd that they would become 
completely arbitrary (i.e. lose all this systematicity) and then become systematic again. 
To summarize, recent experimental work has demonstrated how novel signs can 
emerge and then evolve to become arbitrary, but does not measure systematicity.  Kirby 
(2001) and Kirby et al. (2008), on the other hand, propose a mechanism for and 
measure the evolution of systematicity, but assume an artificial stage in the evolution of 
novel sign systems.  Thus, it’s not clear how the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements 
emerges in novel communication systems.  The current work aims to fill this gap, by 
presenting an experiment in which both arbitrariness and systematicity can be probed. 
Current Approach 
We present an experiment that combines aspects from several of the above approaches 
to explore the emergence of the systematic re-use of arbitrary elements.   
Two participants are seated in separate, soundproof computer booths.  On each 
of their screens is a (blank) virtual whiteboard and a chat window, both of which they 
share.  Each trial, one is the Drawer and the other the Guesser.  The Drawer sees an 
item (such as ‘teacher”) on his screen.  His task is draw on the whiteboard with a 
mouse in order to get his partner to guess the item.  Neither the Drawer nor the Guesser 
has seen a list of the items that will appear in the game – he knows nothing about what 
other items they will eventually communicate to each other, and she must guess off the 
top of her head.  The Drawer may draw anything he likes on the whiteboard, except he 
may not use any pre-established signs (e.g., letters, arrows, a heart to represent love, 
etc.).  The Guesser sees everything the Drawer is drawing.  She has just one guess, but 
is motivated to guess quickly in order to score more points in the game.  When she’s 
ready, she types her guess into the chat window.  He stops drawing and types the item 
into the chat window (whether her guess was correct or incorrect).  Nothing but the 
guess and the actual item are allowed in the chat window.  The participants proceed to 
the next trial, with a new item chosen at random.  The participants switch Drawer and 
Guesser roles every 6 trials, so that both have a hand in creating the signs.  They play 
for 2 hours, during which time the same 26 items appear over and over again.  This 
design allows us to examine what signs the participants create for each item, as well as 
how they evolve over the course of the game.  
The task is adaptation of the Concept Drawing Task presented in Healey et al. 
(2002) and Garrod et al. (2007).  The most significant difference is in the set of items. 
Following Kirby (2001) and Kirby et al. (2008), the items share salient semantic 
features with each other.  This way, we can measure the degree to which the drawings 
for similar items (items that share a semantic feature) share an element, i.e. 
systematicity. 
We hypothesize that an increase in arbitrariness need not entail a decrease in 
systematicity.  In particular, we expect that the first signs people create will exhibit 
systematicity, but will be non-arbitrary.  With interaction, the signal elements will 
become more arbitrary, but the systematicity of the set will be retained.   
Experiment 
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24 University of Edinburgh students participated in exchange for £12.  All were native 
British English speakers.  None had a background in Linguistics (in case an awareness 
of how language works would influence the signs they created).  Participants who 
played together didn’t know each other. 
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Partners were seated in separate soundproof booths with computers.  The experiment 
was run using the Pigeon software (Healey, Swoboda, & King, 2002), which presented 
the item to draw each trial and provided a shared online whiteboard.  Participants 
guessed and corrected/confirmed their partners’ guesses in a chat window. 
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The items are listed in Figure 1. They were chosen to share salient semantic features; 
each item can be thought of as one of five entity types (such as person or building) that 
relates to one of ten themes (such as education or agriculture).   
The 26 core items (boxed in Figure 1) appeared with different frequencies to 
approximate real life, in which people communicate about some things more often than 
others.  Pilot experiments determined that participants were likely to complete at least 
126 trials during the allotted time for the game, so the frequencies of the items was 
determined for blocks of 126 trials.  Every 126 trials, each of the four items in the 
innermost box in Figure 1 appears 8 times, each item in the next box out appears 5 
times, and each item in the next box out appears 3 times. Additionally, there were filler 
items (unboxed in Figure 1), meant to stop participants from assuming that their set of 
items was closed. Every 126 trials, six of the unboxed items appear.  Each of these 
unboxed items appears at most once per game. 
The items were randomized within each block of 126 trials.  
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The experiment is meant to tell us something about how people communicate in the 
absence of conventions, but people have drawn and seen drawings before. So we 
prohibited the use of symbols and drawing conventions in the game: letters, numbers, 
punctuation (?, !, etc.), mathematical signs (+, =, <, etc.), pointing with arrows, 
universal signs (the cross for first aid, a skull and cross-bones for danger, etc.), drawing 
conventions (a heart to represent love, + over the eyes to show that someone is dead, 
teacher school teaching school bus classroom 
firefighter fire station fire-fighting fire engine  
professor university lecturing  lecture theatre 
doctor hospital medical emergency ambulance emergency room 
chef restaurant cooking  gourmet kitchen 
farmer barn farming tractor  
soldier barracks war tank  
prisoner jail crime police car  
chemist pharmacy prescription   
dentist dental practice root canal   
!
Figure 1. The items.  Boxes indicate their relative frequencies, where the items in the innermost 
box appear most frequently. 
 
etc.).   
A pair was allowed just one guess per trial.  After the Guesser guessed, the 
Drawer typed the actual item, so that both knew whether she was correct.  A team won 
1 point for every correct guess but lost 1 point for any incorrect guess or drawing that 
included a symbol or convention.  We penalized incorrect guesses to discourage too-
early guesses.  The goal was to win as many points as possible in the 2 hours of play.  
This was to encourage participants to get through as many trials as possible so that we 
had many drawings to analyze.  It also introduced a pressure to minimize production 
effort.  Participants from the three top-scoring teams were entered into a prize draw for 
an additional £20. 
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Before the experiment started, participants read instructions.  They did not see a list of 
the items they were about to communicate, nor know anything about the items. 
Each trial, one participant was the Drawer and other was the Guesser.  The 
Drawer saw an item (such as “professor”) on his screen and was allowed to draw 
immediately.  The Drawer drew with a mouse, had only black ink, and could not erase 
anything.  These restrictions were intended to limit the amount of information that the 
Drawer could encode, hopefully allowing the participants to get through more trials. 
The Guesser saw everything the Drawer drew immediately, on her screen.  The Guesser 
did not see the Drawer's mouse movements when he was not drawing, and could not 
draw herself.   
When she was ready, the Guesser guessed by typing into a chat window.  She 
was only allowed one guess.  The Drawer stopped drawing immediately and typed the 
item into the chat window, whether or not the guess was correct.  Nothing but the guess 
and the exact item were allowed in the chat window.  The chat window was sized to 
show only the previous three guesses or items, and participants were not allowed to 
scroll up to see earlier items.  Once the Guesser learned what the item was, she hit a 
Next Item button.  Both participants hit an OK button to start the next trial.  
Every six trials, the participants switched Drawer and Guesser roles.  The 
participants played for two hours. 
The instructions to the participants are included as Appendix A. 
Results: An Example Sign System 
Figure 2 shows one of the sets of signs to emerge from this game.  Each image shows 
what was drawn on the whiteboard for that item the last time it occurred in the game, 
regardless of which participant was the Drawer that trial.  Items written in italics were 
drawn by one participant, while items in the normal typeface were drawn by the other.  
The signs are arranged according to the semantic features of the items, not by the 
chronological order of the trials.  Items in the same row and items in the same column 
share a semantic feature.  For example, the first column contains this pair’s drawings 
for various people. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.] 
The first thing to notice is how systematic the set is: the drawings in many of 
the rows and columns share an element.  For example, the drawings for items relating 
to university education (in the second row) each have a filled-in diamond.  As another 
example, four of the drawings for activities/situations (in the second column) have a 
row of squiggly lines.  
Also notice how arbitrary some of the elements have become.  It is probably not 
transparent to the reader that the filled-in diamond recurring in drawings for university 
education items evolved from a drawing of a professor wearing a mortarboard.   
Results: Systematicity 
We measured the systematicity of each pair’s initial set of signs (the drawings 
produced the first time each of the items appeared in their game) and final set of signs 
(the drawings produced the last time each of the items appeared in their game), to 
determine whether systematicity emerged and, if so, when.  We hypothesize that both 
the initial sets of signs and the final sets of signs will exhibit systematicity and, further, 
that degree of systematicity will be retained from the initial sets of signs to the final. 
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Kirby (2001) and Kirby et al. (2008) measured systematicity as a Pairwise Distance 
Correlation: the correlation of the similarities between signals with the similarities 
between their meanings is calculated, and then compared with the degree of correlation 
one would expect if the signals had been randomly assigned to meanings.  RegMap 
(Tamariz & Smith, 2008) measures the degree of regularity in the mappings between 
signals and meanings without such similarity measures.  Instead, each possible 
mapping between semantic feature and signal element is considered, and the number of 
examples of the mapping is compared to the number of counterexamples.  The signals 
produced in our experiment are not necessarily composed of discrete elements, though, 
so both of these methods would require a great many human judgments.   
We adapted these measures of systematicity to our data.  In a nutshell, we 
consider each semantic feature in turn, look at the drawings for items that share that 
feature, count the number of those drawings that share an element, and sum these 
counts to get a measure of systematicity for the whole set of drawings.  We then 
compare this to the amount of systematicity we’d expect by chance. 
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One of the experimenters coded each set for systematicity.  Each set of drawings was 
printed on a page in a table, organized so that rows and columns contained drawings for 
similar items.  The coder examined each row and each column for any element shared 
among two or more drawings.  If there was a shared element, the coder marked which 
of the drawings in that row or column included it.  The coding instructions are included 
as Appendix B. 
There are 26 drawings and each drawing is inspected twice – once as a member 
of its row and once as a member of its column.  Thus, each set of drawings can receive 
a total score of 52.  The total score divided by 52 is our systematicity score. 
For each of the 12 games from the experiment, we coded the Initial sets of 
drawings (the first drawing of each item from that pair of participants) and the Final 
sets of drawings (the last drawing of each item).  To obtain a measure of baseline 
systematicity, we constructed 12 sets each of two kinds of control sets: Mixed Initial 
and Mixed Final.  The Mixed Initial sets were each composed of the initial drawings 
from different games of the experiment (i.e. from different pairs of players).  For each 
Mixed set, for each item (e.g., “teacher”), we choose at random which of the games the 
drawing would be from, with the restriction that the drawings in each row and each 
column would be from different games.  Thus we have four categories of sets of signs, 
each including 12 sets of signs:  Initial, Final, Mixed Initial, and Mixed Final. 
The coder marked these 48 sets in random order and blind, i.e. she didn’t know 
which set she was coding. 
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To check whether the experimenter’s coding was biased, a different coder – who had 
no role at all in the experiment – marked three randomly-chosen sets of each category 
(12 sets in total) independently.  Her systematicity scores were strongly correlated with 
those of the original coder (Spearman’s !  = 0.82, p = 0.001).  (The sets of 
systematicity scores failed standard tests for normality, and so non-parametric statistics 
were used here and in subsequent systematicity analyses.)  
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Figure 3 shows the mean systematicity for each of the four categories of sets of signs
3
. 
(MFinal = 42.79, SD = 18.95; MMixed Final = 19.39, SD = 6.32; MInitial = 47.76, SD = 
11.85; MMixed Initial = 22.28, SD = 11.67)  The first thing to notice is that Final sets of 
signs are more systematic than Mixed Final sets of signs (Figure 3A).  That is, signs 
drawn at the end of the games re-use elements more than can be attributed to the 
tendency across pairs of players to draw these items the same way (roughly, iconicity) 
– they are truly systematic.  A Mann–Whitney U Test confirmed this (p=0.002). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE.] 
How did Final sets of signs get to be systematic?  It turns out that Initial sets of 
signs are also truly systematic; see Figure 3B.  A Mann-Whitney U Test confirmed that 
the Initial sets of signs have significantly higher systematicity scores than the Mixed 
Initial sets of signs (p < 0.001).  Further, sets of signs didn’t become significantly more 
or less systematic over time.  A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test found no significant 
difference between the systematicity scores of Initial and Final sets of signs (p= 
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 One of the Mixed Initial sets of signs is an outlier, with a systematicity score more than 1.5 times the 
interquartile range above the third quartile for Mixed Initial sets of signs.  We chose not to exclude it 
from analysis because there appears to be no error in creation or measurement of that set; it’s simply 
unusually systematic for Mixed Initial sets of signs. 
0.2662). 
What is the relationship between a set of signs’ Initial and Final systematicity 
then?  Figure 4 is a scatterplot of each of the 12 sets’ Initial systematicity score against 
its Final systematicity score.  Clearly, there is some correlation between the Initial and 
Final systematicity of the sets.  (Spearman’s !  = 0.62, p = 0.03)  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE.] 
!"#$%&'$()($"*+(#),##(-.*
Sets of signs produced by partners in the same game are more systematic than signs 
taken from different games.  This effect of interaction is present not just at the end of 
the games but rather right from the first signs produced.   
It may seem odd that sets of signs are immediately systematic.  Recall that 
participants have no access to the list of items they will be communicating before the 
game; it’s not that participants are designing systematic sets of signs in advance.  It 
should also be emphasized that players have no direct pressure for systematicity.  Each 
pair’s goal is simply to communicate accurately and quickly.  In fact, there is virtually 
no correlation between the initial systematicity of the sets and progress in the game 
(i.e., how many trials were completed in the 2 hours) or final systematicity and 
progress.  Spearman’s ! equals 0.01 (p = 0.97) in the former case and 0.07 (p = 0.81) in 
the latter.   
One might expect that the first time one draws a certain item (say, “school bus”) 
with his partner, he would draw it no differently than if he were drawing with a new 
partner.  But most (at least 21 of the 26) initial drawings were produced after a related 
item (from either the same row or same column) had been drawn.  Perhaps players are 
referencing these previous drawings.  Figure 5A shows four pairs’ first drawings of 
“school bus”.  In each of these games, “school bus” was the first primary education to 
be drawn, so the drawings reflect what people draw for “school bus” when 
uninfluenced by previous drawings of primary education items.  In contrast, Figure 5B 
shows a fifth pair’s first drawings of “teacher” and then “school bus”.  In that game, the 
drawing of “school bus” was produced after a drawing of another primary education 
item (“teacher”) had been produced, and appears to re-use elements from it.  In 
particular, note that none of the uninfluenced drawings of “school bus” include a 
chalkboard.     
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE.] 
Results: Arbitrariness 
As in the systematicity analyses, we examined the arbitrariness of the initial signs and 
final signs from each pair.  We hypothesized that, as in Garrod et al. (2007), the 
arbitrariness of the signs had increased through interaction. 
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To measure how arbitrary the signs produced in the experiment are, we followed Fay et 
al. (2008) and had new participants guess what they meant.   
Twelve University of Edinburgh students participated in exchange for chances 
in a prize draw for a £25 Amazon gift voucher.  All were native British English 
speakers.  The corpus was sampled once across participants. A mixed design was used: 
each participant was presented with the initial drawings of each core item from one 
original game and the final drawings of each core item from a different original game.  
The participants were assigned games at random. 
The experiment was run online, and lasted approximately 15 minutes.   
Participants read about the basics of the original communication games, and learned 
that the drawings they’d see would be from different games and different points in the 
games, in random order.  Participants received an entry in the prize draw for each 
correct guess.  Each trial, a participant saw a screenshot of the whiteboard at the end of 
the trial in the original game.  He guessed the meaning of each image by clicking on 
one of 26 buttons, one for each possible item. 
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Figure 6 shows the mean identification rates (as proportions correct) for Initial and 
Final sets of signs. (MInitial = 64.08, SD = 12.37; MFinal = 45.42, SD = 6.86)  Initial sets 
of signs were more accurately identified than Final sets of signs.  A Mann–Whitney U 
Test confirmed this (p < 0.001).  (The arbitrariness scores were not normally 
distributed, so non-parametric statistics were used.)  This suggests that the signs 
became more arbitrary (i.e. their forms related less transparently to their meanings) 
over the course of the games.  
[INSERT FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE.] 
We can also compare the arbitrariness of the drawings produced by pairs who 
completed more or less trials.  There is a non-significant correlation between the 
identification accuracy of Final sets of signs and progress in the game (! = -0.35, p = 
0.26).  The correlation is negative, indicating that pairs who completed more trials in 
the game came to use more arbitrary drawings by the end of their games.  Perhaps the 
more trials a pair gets through, the more arbitrary their signs become.  Or maybe more 
arbitrary signs enable a pair of players to get through more trials (say, because they are 
quicker to produce). 
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The arbitrariness results were as predicted: signs become more arbitrary as pairs 
interact.   
Garrod et al. (2007) argued that a sign becomes more arbitrary as information is 
moved from the signal itself to the history of interaction between the communication 
partners. If simplification is the mechanism by which signs become arbitrary, then – 
since the signs produced in this experiment became arbitrary over time – we expect 
them to have simplified as well.  Preliminary observations suggest that this is indeed 
the case: Initial signs appear to be graphically more complex than Final signs. 
Final Discussion 
We have presented an experimental design in which both arbitrariness and 
systematicity can be probed.   Further, we’ve demonstrated how the systematic re-use 
of arbitrary elements can emerge in novel sign systems.  The first signs people create 
exhibit systematicity: signals for similar meanings share an element.  As 
communication partners used the signs more and more with each other, the signs 
became more arbitrary.  Yet the systematicity of the set of signs was retained. 
While previous work has explored the evolution of systematicity in 
experimenter-constructed sets of arbitrary signs, our work has shown systematicity 
simply emerging when communication partners create their own signs.  Further, the 
systematicity appears to be easily maintained.  Could research on how communication 
systems become systematic be misguided?  Perhaps we should explore instead the 
conditions under which initial systematicity is retained.   
We posited a tendency of communication partners to reference previously used 
signs when creating new ones.  What causes this?  A Drawer might reference a 
previous drawing of “teacher” in his current drawing of “school bus” because he knows 
that his partner will understand that clue.  Or the cause may be more egocentric: 
perhaps the first thing a Drawer thinks of when he sees he is to communicate “school 
bus” is how he or his partner recently communicated “teacher”.   We also suspect that 
not referencing a previous drawing of a closely-related item is somehow marked. 
Previous work demonstrated that there are many different ways a signal can 
have some inherent connection to a meaning, i.e. there are many different ways to 
successfully communicate a concept for the first time.  Here we see that an inherent 
connection between signal and meaning may be necessary only when communicating a 
concept completely unrelated to any you’ve communicated before.  Taken together, we 
see how communication in a modality less well suited to iconicity, such as speech, 
could have emerged.  Thus, the results presented here inform not just graphical 
communication, but communication in general. 
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Appendix A: Instructions to Participants  
You two are going to communicate items to each other by drawing.  You'll take 
turns being the Drawer and the Guesser. 
When you're the Drawer, you'll see an item (such as Arnold Schwarzenegger) at 
the top of your screen. You want your partner to guess exactly that.  You may NOT use 
any symbols or drawing conventions, such as: 
• letters 
• numbers 
• punctuation (?, !, etc.) 
• mathematical signs (+, =, <, etc.) 
• pointing with arrows 
• universal signs (the cross for first aid, a skull and cross-bones for danger, etc.) 
• drawing conventions (a heart to represent love, + over the eyes to show that 
someone is dead, etc.) 
Imagine your partner is an alien who has spent time on Earth but has never drawn, 
written, or read anything before. If the alien wouldn't understand it, it's not allowed! 
When you're the Guesser, as soon as you can, guess by typing into the chat 
window. You may not type anything other than your actual guess. (For example, you 
may NOT type I think it's Arnold Schwarzenegger or Arnold Schwarzenegger?)  You 
may not scroll up in your chat window to remind yourself of previous guesses.  Your 
team gets just one guess per item. 
As the Drawer, you must stop drawing immediately. Type exactly what your 
item was, and nothing else. (For example, you may NOT type Right! or You were close 
- it was Arnold Schwarzenegger.) 
Your team gets 1 point for every correct guess and loses 1 point for any 
incorrect guess or drawing that included a symbol or convention.  Your team's goal is 
to get as many points as possible in the allotted time. Subjects from the top three teams 
will be entered into a prize draw for an additional 20 GBP! 
The items are generated randomly. You may get the same item twice, even in a 
row. 
Appendix B: Instructions for Coding Systematicity 
You’re going to see sets of drawings from a communication game.  In it, pairs 
of people communicated items (such as “teacher” or “medical emergency”) to each 
other by drawing on a whiteboard. Partners played with each other for a very long time, 
drawing the same 26 items for each other over and over again. 
You’re going to see sets of drawings.  Each set contains a drawing for each of 
the 26 items (below), and represents what players were drawing at a point in time in 
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I want to know how systematic each set of signs is, i.e. to what extent drawings 
for similar items have an element in common.  Notice that the drawings in each row 
and in each column will be for similar items.  For example, the drawings in the fourth 
row of each set will be for items that relate to fire-fighting.  You’re going to look at 
each row and each column and tell me if any of the drawings in it have an element in 
common.  If so, briefly describe or draw the element and mark which of the drawings 
have it. 
Only pick out an element if you’re sure that there was a special understanding 
between the players to draw a certain thing (or things) a certain way to mean that those 
items relate to fire-fighting, that those items are buildings, etc.  
It’s completely fine if the drawings in a row or a column have nothing at all in 
common.  You may even see totally unsystematic sets of signs, in which none of the 
rows or columns have anything in common. 
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